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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VB. 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON 
J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. 




Case No. CV-02-222 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY 
MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANTS 
MiITES' "REPLY" BRIEF ON 
SECOND REMAND RE: DAMAGES 
On April 1, 2004, this Court issued its Memorandum Decision And 
Order On Reconsideration, On New Trial Issues, And Additional Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages. The Supreme Court vacated 
the award for damages becau.se such determination was intertwined with 
the question of the scope and boundaries of Defendants' easement rights. 
This Court has now determined the scope of the prescriptive easement and 
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given the parties the opportunity ~o present· argu.ment on whether such 
determination changes this Court's April 1, 2004 fmdings and conclusions 
on damages. 
II. 
AMENDED FINDINGS ON DAMAGES 
Whites argue that this Court should amend its Fjnding of Fact No. 
I. Whites argue there is no credible evidence that supports the Court's 
con,elusion that White or Mortensen trespassed on Akers property. This 
argument is unrelated to the location of the prescriptive easement. Rather, 
it is an argument that this Court this Court should reconsider its decision 
based upon the credibility of the evidence received. These arguments have 
been made to this Court ad nauseum in several motions to reconsider. For 
the same reasons this Court has cited to in response to those previous 
motions to reconsider, this argument should be discounted. 
The court's finding that the use of tracked vehicles was 
unreasonable and not done for the purpose of maintenance was supported 
by substantial and competent evidence, albeit disputed. More importantly, 
this fmding is unrelated to the location of the prescriptive easement. 
The next damage award challenge by Whites is for the $6,0000 
which included costs for repairing damage to Akers' curved approach and 
restoration to land outside the easement in an, area unrelated to the 
prescriptive easement. As cited In the In"ltial brief on :remand, there was 
ample evidence in the record that supported such damage award. Further, 
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such damage was at the opposite end of the easement from the prescriptive 
easement area. Thus, the Court's previous finding was unaffected by the 
location of the prescriptive easement on remand. 
Next, Whites claim that the Court improperly awarded Akers $1939 
for damage to his truck that took place near the west end of the easement 
(the opposite end of the easemen.t road from the prescriptive easement, 
which is located on the east end of the easement road) when Mortensen 
rammed his vehicle. Whites argue that they were engaged in lawful use of 
the easement when Akers obstructed passage of a tracked vehicle driven, by 
Mortensen. This Court has found otherwise. The tracked vehicle was 
driven up an.d down the easement with the intent of destroying and 
obliterating the existing easement road in. an attempt to widen it. Once 
again, Whites response is yet another attempt to change this Court's 
previous fmdings and the argument is unrelated to the location of the 
prescriptive easement on remand. 
III. 
TREBLE DAMAGES 
Similar to Marti's argument, Whites claim there wasn't any "no 
trespassing" sign posted in the triangle area, and therefore treble damages 
on remand is not justified. As argued in the brief flied in reply to Marti's 
argument, there is no requirement in the statute or any case law that the 
sign be posted at the point of damage. White argues that there should not 
be any trebling of damages beyond the sign~e. This argument is contrary 
to the language at),d intent of the statute which allows the signs to be 
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spaced 600' apart in order to allow for an award of damages. The 
limitation argued by White does not B.ppear in the statute or in any case 
law. 
Vv'hite also argues that Akers should not be awarded damage 
beca.use the gate post/fence were owned by him. There is no eviden.ce that 
the gate/fence post were on White's property at the time of his purchase. 
Thus, he has no ownership interest in them. Akers testified he maintained 
these items to prohibit trespassing across the easeme1'l.t road as it was 
sometimes mistaken to be a public right of way, and they had been 
installed with Peplinski's permission and assistance. HO'Wever, such fact 
does not transfer ownership of them to White. 
IV. 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
White maintains Sherrie Akers is not entitled to damages for 
emotion distress because she created the circumstances in which she 
found herself and she "brought herself into a confrontation with White or 
Whites' employee in each instance". This argument is ridiculous. Sherrie 
Akers lived on the property where the acts were occurring. The road was 
her ingress/egress to her residence. She did n.ot bring herself into the 
circumstances in which she found herself. Rather, she lived in the 
circumstances created by White and Mortensen. The emotional distress 
damages were entirely appropriate. Further, these damages were unrelated 
to the location of the prescriptive easemen.t. 
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White also claims that Sherrie Akers' distress is unrelated to them. 
and caused because she pezjured herself at trial regarding the location of 
the prescriptive easement. It is disappointin,g and disturbing to see White's 
counsel advance this unwarranted attack on Mrs. Akers. This Court 
accurately and effectively set forth the basis that it found an award of 
emotional distress for Mrs. Akers to be proper. It related to the 
inappropriate conduct of the Defendants, prior to and during trial. 
Defendant's actions exceeded the bounds of appropriate conduct, even in 
light of disputed property rig.hts and the tension of litigation. 
v. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
White maintains that this Court's award of punitive damages was 
disallowed pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in R, T. Nahas 
Co. v. Hu.let, 114 Idaho 23, 752 P.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1988). This decision, 
was issued by the Idaho Court of Appeals, wherein it recited to recent 
Idaho Supreme Court cases. In that case, the Court of Appeals entire 
holding disallowing punitive damages was: 
In the present case, we believe the record lacks 
substantial evidence that Hulet's actions were an. "extreme 
d.eviation from reasonable standards of conduct" or were the 
product of an "extremely harmful state of mind." Hulet 
arguably relled upon his water permit in diverting the 
water. Certainly Hulet was motivated by monetary gain. 
However, stancling alone this is an insufficient basis upon 
which to fiDd that the criteria for punitive damages have 
been satisfied. Furthermore I the trial court's finding of 
"oppressiveness" is not supported by the record. It is true that 
Hulet viol.ated the eventually determined water right of a 
neighbor. However, at that time the scope of Nah.as' right was 
uncertain; it was not adjudicated until the 1981 trial. All of 
the acts complained of took place before Nahas had his rights 
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adjudicated. Although we do not suggest that interference 
with unadJudicated rights never c:an satisfy the criteria 
for punitive damages, we hold that the record in this case 
fans short of showing the extreme circumstances required 
for such an award.. Compare Village of Peck v, Denison, 92 
Idaho 747, 450 P.2d 310 (1969) (pu,nitive damages properly 
awarded against defendants who threatened to disrupt village 
water supply by disconnecting water system, putting debris 
in springs, threatening to kill persons who attempt to repair 
the system, and threatening to build a feed lot near the spring 
in order to contaminate the water). Accordingly, on remand. 
the judgment must be modified to delete the award of 
punitive damages. (Emphasis added.) 
R. T. Nahas Co. v. Hulet, 114 Idaho at 29. 
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In the present case, the reliance on a claimed easement right does 
not stand alone. As this Court noted in. its memorandum decision, and as 
Plain,tiffs more fully point out in their reply to Marti's opposition brief, 
Defendants did much more than rely on their easement rights. They 
disregarded a court injunction. They disregarded county ordinances. 
There were threats of physical violence against Plaintiffs. There were acts 
where Defendants tried to incite Plaintiffs to engage in physical violence. 
There was purposeful damage to property not necessitated by maintenance 
of the easement. There was an attempt to manipulate the county 
prosecutor. There was intimidation of witnesses during trial. This conduct 
meets all of the criteria of being oppressive, malicious and outrageous and 
takes this litigation outside the normal parameters of a normal easement 
dispute. The location of the prescriptive easement changes none of the 
Court's review of this conduct. Thus, the punitive damages should be 
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rein,sta,ted on remand. 
DATED this 25th day of January, 2011. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Sushli P. Weeks 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 25111. day of January: 2011, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below. and 
addressed to the following: 
0 U.S. Mai] 
0 Hand Delivered 
Vernon.T. Mortensen 
P.O. Box 1922 
Bonners Ferry. ID 83805 
0 U.S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivered 
Robert Covington 
8884 N. Government Way, Ste. A 
Hayden Lake, ID 83835 
Fax: (208) 762·4546 
Dustin Dejssner 
Van Camp & Deissner 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Fax: (509) 326-6978 
GJ/ Electronic Mail 
cY Teleco,Py (FAX) 
0 Ovem.ight Mail 
g/ TeJecopy (FAX) 
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ROBERT E. COVINGTON 
Attorney at Law 
8884 North Government Way, Suite A 
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COMES NOW Mike Hathaway, being duly sworn, on oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. That I have personal knowledge of and am competent to testify under oath to the facts 
hereinafter set forth. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MIKE HATHAWAY 1 
2. That I am the Survey Manager of Welch Comer Engineers of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. 
3. This affidavit is intended as a supplement to my affidavit in this proceeding that was 
dated June 30, 2010. 
4. In the previous affidavit I referenced a high resolution version of Exhibit B-1 thereto 
that as of June 30,2010 I had ordered from the USGS/EROS center but not then 
received. Attached hereto as Exhibit B-2 is a magnification of the relevant portion of 
the high resolution version of Exhibit B depicting the same area as depicted in Exhibit 
B-1 showing the location of the easement road in 1982. 
Dated this 25th day of January, 2011. __ ~_1~_ 
Mike Hathaway 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public for the State of 
Idaho on January 25, 2011. 
SHARIE MacDONALD ~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
~~14-~-Residing at: ___ ~~ ___ _ 
Commission Expires:JJ.t.L~LlLL_ 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MIKE HA THA WAY 2 
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of January, 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by facsimile 
transmission to Deissner, hand delivery to Leander James and mail to 
Mortensen: 
Leander James 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax: 208-664-1684 
And by mail to: 
Vernon J. Mortensen 
PO Box 330 
Naples,ID 83847 
Dustin Deissner 
Van Camp & Deissner 
1707 W. Broadway Avenue 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Fax: 509-326-6978 
Robert Covington 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MIKE HATHA WA Y 3 
USGS AERIAL IMAGE 
DATED 6-23-82 
226-150 471608 10 NUMBER 
MAP IS NOT TO SCALE 
1 DEsiGNE·o·By:······ .... ···· .............. · 
1·oRAwN·By·: .......................... ·TJF 
....................................................... 
: DWG NAME: WHITE-EX : .................................................... . 
: DATE: 7-12-2010 : .................................................... . 
: SHEET NO: 1 
WELt:H-'" COM 
www.welchcomer.com 
350 E. Kathleen Ave. 
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83815 
208-664-9382 
(toll free) 877 -815-5672 
(fax) 208-664-5946 
COPYRIGHT 2010 
• Welch-Comer & Associates, Inc. 
: This document, and ideas and designs : 
: incorporated herein, as an instrument : 
: of professional service, is the property : 
: of Welch-Comer & Associates, Inc. , : 
: and is not to be used in whole or in : 
: part for any other project without the : 
: written authorization of Welch-Comer : 
1 & Associates, Inc. l 
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FAX: (208) 664-1684 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS. husband and 'Afife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
D. 1. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, lNC.; 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. 
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN. 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-02-222 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT .AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA W AND 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
ON NEW TRIAL ISSUES AND 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
REGARDING DAMAGES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs by and through their attorney of record here by file this 
Memorandum in Response to Defendant Vernon J. Mortensen's to Correct 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion for Reconsideration on 
New Trial Issues and Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Damages. Although it is difficult to work through Mortensen's 
motion given the format and incorrect cites to the record, Mortensen raises one 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN'S 
MOTION TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON NEW TRIAL ISSUES AND ADDITIONAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF it! ~gARDING DAMAGES: 1 
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valid point where a correction is needed in the additional findings flied April 1, 
2004. Other than one minor point, Mortensens' motion is without merit. 
II. FINDINGS OF FACT 
Turning to the specifics of the requested changes, Mortensen first cites to 
the Court's conclusions of law regarding damages, and challenges the Court's 
conclusion that: tlThis is not the first time Mortensen has bought property low, 
sold quickly for a marked increase, then found himself in litigation because of a 
lack of access to that property." The Courfs conclusion is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence in the record. The court received 
testimony that Mortensen was in another access conflict over an easement road 
leading to parcels where it was alleged there were illegal splits (subdivisions) 
and that Mortensen was still selling parcels knowing there was a dispute about 
access Tr. Vol. II, p. 1423, 11. 13-25, 1424-1434; J.435,1l. 1·5. In tria17 
Mortensen did not deny he ha.d been involved in other land disputes in 
litigation Tr. Vol. I, p. 208, 11. 12-20. Mortensen's own surveying expert, Alan 
Kiebert, testified he had worked with Mortensen on 6 projects wherein 
Mortensen had sold lots without surveys against Kiebert's advice Tr. Vol. I) p. 
1764, 11. 20-25; pp. 1765-1768, p. 1769, 11. 1-16. Further, Morten,sen 
acknowledged he bought the current property at below market value because 
he knew there was a dispute regarding the scope of the ea.sement rights of the 
party. Te. Vol I, p. 242, 11. 3-8. 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN'S 
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Mortensen takes exception to the Court's Additional Finding of Fact No. 
31. The court cited the trial transcript and the testimony supports the finding. 
Mortensen's main objection is that the Court did not find his testimony 
credible. It is the Court's prerogative to determine which testimony was 
credible. Although the evidence is disputed, the Court's finding is supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. 
Mortensen also discusses the Court's Finding of Fact No.4. The Court 
correctly notes that the Mortensen claims he never requested pernrission to use 
the curved approach and Dennis Akers maintains that he gave Mortensen 
permission the first time they discussed the matter. This summary of the 
evidence is correct. Akers did testify he gave permission to Mortensen the first 
time they met when Dennis blocking the curved approach and Mortensen 
asked him to move his vehicle. Tr. Vol 1, p. 612, 11. 3-25; 613, 11. 1-20. 
Mortensen gives the same account of meeting Akers. Tr. Vol I, p. 948, 11. 7-25, 
p. 949, 11. -1-23. The only difference in the stories is Akers testified he gave 
Mortensen permission to use the curved approach. Tr. Vol I, p. 5561 n. 11-25; 
p. 557, 11. 1-7; 1267,11. 22-25; p. 1269, 11. 1-5. 
The court does incorrectly find that the first meeting occurred as a result 
of Mortensen placing a card in Akers' door. This finding is incorrect. The card 
was placed in the door by Mr. White. Tr. Vol I, p. 560, 11. 8-25; 561, 11. 1-5. 
However, this minor error does not change the court's ultimate rmding. 
The issue is still one of credibility. Morten,sen testified that he reviewed the 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN'S 
MOTION TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
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Peplinski litigation many times. Tr. Vol I, p. 213, 11. 12-21. The Peplinski 
litigation was a settled with acceptance of offer of judgment in October after 
Mortensen purchased wherein Akers granted a permission to Peplinski to use 
the curved section. Tr. Vol I, p. 978, 11. 16-25; 979-984. Since Mortensen, was 
familiar with the litigation, it is likely Mortensen knew Peplinski understood the 
use of the curved approach was a permissive one and accepted an offer to 
settle where he was granted permission to use the curved approach. 
Mortensen seems to believe that because there was a lapse of several 
months before he first encountered Akers that his use was not permissive. 
However, the fact that Akers did not know that the parcel was sold to Akers 
does not shed any light on the issue of permissive use. Akers testified that the 
first tim.e he met Mortensen he told him that he would give him permission to 
use of the curved approach. Given the timing and topic of the litigation to Mr. 
Akers encounter with Mr. Mortensen, it is more credible to believe that Akers 
discussed this subject with Mortensen than to believe Mortensen that Akers 
never mentioned it to him. 
This finding is even more probable given the fact that years later, 
Mortensen's purchaser, White, felt it necessary to approach Akers and discuss 
the curved approach. If Mortensen believed the curved approach was part of 
the original easement, there would be no reason to discuss any potential issues 
with White. Whatever information was exchanged, it was enough to cause 
White to approach Akers and request a discussion regarding use of the curved 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN'S 
MOTION TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON NEW TRlAL ISSUES AND ADDITIONAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS qfj ~cttEGARDING DAMAGES: 4 
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approach. Thus, it a reasonable inference that Mortensen told White 
something that lead White to believe he needed to come to an accord with 
Akers about use of the curved approach. 
Mortensen also challenges the Court's finding that his use of the road 
was rare. Mortensen bases this on testimony of Akers that Mortensen ran 
heavy equipment on the property frequently. This testimony doesn't address 
the frequency of the use of the road, especially when, the Court heard 
(controverted) testimony that Mortensen used the back way for bringing in 
equipment. Regarding frequency of use of the road, Bill Reynolds testified that 
Mortensen used the land for agricultural purposes and sight seeing and didn't 
use it frequently Tr. Vol I, p. 66, 11. 22-25; 67, 68, 11. 1-22. 
Mortensen also points out in paragraph 2 of Finding No. 31 that the 
Court transposed his name for White's name. The testimony of Sherrie Akers 
was that at the time that White was purchasing the property, she received a 
telephone call from Stewart Title calling on behalf of Mortensen wanting to 
know if Akers would be willing to quitclaim an easement to Mortensen. Tr. Vol 
I, p, 413, 11. 23-25; p. 414; p. 415, 11. 1-17. Mortensen claim this minor error 
proves the Coures entire fmdings and conclusions are in error and shows an 
indulgence to Akers. Actually, if anyone were to benefit from this error, it 
would be White. 
Mortensen claims the prejudice to him of the above errors establishes 
that n.owhere in the trial transcript is a time or place or event established when 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN1S 
MOTION TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF I.,A W AND 
MOnON FOR RECONSIDERATION ON NEW TRIAL ISSUES AND ADDITIONAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS ~~ w.~GARDING DAMAGES: 5 
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Akers gave Mortensen permission to use the curved approach. This statement 
is not true. As indicated above, with transcript citations, Akers testified that 
when he first met Mortensen in person, which encounter occurred when 
Mortensen requested Akers move his vehicle that was blocking the easement, 
Akers told Mortensen he was giving him permission to use the curved 
approach. 
Mortensen also claims that no one testified he excavated on the property. 
This statement is not true. Shaun Montee, the contracted excavator, informed 
Bill Reynolds that he was hired by White and Mortensen to excavate the upper 
road. Tr Vol I, p. 88, 11. 9-25; p. 89, 11. 1-20. 
Mortensen also claims the court erred in finding there was excavation on 
Akers property. Mortensen's citation to the transcript is not in context. At that 
point in testimony, the parties were discussing excavation on White's property 
leading to water trespass on Akers property. However, Akers was not testifying 
that no excavation had occurred on his property. Akers testified that the 
excavation of the upper road took a little bit off the top of his property. Tr. Vol 
III, p. 1201, 11. 1-5. 
Mortensen also claims the court erred in Findings of Fact No. 37 that 
White and Mortensen entered into a business relationship. Mortensen 
characterized himself as a speculator who improved roads as part of his 
endeavors, but didn't build houses. Tr. Vol I, p. 205, n. 4-25. Mortensen 
testified that "we" dumped fill dirt (in the triangle area). Tr. Vol I, p. 253,11. 24-
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO JERRY MORTENSEN'S 
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25; p. 254, 11. 1·20. Mortensen operated the caterpillar that spread the dirt. 
Tr. Vol I, p. 254, 1. 25, 255, 256, 11. 1·22. Mortensen testified that the work he 
and White did complied with the court's injunction order. Tr. Vol I, p. 265, 11. 
5"23. He and White did work on upper end of road on White's land. 
Mortensen claimed he was working with White with his Cat in easement area. 
Tr. Vol I, p. 285, 11. 7-22. It was a reasonable inference for the Court to fInd 
White and Mortensen were in a business relationship together. Otherwise, 
Mortensen would have had no reason to be involved with White in the acts that 
occurred on the easement. 
Mortensen also claims that the trial tra.nscript does not support 
Mortensen's involvement with any other alleged dama.ges to Akers property. 
Bill Reynolds testified they dumped dirt in the triangle area, moved fill on Akers 
curved approach and covered part of it, dozed the gate out, tore out a fence 
post, busted up the oil finish on the road,. Tr. Vol I~ p. 96, 11. 7-25; pp. 97 -
114i p. 123, 11. 1-9. Mortensen acknowledged he pulled the fence post and 
knocked down the gate. Pulled a gate post, cut the lock on the gate and took 
out the gate after cutting the lock. Tr Vol. I, p. 278, 11. 16-25; p. 279, 11. 1-10. 
Reynolds testified Mortensen damaged Akers fence with his truck. Mortensen 
damaged the fence with his truck. Vol I, p. 118, 11. 21-025; p. 119; p. 12011. 1-
6. 
Mortensen claims this Court erred in finding that his damage to Akers 
fence with his truck occurred when he intentionally drove into the fence. Trial 
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testimony established that Mortensen intentionally drove around a vehicle 
parked on the curve approach. Reynolds characterized this action as a 
misjudgment because one could plainly see there wasn't room to go around the 
truck blocking the curved approach and the other way was open. Tr. Vol I, p. 
177, 11. 4-25, p. 178, 11. 1-15. Mortensen also claimed it was a misjudgment 
and that he took this action to keep the peace. Mortensen never explained how 
using the blocked curved approach when the other easement route was open 
served the purpose of keeping things calm. Tr Vol I, p. 298, 11. 22-25; p. 299, 
ll. 1-8; p. 306, 11. 19-25, p. 307,11. 1-2. 
Mortensen also claims Finding of Fact No. 38 is incorrect in summarizing 
Scott Rasor's testimony in conjunction with Exhibit 74 (subdivision ordinance). 
Tr Vol I, p. 458, 11. 20·25; p. 459-461, 462, 11. 1-4. Mr. Rasor also testified the 
road did not comply with the county's road approach ordinance. Tr Vol I, p. 
455, n. 8-25, p. 456-457; p. 458, 11. 1-19. 
On Finding No. 44, Mortensen again claims there is no evidence he 
damaged Akers property. The excavation, dumping and spreading of dirt, 
damage to fence, gate and lock have been discussed previously. The tree 
damage was supported in the record. Tr Vol II, p. 1302, 11. 2-25. 
On Finding No. 45, Mortensen's argument that he was not caught in 
ex.cavating without the proper permits in place is only persuasive if one 
disregards the statement of Mortensen's agent, Shaun Montee, that he was 
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excavating on behalf of White and Mortensen. However, the evidence is that he 
was working for Mortensen; therefore this finding is supported by the record. 
Mortensen also argues that finding number 47 is error that Mortensen 
willfully trespassed and willfully damaged plaintiff's property. The record 
supports these fmdings. The damage claims have been briefed to this court in 
this brief and in the damage brief on remand previously submitted. Mortensen 
was aware that Akers claimed that the use of the curved approach was 
permissive. They were aware Akers claimed title to the disputed triangle area. 
Despite this awareness, Mortensen chose to move fo:rvvard with his activities 
with full knowledge of the claim that he was exceeding his easement rights. 
B'urther, Bill Reynolds did not testify he did not think Mortensen was acting 
intentionally. In fact, Reynolds testified he inquired of Mortensen why he was 
dumping dirt allover the triangle area, and Mortensen replied that Mortensen 
was dumping dirt in disputed triangle to force the matter to go to court. Tr Vol 
I, p. 162, 11. 20-25, p. 163, n. 1~3, 
Mortensen also claims that Finding No. 48 is wrong in its entirety. It is 
not wrong in its entirety. However, it is incorrect regarding Defendant's 
prescriptive easement rights and this court has amended this finding on the 
second remand. 
Mortensen claims Finding No. 49 is wrong. It is not. Kootenai County 
issued two ('stop work" order on this project. 
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Mortensen also claims that Finding No. 50 is wrong because it 
mischaracterizes Rasor's testimony. It does not. Tr. Vol I, p. 540, 11. 2-25; p. 
541, p. 541,11. 1-11. 
Mortensen claims that there is no evidence to support Finding No. 51 
that he violated any cou.nty ordinance. As previously discussed in this brief, 
the trial court received such testimony. 
Mortensen contends there is no evidence to support Finding No. 52 that 
defendant willfu.lly engaged in the activities discussed in the findin,gs because 
he was in Mexico. The evidence is replete with evidence that Mortensen was 
involved in the activities discussed by the trial court. In fact, even in this brief 1 
Mortensen acknowledges he drove into Akers fen,ce. It is hard to fathom how 
he did so while in Mexico. 
Mortensen claims that there is no evidence to support Finding No. 53 
that he attempted to widen the road or reduce the grade. As discussed 
previously, there was ample evidence that Morten.sen and White both worked 
together to achieve these results. There is certainly no evidence that 
Mortensen tried to keep the road in the condition in which it had always been 
kept. 
Mortensen's claim that Finding No. 54 is incorrect is again refuted by the 
evidence previously submitted herein. There is evidence Mortensen attempted 
to wide the approach without obtaining an approach permit as required by law. 
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Mortensen takes exception to Finding No. 56 and 57 that Akers have 
exclusively maintained the easement. Mortensen basically argues the court 
must accept his uncorroborated testimony. It does not have to do so and such 
testimony was not credible. 
Mortensen challenges Finding No. 58 claiming only White was 
respon.sible for the excavation that caused water damage. However, as noted 
earlier, the excavator was working for White and Mortensen jointly. 
Mortensens claim that Finding No. 60 is not supported by eviden.ce is 
incorrect. There is a plethora of evidence that defendants interfered with use of 
the curved approach and driveway as discussed previously. 
The conclusions of the court, other than those related to the existence 
and scope of the prescriptive easement, are supported by the above findings. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial cou,rt should grant Mortensen's 
motion to correct the findings to change the two mistakes as noted above 
(correcting the finding regarding the circumstances of Akers conversation with 
Mortensen when permission was granted to use the cUIVed approach and 
correcting the portion regarding White leaving the card in Akers' door). Other 
than these two minor changes, all other findings and conclusions should 
remain the same, except as modified by subsequent findings and conclusions 
entered by the court on previous motions to reconsider and amendments and 
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findings made on remand. 
DATED this 11th day of February, 2010. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
By ~ if ffecL 
Susan P. Weeks 
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1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE 1. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
DA VID 1. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. 
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, 
husband an.d wife~ 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-02-222 
POST·HEARING MEMORANDUM 
RE:WHITE'S MOTION TO ADMIT 
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE RE: 
EASEMENT LOCATION 
For a second time, White moves this court to allow it to admit addjtional evidence in this 
matter to admit newly discovered evidence. This motion was filed on June 30, 2010, after the 
briefing on remand was completed, and one day before the oral argument on remand. Akers 
objected at the hearing to White's referring to this additional evidence at hearing. This motion 
was never calendared for oral argum.ent. White's requested that it be heard at the hearing for 
dam.a.ges even though a notice of hearing was never give:n of the motion. Akers agreed to have 
the motion heard as long as they were allowed to file a post~heat'ing brief in opposition to the 
motion. The following is Akers' post-hearing brief opposing White's motion to allow the 
admission of additional evidence consisting of a 1975 aerial photograph from the USGS EROS 
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database depicting the roadway in question and a 1982 aerial photograph from the USGS EROS 
database. While Akers do not believe these photographs add much in. the way of assistance to 
the 
In their motion, White's rely on 1.R.C.P. 11(a)(2) and 59(a)(4) for the basis of admitting 
the maps. Neither of these rules authorizes the admission of the maps into evidence at the close 
of the case. Rule 11 (a)(2) allows the court to reconsider a decision it has made. It does not 
allow for the post trial submission of additio.nal evidence. 
Rule 59(a)( 4) allows the court to order a new trial when a party has "newly discovered 
evidence, material for the party making the applicati.on, which the party could not, with 
reasonable diJigence, have discovered and produced at the tria1." Akers oqjects to the court 
ordering a new trial in this matter. The evidence submitted is from a governmental source. It 
could have been discovered at any time before or during the trial of this matter. White presents 
no argument to this Court why he could not have discovered and produced this evidence at trial. 
To the extent that White's request is a motion for a new trial, Akers' object to it. 
White also cite to case law as authority for the submission of the additional evidence after 
trial. Defendants cite to Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 952 (1961). In this case, an 
easement case was remanded to the trial cow1 to set forth with precision and particularity, th.e 
origin, course and din1ension, on the ground, of the area affected by a prescriptive easement that 
had been established. The Supreme Court granted the trial court on remand the right to take 
further testimony respecting the origin, course and dimension. on the ground, of the easement 
that had been established. Later, in County o/Bonner VS. Dyer. 92 Idaho 699,448 P.2d 986 
(1968) the Supreme Court, citing to the Sinnett case, held that reopening or refusing to reopen a 
trial for the purpose of hearing furtJler evidence on a particular issue is within the sound 
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discretion of the trial court. In the present case, White has not requested the court to re-open the 
trial. Rather, it has asked the court to include in its consideration two aerial photographs that it 
claims are clearer than. those presented at trial with a.en.al depictions. While the image m.ay be 
sharper, they really do not assist the Court in determining where the road lay with respect to the 
property boundaries of each parcel. 
It is in. the discretion of this court whether to accept these photographs to assist it in 
locating the easement. From Akers perspective, the issu.e is rather moot at this point as the Court 
already considered and discussed White's addition.al evidence in its opinion on remand. 
DATED this 16th day of February, 2010. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
~ 
1"''1 
By ~~-- if &71..., 
Sus ... Weeks 
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Akers argue that the Idaho rules of procedure create an obstacle in allowing the 
admission of new evidence. The Supreme Court however does not approve of 
rules being applied rigidly at the cost of practicality and justice. 
On their second appeal, Mortensens brought up the issue that Judge Mitchell had 
not complied with L.R.C.P. S2(a). Below the Idaho Supreme Court clarifies its 
attitude when balancing rules with practicality and justice. 
~The court issued a written memorandum decision that did not expressly state 
that the decision constituted its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neither 
did the district court adopt the memorandum decision as its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law by order. Accordingly/ the Order on Remand did not comply 
with requirements of L.R.CP. 52(a) However/ this conclusion does not end our 
inquiry." 
The Idaho Supreme Court then expressed the need for sensibility, and flexibility 
while dealing with rules: 
"/d. at 292. 723 P.2d at 836. This conclusion is completely consistent with the 
admonition that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Nshall be liberally construed to 
secure the just/ speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding. H I.R. CP. l(a). Although we expect the trial courts of this state to 
comply with our rules of procedure/ the interests identified in I.R. CP. l(a) would 
not be served if we were to rigidly interpret I.R.CP. 52(a). 
The Idaho Supreme Court's message above advocates applying rules liberally to 
provide for a "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding." 
In line with what the Supreme Court expressed it follows that drawing on 
evidence advantageous to a correct decision would be proper and sensible. Clear 
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and abundant evidence adds to the probability that a Court's determination will 
be "just". And arriving at just determinations makes for speedy and inexpensive 
litigation by avoiding costly appeals. 
Akers argue that, "While the image of the Aerial at issue may be sharper, they 
really do not assist the court in determining where the road lay with respect to 
the property boundaries of each parcel. " 
However the Supreme Court believed the aerial photos were very important in 
determining the location of the easement road. The Supreme Court relied on the 
aerials in conjunction with Richard Peplinskis testimony in arriving at their 
conclusions. On the other hand Razors' survey representation of where the road 
was in 2002 in section 24 is insignificant to where it was in the year 1966 or even 
in 2001. When Razor did his survey, David White had already lowered his 
property immediately crossing the section 24 line thus allowing a more southerly 
turn than had been possible at earlier times. The Supreme Court stated the 
aerials available matched Richard Peplinskis testimony that the road extended in 
to Akers property a considerable distance before veering southerly and then 
tracing a curve similar to "a shepherd's crook". Clearer images definitely help 
define where the road actually was during the critical time the easement was 
established. Razors' survey is irrelevant. It was made after White had changed 
the lay of the land where Razor determined the road should be. 
This Court should also keep in mind that Akers provided this Court with false 
testimony claiming the road turned south at a 90 degree angle before entering 
their property in section 24 thus robbing Mortensens and Whites of their legal 
rightful easement and forcing costly appeals. True to their nature Aker continue 
to represent the easement road veering southerly prematurely after entering 
their property in section 24 instead of continuing in a straight line for a 
considerable distance in line with Richard Peplinskis testimony and the aerial 
photo Whites seek to have entered into evidence. The Aerial photos and 
testimony of those who used the road when Peplinskis owed the property before 
Akers arrived are the foundations of determining the exact route. Razor could 
have claimed the road was anywhere he wanted it to be when he surveyed in 
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section 24 because all of the property south of where the road is depicted in the 
new aerial photos was excavated and compacted with trucks and an excavator. 
Akers contend that this Aerial is just like others this Court has in evidence, just a 
little clearer. If that is the case then why do they resist having it entered into 
evidence? By stipulating to having it entered into evidence Akers would be 
saying, "We just want the easement road to be where it has a legal right to be./I 
This could have some redeeming benefit for the false testimony they provided 
regarding the location of the easement and thus prolonged this case into a ten 
year disaster. 
Akers argue that White could have gotten this aerial photo earlier; he should have 
known where to look. It was always there. That is like telling Columbus he should 
have discovered America earlier; he should have known where to look; it was 
always there. The same argument applies to Akers. Why didn't they provide the 
aerial at an earlier date; after all the purpose of the trial was to establish the 
truth? All parties had an equal obligation to provide the best information 
available to the court unless there is a prevailing opinion that the purpose of the 
court is not to establish the truth but to deceive. 
It would appear that at this stage of a ten year lawsuit prolonged by false 
information and errors, it would be in the best interest of all to get the facts right 
and a correct ruling. 
Akers state as follows. "It is in the discretion of this court whether to accept 
these photographs to assist it in locating the easement. From Akers perspective, 
the issue is rather moot at this point as the Court already considered and 
discussed White's additional evidence in its opinion on remand./I 
The question should be asked, If Akers are so certain that this new evidence 
makes no difference, then why are they fighting it. 
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Dated this 18th day of February, 2011 
Vernon Jerr( ort0sen Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Vernon J. Mortensen certifies: 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document by the methods indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, 10 83814 
Fax 208 664 1684 and Electronic Mail 
Robert Covington 
8884 N. Government Way, Stc. A 
Hayden Lake 10 83835 
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Fax 208 762 4546 and Electronic Mail 
Van Camp and Deissner 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Fax 5093266978 and Electronic Mail 
Dated,-)~Ld-I g 20/1 
. I 
Vernon J. Mortensen 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. ) 




D.L. WHITE CONST., INC., DAVID L. WHITE ) 
and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and wife; ) 
and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. ) 
MORTENSEN, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 
Case No. CV2002222 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON REMAND 
RE: DAMAGES, and ORDER 
DENYING WHITES' MOTION FOR 
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON 
EASEMENT LOCATION 
The present issue before this Court is the issue of damages, if any, to the plaintiffs, on 
remand from the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. Akers v. Mortensen and White, 147 Idaho 39, 
205 P.3d 1175 (2009). The previous award of damages, trespass damages, damages for 
emotional distress and punitive damages, was vacated as "the question of damages flowing from 
Appellants' [Mortensens' and Whites'] conduct is inseparable from consideration of Appellants' 
easement rights." 147 Idaho 39, 48-49, 205 P.3d 1175, 1184-85. 
On September 29, 2010, this Court issued its "Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement Location." At the end of that 21-one page decision, 
this Court concluded: 
Based on the above, the location of the prescriptive easement across Akers' 
Parcel B land is as shown in Exhibit 6 and 7. Akers have proven such by a 
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Page I 
preponderance of the evidence, even though Akers did not have the burden of proof. 
Whites and Mortensens have not proved any contrary location by a preponderance 
of the evidence when they had the burden of proof. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the prescriptive easement in favor of Whites 
and Mortensens across Akers' Parcel B land is as shown in Exhibit 6 and 7, and as 
described in Exhibit C to the Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand Regarding 
Location of Easement. Exhibit C to the Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand 
Regarding Location of Easement is attached hereto. That easement is 12.2 feet 
wide. 
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement 
Location, pp. 20-21. The following procedural history is taken directly from that decision: 
This action is before the Court on remand a second time from the Idaho 
Supreme Court. The purpose of this remand is to determine the location of the 
prescriptive easement as it enters Akers' Parcel B land and turns south onto the 
property owned by Whites and Mortensens. 
To orient the reader, the land at issue has as its axis the quarter comers of 
Section 19 and 24, in Kootenai County. The Akers own the land to the north in two 
parcels: "Government Lot 2" to the east, which is in Section 19; and "Parcel B", the 
adjacent parcel to the west of Government Lot 2. All of Parcel B is in Section 24. 
Immediately to the south of Akers' Government Lot 2 is land owned by Reynolds, 
not a party to this litigation. Immediately to the south of Akers' Parcel B land is 
land purchased by defendants Whites and Mortensens. This litigation concerns 
Whites and Mortensens rights to use a roadway that connects White and 
Mortensens' property to Millsap Loop Road. That roadway crosses Akers' property 
at the southern edge of Akers' Government Lot 2 near, at or over the northern 
boundary of Reynolds' land. It is the exact location of the road as it enters into 
Akers' Parcel B that is the subject ofthis remand, specifically, the exact location of 
the road as it existed in that area between 1966 and 1980, for prescriptive purposes. 
The Court trial in this matter took place over fourteen days of trial testimony 
and occurred from September 2002 to May 2004. On January 2, 2003, this Court 
filed its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order." Later, the issue of 
damages was tried to the Court, and on April 1,2004, this Court filed its 
"Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues and 
Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages, and Order." 
Defendants appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. On December 30,2005, the 
Idaho Supreme Court filed its first decision in this case. Akers v. D. L. White 
Construction, Inc., et aI., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005). 
In that opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed this Court's findings as to 
the triangle area to the east. 142 Idaho 293, 299-300, 127 P.3d 196,202-03. The 
Idaho Supreme Court reversed this Court's findings regarding an implied easement 
from prior use (142 Idaho 293, 301-02, 127 P.3d 196, 204-05) and easement by 
prescription. 142 Idaho 293, 303-04, 127 P.3d 196,206-07. The Idaho Supreme 
Court affirmed this Court's finding that the express easement defendants had over 
plaintiffs' land was 12.2 feet in width in 1966, but expressed no opinion as to the 
width or scope of any possible easement by prescription or implied from prior use, 
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leaving that issue to be resolved by this Court on remand. 142 Idaho 293,304, 127 
P.3d 196,207. This Court was also instructed to revisit the trespass and damages 
issue after determining easement rights. 142 Idaho 293, 304-05, 127 P.3d 196,207-
08. 
After the remittitur was issued by the Idaho Supreme Court, this Court held 
a hearing on April 19,2006, wherein a briefing scheduled was issued. Additional 
briefing was filed and oral argument based upon that additional briefing was 
scheduled for June 22,2006. On June 22, 2006, counsel appeared for oral 
argument. On September 7,2006, this Court issued its "Order on Remand." At that 
time this Court held: 
IT IS ORDERED defendants have an easement by 
prescription, but not over the portion of Akers' property they 
excavated. The easement by prescription is as established prior to 
1980, and that is a 12.2 foot wide strip located just inside the 
northeast comer of defendants' land, turning south immediately west 
of the west boundary of Government Lot 2 (where the express 
easement ends) and the east boundary of Parcel B. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendants have no implied 
easement by necessity. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendants are responsible 
for damages as previously set forth in the Memorandum Decision 
and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order filed April 1,2004, pp. 12-29. The prescriptive easement does 
not expand the express easement, and the prescriptive easement over 
Akers' land in Parcel B is in a slightly different location than 
defendants' excavated on that parcel. Additionally, defendants 
placed fill from their excavation on Akers' Parcel B. Accordingly, 
even with the finding of an easement by prescription, all previous 
findings regarding damages remain. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Akers are the prevailing 
party, entitled to costs as proven at a later hearing. 
Order on Remand, p. 19. Specifically, this Court found the location of the pertinent 
portion of the easement to be as follows: 
An alternative reason Akers claim defendants fail on their 
claim for an easement by necessity is that at the relevant time period, 
1966, the road to which they seek to establish an easement by 
necessity upon did not exist, at least not on Akers' land in Parcel B 
in the same location upon which defendants have excavated in recent 
times. As Akers point out, the road did not exist into Parcel B back 
in 1966. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 3-4. Instead, the 
road went on to Reynold's land in 1966, and Reynolds is not a party 
to this litigation. According to Reynolds, the road was established in 
this century by defendant David White. Tr. Vol. I, p. 84, L. 16 - p. 
85, L. 24. Reynold's testimony is corroborated by some of the 
exhibits. Exhibit 11 and J1 do not show this road along any part of 
Parcel B back in 1951 and 1958 respectively. Reynold's testimony 
is corroborated by the testimony of William Milsaps, as set forth in 
Finding of Fact 21: 
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21. * * * Bill Millsaps [ sic] was also unclear as to 
whether the access road went on to Reynolds' 
property or whether it went on to that portion of 
plaintiffs['] land west of the western boundary of 
Government Lot 2. Thus, in 1966, it is unclear 
whether one could access the Millsaps' [sic] 60 acres 
without traveling on the right of way outside 
Government Lot 2. 
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
pp. 7-8, Finding of Fact ~ 21. This Court was not perfectly clear 
when it wrote Finding of Fact 26: 
26. The curve into the Millsaps' [sic] property at the 
west end of the driveway in 1966 was east of its 
current location, in Government Lot 2. As stated 
supra in Finding of Fact ~ 21, Bill Millsap was 
unclear as to the location of that "road" after it left 
Government Lot 2. William Reynolds testified that 
after the "road" left the west boundary of 
Government Lot 2, it turned sharply in a 90 degree 
bend then went south, essentially right around the 
northwest comer of Reynolds' land. This is 
corroborated by Defendants[']s Exhibit D41 (map 
from photos taken in 1978) D42 (represented by Mr. 
Reagan [former defense counsel] as a 1973 aerial 
photo), D43 (represented by Mr. Reagan as a 1973 
map) and D44 (represented by Mr. Reagan as a 1973 
aerial photo), and thus, this Court finds this to be the 
approximate route ofthe "road" in 1966. Mr. 
Reynolds testified Peplinski worked on this area of 
the road toward the end of his ownership, and in 
doing so, caused part of Reynolds' fence to fall 
down. Sherrie Akers similarly testified that it was 
well after 1980 that Peplinski altered the course of 
the road to the west of the western boundary of 
Government Lot 2. 
January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
pp. 8-9, Finding ~ 26. Any lack of clarity by this Court in Finding 26 
was clarified in Finding 27. 
27. With the Akers' permission, Richard Peplinski 
extended the driveway west of Government lot 2 and, 
with Akers's permission, used this driveway west of 
Government Lot 2 for farming and occasionally 
logging in the spring, summer and fall. 
January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 
10, Finding of Fact ~ 27. What was testified by Reynolds, what this 
Court was persuaded by, and what this Court meant when writing 
Finding 26 was the route in 1966 was as shown on Exhibit D42, D43 
and D44, but that the road essentially crossed and went south at the 
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intersection or four comers formed by Government Lot 2 to the 
Northeast, Parcel B to the Northwest, Reynolds' land to the 
Southeast, Peplinskis' (now defendants') land to the Southwest. At 
the very least, defendants have failed in their burden of proof on the 
issue of "apparent continuous use" of this entire route over Parcel B 
which they now desire. The road defendants constructed in recent 
times crosses Akers land in Parcel B further to the west than it did in 
1966. Thus, contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's finding, element 
two "apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the 
dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent" 
is lacking in defendants' case on implied easement by necessity. 
Order on Remand, pp. 6-8. 
Defendants again appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. On June 4, 2008, 
the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion. However, no remittitur followed. On 
January 22, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its "Substitute Opinion" in this 
case. In pertinent part, the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
2. The district court erred when it found that Appellants' 
prescriptive easement turned immediately south upon entering 
Parcel B. 
Appellants argue that their prescriptive easement does not 
tum immediately south upon entering Parcel B, and instead extends 
further to the west around a hill before turning south onto 
Appellants' property. The district court found that the access road 
on Parcel B, prior to 1980, turned south immediately after entering 
Parcel B from Government Lot 2. The district court included an 
attached exhibit to its amended judgment that illustrated the 
location of Appellants' prescriptive easement on Parcel B. After 
the prescriptive easement crossed the boundary of Government Lot 
2 into Parcel B, the exhibit indicates that the easement turns 90 
degrees to the south and enters Appellants' property. However, this 
finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
The district court stated that it relied upon a number of 
exhibits when it concluded that Appellants' easement turned 
immediately south upon entering Parcel B, including Defendants' 
Exhibits 42 and 44. However, these exhibits, which are aerial 
photographs of the relevant property, indicate that the access road 
historically made a more gradual turn resembling a shepherd's 
crook rather than a 90-degree tum. Defendant's Exhibit 41, an 
aerial photograph from 1978 also shows that the access road made 
a gradual turn through Parcel B before entering Parcel A. Perhaps 
most telling is Plaintiffs Exhibit 253, which is a photograph of the 
shared boundary between Government Lot 2, Parcel B, and Parcel 
A, and the Quonset hut on Parcel A. While the photograph was 
taken in 2003 (well after the prescriptive easement was established 
prior to 1980), it is nonetheless informative. The photograph 
depicts a large hill to the south of the access road, which the access 
road gradually curves around. We recognize that the 
uncontroverted evidence showed that the Akers permitted 
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Peplinski to extend the access road further to the west in Parcel B 
after the Akers purchased the property. However, the photograph 
does not support a finding that the access road previously turned 90 
degrees to the south traveling straight up a steep hill in order to 
access Parcel A, as would be required if the access road had 
immediately turned 90 degrees upon entering Parcel B. In light of 
this photographic evidence, we conclude that there is not 
substantial evidence supporting the district court's conclusion as to 
the location of Appellants' prescriptive easement on Parcel B. This 
issue must be remanded to the district court for additional fact 
finding consistent with this opinion. 
Akers v. Mortensen and White, 147 Idaho 39, 47-48, 205 P.3d 1175, 1183-84 
(2009). Following that January 22, 2009, opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court, 
this Court, aided by briefing and oral argument, issued an order on December 1, 
2009, establishing: 
1) Plaintiff has the burden of proof on all damage issues. 
2) No additional evidence regarding location of the 
easement is needed, however, a metes and bounds description of the 
location as found by the Court will be necessary to comply with 
Idaho case law. 
3) The defendants have the burden of going forward (burden 
ofproduction) and the burden of persuasion (burden of proof) as to 
the location of the easement. Palmer v. Fitzpatrick, 97 Idaho 925, 
927,557 P.2d 203,205 (1976). While the parties continue to 
negotiate an agreed location of the easement, the following applies 
absent that agreement. 
4) Each defendant will submit a brief regarding location of 
the easement, with reference to specific exhibits in evidence and 
specific reference to previous decisions ofthis Court or the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and such brief shall be due on or before January 15, 
2009. 
The plaintiffs shall then submit a brief regarding location of 
the easement, with reference to specific exhibits in evidence and 
specific reference to previous decisions of this Court or the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and such briefs shall be due on or before January 22, 
2009. 
Each defendant shall then submit a response brief, if any, by 
no later than January 29, 2009, regarding location of the easement. 
Each party is encouraged (but not required) to submit a metes 
and bounds description of their claim as to the location of the 
easement, along with their briefing. 
5) Once the Court determines the location of the easement 
(or the parties advise the Court that they have stipulated by 
agreement the location of the easement), the Court will establish a 
briefing schedule regarding the issue of damages. 
Order Regarding Burdens of Proof and Order Establishing Briefing Schedule, pp. 2-
3. On January 21, 2010, this Court extended that briefing schedule, based upon the 
parties' stipulation. On January 22,2010, Vernon Jerry Mortensen pro se, filed his 
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"Brief of Vernon J Mortensen Supporting Location of Easement." On March 29, 
2010, Whites filed their "Brief of Defendants White Re: Section 24 Easement 
Location." On June 1 7, 2010, Akers filed "Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand 
Regarding Location of Easement." On June 24, 2010, Whites filed their "Reply 
Brief of Defendants White Re: Section 24 Easement Location." Oral argument was 
held on July 1, 2010. At oral argument on July 1, 2010, this Court was made aware 
of two additional pleadings filed by Whites the day before. On June 30,2010, 
Whites filed an "Affidavit of Mike Hathaway" and a "Motion to Admit Additional 
Evidence Re: Easement Location." That motion was not noticed up for hearing. On 
July 1,2010, at oral argument, the Court asked Whites' counsel if Whites were 
making a motion to continue the hearing scheduled for July 1, 2010, regarding the 
easement location. Whites' attorney indicated they were making a motion to 
continue the July 1,2010, hearing. Akers objected. Argument was held on Whites' 
motion to continue. At the conclusion of that argument, the motion to continue was 
denied. In the intervening two months, Whites have not noticed up for hearing their 
Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location. Counsel for Whites 
also contacted this Court's Deputy Clerk of Court and reserved a time on September 
29, 2010, to hear a motion to add additional evidence, but no hearing was ever 
noticed up and no hearing was held. In case such motion was noticed, this Court 
waited for that time reserved for hearing before issuing this opinion. The Court's 
waiting for Whites to bring their Motion to Admit Additional Evidence to a head 
creates problems for the Court (Article V, Section 17, Idaho Constitution; I.C. § 59-
502) as this matter has technically been under advisement with the Court since July 
1,2010. This Court will wait no longer on the issue of taking additional evidence. 
Marti E. Mortensen has not filed any briefing regarding the easement 
location, but at the July 1, 2010, oral argument, adopted the ~ubmissions filed by the 
Whites. 
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement 
Location, pp. 1-7. 
After that decision was filed September 29,2010, on November 10,2010, plaintiffs filed 
"Plaintiffs' Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages" and a "Notice of Hearing on 
Remand Re: Damages" scheduling oral argument for November 24, 2010. On November 17, 
2010, defendant Marti Mortensen filed "Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages". On 
November 19,2010, plaintiffs filed an "Amended Notice of Hearing on Remand Re: Damages" 
scheduling oral argument for January 26, 2011. On January 18, 2011, defendants D.L. White 
Construction, Inc., David L. White and Michelle V. White, filed "Reply Brief of Defendants 
White" and a "Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway". On January 19,2011, plaintiffs filed 
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"Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages." On January 24, 2011, two 
days before the scheduled hearing, defendant Vernon Mortensen, pro se, filed a pleading entitled 
"Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04", an Affidavit 
in Support of Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04" and a 
"Motion for Shortening Time" to have that "motion" heard on January 26, 2011. On January 25, 
2011, plaintiffs filed "Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites' "Reply" Brief on 
Second Remand Re: Damages." Later in the day on January 25, 2011, defendants Whites filed 
"Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway" and various notices of hearing purporting to 
schedule a hearing on White's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence and a hearing on a motion 
to shorten time on that motion, all for hearing on January 26, 2011. [Recall from the procedural 
history reiterated above from this Court's September 29,2010, decision, that on June 30, 2010, 
Whites had filed a "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location", but failed to 
notice such up for a hearing.] A "Motion to Shorten Time" was filed by Whites, but no "Motion 
to Admit Additional Evidence" has ever been filed by Whites. 
At the hearing on January 26, 2011, which plaintiffs had scheduled for the hearing on 
damages, the Court heard argument on that issue as well as the issue of presenting any other 
evidence. The Court allowed plaintiffs until February 16,2011, to file a brief on the issue of 
presentation of new evidence. Vernon Mortensen requested his motions he had filed two days 
before be heard. The Court denied that request, as the Court had yet to read those pleadings 
Vernon Mortensen had filed, because counsel for plaintiffs had not yet had the opportunity to 
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read those pleadings, and because Vernon Mortensen had failed to clear such with the Court's 
Clerk for scheduling purposes. 
On February 11,2011, plaintiffs filed "Response to Motion to Correct Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Motion for Reconsideration on New Trial Issues and Additional 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages" (defendant Vernon Mortensen's 
motion). On February 15,2011, counsel for defendant Marti Mortensen filed an "Amended 
Notice of Hearing: Jerry Mortensen's Motion to Amend Correct Findings" for argument on 
March 22, 2011. While it is unusual for one party to notice up for hearing the motion of another 
party, such is permitted. On February 16,2011, plaintiffs filed "Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: 
White's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location", and later that day, 
Whites filed "Supplemental Citation Re: Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement 
Location." On February 18,2011, defendant Vernon Mortensen,pro se, filed his "Reply to 
Akers Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Whites' Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: 
Easement Location." 
II. WHITES' MOTION TO ADMIT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
RE: EASEMENT LOCATION. 
In Whites' "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location" filed June 30, 
2010, Whites made that motion pursuant to l.R.C.P. 11(a)(2) and l.R.C.P. 59(a)(2), and cited 
Sinnet v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514 (1961) and County of Bonner v. Dyer, 92 Idaho 699 (1968). 
Motion to Admit Additional Evidence, p. 1. Whites ask the Court to admit the "newly 
discovered evidence on the issue oflocation of the prescriptive easement" (Id.), and Whites 
claim the "newly discovered evidence" consists of two photographs ofthe roadway in question as 
it existed in 1975 and 1982 were obtained from a United States Government website: 
"eros.usgs.gov." Id., p. 2. Whites claim an even higher resolution of the 1982 photograph was 
"available but not yet in the possession of counsel for Whites as it has not been received from the 
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USGS/EROS office of the United States Government." Id 
Nothing happened for over six months. In the interim period, on September 29,2010, 
this Court issued its Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Re: Easement Location." On January 19,2011, Whites filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Mike 
Hathaway, which attached the aforementioned higher resolution photographs taken in 1982. That 
affidavit was signed on January 18,2011. On January 25,2011, Whites filed what appears to be 
an identical "Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway", but this one was signed on January 25, 
2011. 
Plaintiffs made the following legal argument in their "Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: 
White's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location": 
In their [Whites'] motion, White's rely on LR.C.P. 11(a)(2) and 59(a)(4) 
for the basis of admitting the maps. Neither of these rules authorizes the 
admission ofthe maps into evidence at the close of the case. Rule 11(a)(2) allows 
the court to reconsider a decision it has made. It does not allow for the post trial 
submission of additional evidence. 
Rule 59(a)(4) allows the court to order a new trial when a party has "newly 
discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which the 
party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trial." Akers objects to the court ordering anew trial in this matter. The evidence 
submitted is from a governmental source. It could have been discovered at any 
time before or during the trial of this matter. White presents no argument to this 
Court why he could not have discovered and produced this evidence at trial. To 
the extent that White's request is a motion for a new trial, Akers' object to it. 
Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: White's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement 
Location, p. 2. This Court agrees with each point raised by plaintiffs. This Court also agrees that 
the cases cited by Whites: Sinnet and County of Bonner, neither direct a new trial nor the 
reconsideration based on this "new evidence". 
This Court finds Whites have not met LR.C.P. 59(a)(4) [LR.C.P. 60(b)(2) has the same 
standard] and its requirement as to the "newly discovered evidence", the Whites "could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at trial." This evidence is from the United 
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States Government. This evidence exists now and it existed at the time of trial which took place 
on various dates from September 2002 to May 2004. Due to the protracted nature of this court 
trial, the Whites also had the luxury of an inordinate amount of time in that a year and a half 
during the trial in which Whites, or any other party, could have found this evidence. 
Additionally, this Court has looked at the photographs attached to the Supplemental 
Affidavit[ s] of Mike Hathaway, and they certainly are not sufficient to cause this Court to grant a 
new trial. Even if there were a legitimate method for this Court to simply review this new 
material and reconsider its earlier decision, the photographs would not change this Court's 
decision. This Court, in its September 29, 2010, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement Location, repeatedly stated that the relevant time 
period for the easement location was 1966, the year that the dominant parcel was severed from 
the servient parcel. That was the pertinent time period as found by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
However, we remanded the case due to the lack of findings necessary for the 
resolution of the question of whether in 1966, when the dominant estate was 
separated from the servient estate, use of the access road through Parcel B was 
"reasonably necessary" to the enjoyment of the dominant estate. 
Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39,45-46,205 P.3d 1175, 1181-82 (2009), citing Akers v. D.L. 
White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196,204 (2005) (Akers 1). Thus, these 
photographs of the road in 1975 and 1982 are not taken at the pertinent time period, which was, 
and still is, 1966. Also, there were other photographs considered by the Court, which were taken 
at times near 1975 and 1986. Thus, the fact that these "newly discovered" photographs are more 
clear is of no assistance to the Court. Whites' "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: 
Easement Location" must be denied. 
III. DECISION ON REMAND REGARDING DAMAGES. 
This is the fourth time this Court has addressed the damage issue. The first was in this 
Court's 27-page Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated January 2, 2003. The 
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decision simply found that defendants had trespassed, plaintiffs had been damaged, punitive 
damages were warranted, and the extent of all damages to be proven at the second phase of trial 
on damages. January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 25-27, ~~ 13-
28. The second was in this Court's 29-page Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration, on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Damages and Order dated April 1, 2004. The third was in this Court's 20-page Order 
on Remand dated September 6, 2006. Order on Remand, pp. 13-16. In that most recent decision, 
five years ago, this Court held: "This Court finds most of defendants' actions of trespass involved 
activity outside the boundaries ofthis 12.2 foot easement." Order on Remand, p. 13. Nothing has 
changed in the past five years in that regard. 
This disputed easement has two ends. 
One end, the "triangle" area, or the east end, is where this easement begins at its 
intersection with Millsap Road. Much of the wrongful activity by defendants against plaintiffs 
took place in this "triangle" area. The two Idaho Supreme Court cases and this remand have 
nothing to do with the "triangle" area. Thus, as to this area of the easement, none of the damage 
issues have changed. 
The other end is where, after leaving Millsap Road, traveling west along plaintiffs' 
southern boundary, the easement goes up a hill and then at its terminus, bends into defendants' 
Mortensens' 260-acre parcel. January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
p. 12, ~31, p. 13, ~32. In 2001, defendants Whites purchased from Mortensens the northern 80 
acres of Moretensens' 260 acre parcel, and that 80 acres was contiguous to the southern boundary 
of Akers' land. Id., p. 14, ~34. On remand, this Court determined the location ofthe easement at 
this "terminus" end changed slightly. 
The fact that one small portion of the exact location of the easement across Akers' land 
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changed slightly due to this Court's decision on remand [the September 29,2010, Memorandum 
Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement Location] does not 
change this Court's decision as to damages suffered by the Akers. It is uncontroverted that 
White and Mortensen excavated and deposited soil on plaintiffs' land in the area of this slight 
change. In other words, the claim simply cannot be made that White and Mortensen performed 
all their earthwork within the boundaries of the easement. Such a claim would simply be an 
impossibility, and not in any way supported by the evidence before this Court. Also, the work 
performed by defendants on this terminus end caused specific damage to plaintiffs caused by 
defendants' actions in changing the water drainage of the area. Thus, even if all the earthwork 
performed by defendants were within the boundaries of the easement (again, an impossibility), 
there was collateral damage caused by defendants' actions. 
The Court will examine the arguments made by the parties. But first, because the 
location of the prescriptive easement changed only slightly, and this Court now finds that change 
has no effect on damages, a review of this Court's most recent decision on the issue of damages, 
written five years ago, is in order: 
D. DAMAGES. 
Defendants argue at length that trespass damages, emotional distress 
damages and punitive damages are not appropriate. (Defendants') Brief on 
Remand, pp. 9-41. Defendants' argument is premised on their claim they have done 
nothing wrong if they have a 25 foot wide easement by prior use or by prescription. 
As stated above, this Court finds no easement by necessity and the prescriptive 
easement is limited to 12.2 feet. The Idaho Supreme Court wrote: "[T]he question 
of whether and to what degree the Defendants' conduct constituted trespass on the 
Akers' property is intertwined with the scope and boundaries of the Appellants' 
easement." 127 P.3d at 207. This Court finds most of defendants' actions of 
trespass involved activity outside the boundaries of this 12.2 foot easement. 
There were wrongs visited by defendants upon the Akers at various points 
along this road. The Idaho Supreme Court decision did nothing to disturb this 
district court's decision regarding the ownership of the eastern portion of the 
roadway, or the express easements along the southern portion of Government Lot 2. 
This Court now finds no expansion of that express easement by prescriptive acts of 
defendants or their predecessors, and the Court finds no easement by prior use. 
Thus, the damages visited by defendants upon Akers along those locations does not 
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change. This Court now finds the defendants have a 12.2 foot easement along 
Akers' Parcel B. However, as stated above, the use that defendants are allowed is 
"confined to the right as exercised during the prescriptive period" and "is limited by 
the purpose for which it is acquired and the use to which it is put." Idaho Forest 
Indus., v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imporvement Dist., 112 Idaho 512, 515, 733 P.2d 
733, 736 (1987); Citing Azteck Limited, Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 Idaho 566, 
568,602 P.2d 64, 66 (1979). Thus, defendants had no right to take their 12.2 foot 
wide easement and excavate into the earth on Akers' land in their attempt to reduce 
the grade of the road to in turn attempt to meet minimum criteria for a subdivision. 
This is an express easement for agricultural purposes, that is now extended in length 
only, across Akers' Parcel B. It is not extended in width beyond 12.2 feet, it is not 
extended in purpose, and it is not extended in defendants' right to excavate. It is 
beyond cavil how defendants could have thought that they had any right to perform 
such earthwork, when at best they had to litigate to have any prescriptive right 
established across Parcel B. 
Defendants argue at length that they did no excavation on Akers' land. 
(Defendants') Brief on Remand, pp. 18-19. This argument is not supported by the 
record. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 681, Ll. 3-6; p. 683, L. 13 - p. 684, L. 2; p. 685, L. 5 - p. 684, 
L. 4. Exhibit 24, 46, 47, 48, 49 and 55. Additionally, defendants' argument that 
they did no excavation is inconsistent with defendants' argument that the excavation 
they did was pursuant to their right to maintain or improve their easement (discussed 
immediately below). Finally, this issue has already been decided by this Court in 
Finding of Fact 44: 
44. On or about January 3, 2002, defendants, without authority or 
proper permits, commenced excavation work on plaintiffs' real 
property in an attempt to widen plaintiffs' driveway and lower its 
grade for access to defendants' housing development. In doing so, 
defendants excavated portions of plaintiffs' real property, dumped 
dirt and gravel on plaintiffs' real property, damaged plaintiffs' fence, 
gate, lock, tree and other parts of plaintiffs' property. 
January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 15, Finding of 
Fact ~ 44; p. 25, Conclusion of Law ~1O. Defendants argue that since they have an 
easement they have the right to maintain the easement. (Defendants') Brief on 
Remand, p. 9. Defendants make the same claim regarding the right to make 
"improvements" on the easement. Id p. 15. Defendants cited no case law to 
support this position. There is no case law which allows what defendants were 
trying to do: establish a 60-foot-wide right of way and reduce the grade of a steep 
hill so they could get approval for a subdivision over a strip of land that at best they 
had questionable easement rights upon. January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 18, Findings of Fact ~ 51-53. That conduct is far 
beyond "maintenance". While such conduct amounts to "improvements", it is not 
allowed under the law. Idaho Forest Indus., v. Hayden Lake Watershed 
Imporvement Dist., 112 Idaho 512, 515, 733 P.2d 733, 736 (1987); Azteck Limited, 
Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 Idaho 566, 568, 602 P.2d 64,66 (1979); Gibbens v. 
Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 570 P.2d 870 (1977); Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield 
Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 628, 277 P. 542, 545 (1929). 
This Court has already dismissed defendants' arguments regarding 
"improvements" or "maintenance" of the easement, finding as a matter of law: 
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11. Defendants have a duty to maintain the easement, but do not 
have a right to develop the easement beyond the parameters as 
defined in the deed reserving the easement. Defendants specifically 
do not have the right to widen the driveway surface on plaintiffs' 
property, to reduce the grade of plaintiffs' driveway or to lengthen 
plaintiffs'driveway. 
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 25, Conclusion 
of Law 1 II. 
The Court has previously found as an established fact that Mortensen's bad 
actions are not unusual in this case: "Defendant Mortensen has violated the 
Subdivision Ordinance on prior occasions and had thereby harmed innocent 
purchasers of property." January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, p. 18, Finding of Fact 150. 
This Court has previously found that: 
Mortensen knew he had access problems when he purchased this 
land from Peplinskis. This Court finds credible William Reynolds' 
testimony that Mr. Mortensen approached him to sell an easement or 
trade some ground so Mr. Mortensen could get into his land through 
the easement over the south part of plaintiffs' land in Government 
Lot 2, but Reynolds refused. On re-cross examination of Mr. 
Mortensen by his own attorney, Mr. Mortensen first denied asking 
Reynolds if he could buy some of his property, but then sort of 
admitted William Reynolds could be telling the truth about that 
conversation. 
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 22, Conclusion 
of Law 1 7. 
This Court finds all damages previously awarded remain. Specifically, all 
aspects of this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed April 1, 2004, pp. 12-29 are re-
affirmed. 
Order on Remand, pp. 13-16. 
The following factual summary written by Akers is completely accurate, and this Court 
agrees with the conclusion that follows the accurate factual recitation: 
This Court found that Defendants, without authority or proper permits, 
commenced excavation work on plaintiffs' real property. Finding No. 44. 
Defendants were red tagged by Kootenai County and issued a stop work order. 
Finding No. 45. Defendants knew prior to excavation that the scope of the 
easement had been at issue between Plaintiffs and Defendants' predecessor in 
interest. Finding No. 46. Defendants intentionally ignored Plaintiffs' requests not 
to trespass. Finding No. 47. Defendants were cited a second time by Kootenai 
County for dumping fill dirt and excavating without a proper site disturbance 
permit. Finding No. 49. Defendant Mortensen has violated the subdivision 
ordinance on prior occasions and harmed innocent purchasers of property. 
Finding No. 50 
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Nothing related to the location of the prescriptive easement across Parcel 
B changes these findings. 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 9. 
Defendant Marti Mortensen cites Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 152 
P.3d 2 (2006), for the proposition that "When a road easement is developed, the land may be 
modified: trees may be cleared, gravel may be laid, and fences may be built." Marti Mortensen's 
Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 2. Marti Mortensen does not favor the Court with a page 
citation, but this is an accurate quote found at 143 Idaho 641, 644, 152 P.3d 2, 4. As noted by 
Akers in their briefing, Ransom dealt with an express easement, where this case deals with an 
express easement over part of Akers' land, and then a prescriptive easement over a different 
portion of Akers' land, and under Idaho law the possible expansion of a prescriptive easement is 
much narrower than that allowed under an express easement. Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on 
Second Remand Re: Damages, pp. 2-3, citing Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61 [64-65], 190 
P.3d 876, 880, 883-884 (2008). But even as to an express easement, with which one is allowed 
to do much more than with a prescriptive easement, the Idaho Supreme Court in Ransom noted 
what one cannot do (which actions also describe what happened in the instant case): 
While it's not clear from the parties' briefing on appeal or the record, it 
appears that problems arose when, in creating the road, Lower pushed dirt onto 
other property owned by FaIT West and made cuts onto Farr West's property, 
which had nothing to do with the creation or maintenance of the road itself. 
Additionally, during construction, Lower blocked off areas where water had 
traditionally crossed FaIT West's property, altering the natural flow ofthe water 
runoff causing sink holes and sloughs. 
143 Idaho 641, 642, 152 P.3d 2,3. And, as the Idaho Supreme Court in Beckstead held: 
Recognizing that "[p ]rescription acts as a penalty against a landowner[,]" 
this Court has stated prescriptive rights "should be closely scrutinized and limited 
by the courts." Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 638, 570 P.2d 870, 875 
(1977). The scope of a prescriptive easement is fixed by the use made during the 
prescriptive period. Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., 101 Idaho 356,359,613 P.2d 
367,370 (1980); Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 638,570 P.2d at 875 (quoting 
Bartholomew v. Staheli, 86 Cal.App.2d 844, 195 P.2d 824,829 (1948)). The 
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holder ofthe prescriptive easement "may not use it to impose a substantial 
increase or change of burden on the servient tenement." Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 638, 
570 P.2d at 875 (quoting Bartholomew, 195 P.2d at 829). 
As to use, the Prices assert that during the prescriptive period there was no 
continuous use of the various means of transportation named in the Becksteads' 
complaint: trucks, campers, livestock trailers, four-wheelers, pedestrian traffic, 
and heavy equipment needed to improve the Beckstead Property. In the past, this 
Court has not required the scope of the easement specify particular vehicles or 
types of vehicles that can use the easement; rather, we have characterized 
easement uses as residential, agricultural, or recreational. See Brown, 140 
Idaho at 443-44,95 P.3d at 61-62. Thus, the scope of the easement should 
include any reasonable means of transportation for the character of use made 
during the prescriptive period. 
146 Idaho 57, 64-65, 190 P.3d 876, 880, 883-84. (bold added). The first paragraph ofthis quote 
from Beckstead shows the restrictive nature of a prescriptive easement, which is all Mortensens 
and Whites have across the western portion of Akers' land, the terminus end ofthe easement. At 
most, the historical use of this prescriptive easement across the western portion of Akers' land 
was for very occasional use for agricultural purposes only. 'The scope ofa prescriptive easement 
is fixed by the use made during the prescriptive period." Id. But Mortensens and Whites 
completely ignored this. Mortensens and Whites knew that, at best, all they had was a 
prescriptive easement across the western portion of Akers' land. Mortensens and Whites knew 
there was a serious question as to their ability to access their land across Akers' land because that 
is the sale reason why Mortensen was able to buy this land so cheap. January 2, 2003, Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 12, ~ 31; p. 17, ~ 48; p. 22, ~ 7. Vernon Mortensen 
testified proudly at trial that he had purchased the first 160 acres for $250,000, at "a fraction of 
the price", due to the existence ofthe prior lawsuit Akers had with Peplinskis, from whom 
Mortensens bought this property. Id., p. 12, ~ 31. After the sale to Moretensens the title 
company that wrote the policy in Mortensens' favor wanted to obtain an express easement from 
Akers. Id. They were unable to do so. Id. Mortensen then sued his own title company. Id., ~ 
33. Mortensens and Whites were all developers. Id., p. 14, ~ 34. Without any required permits, 
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Mortensens and Whites excavated to lower the percentage of grade and tried to widen this 
easement across Akers' land to sixty feet, which historically had only been 12.5 feet wide. Id., p. 
15, ~ 44; p. 18, ~ 53; p. 16, ~ 10. "The holder ofthe prescriptive easement "may not use it to 
impose a substantial increase or change of burden on the servient tenement.'" 146 Idaho 57, 65, 
190 P.3d 876, 880, 884. That is exactly what Mortensens and Whites tried to do. Unable to get 
access legitimately, the Mortensens and Whites bullied their way against Akers to create their 
own access. Their reason for doing this was to subdivide at least the 80 acres which Whites 
bought from Mortensens into sixteen five-acre parcels. January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 14, ~ 34. 
This returns us back to the bolded portion of Beckstead, quoted above: 
In the past this Court has not required the scope of the easement specify particular 
vehicles or types of vehicles that can use the easement; rather, we have 
characterized easement uses as residential, agricultural, or recreational. 
146 Idaho 57, 65, 190 P.3d 876,880,884. (bold added). Mortensens and Whites attempted to 
take what was at best occasional, seasonal, agricultural use, and attempted to turn it into full-
time, year-round, fairly high volume, residential use. Since Akers were unwilling to simply 
"give" Mortensens an easement over the western portion oftheir land, Mortensens and Whites 
knew they would have to litigate any prescriptive easement However, instead of choosing the 
civil alternative of filing a civil lawsuit, Mortensens and Whites chose to simply start excavating 
and widening. Instead of acting civilly, Mortensens and Whites chose to threaten and intimidate 
the Akers. And, at least for Mortensens, according to the testimony of Scott Rasor, whom this 
Court found to be credible, this was consistent with prior conduct. Vernon Mortensen had 
violated the subdivision ordinances on prior occasions and doing so had harmed innocent 
purchasers of other properties. January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, p. 18, ~ 50; Tr. Vol. II, p. 539, L. 3 - p. 540, L. 20; April 1,2004, Memorandum 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND RE: DAMAGES, AND ORDER ON ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE RE: EASMENT LOCATION 
Page 18 
Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 31. 
This Court found that after the present lawsuit began, Mortensen purchased sixty acres near 
Akers' property, subdivided that property into five-acre parcels, sold four parcels and then found 
himself in a legal dispute with the adjoining landowner regarding the legality of the subdivision 
and access to that subdivision. April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 31. This Court wrote: "The easement-
road dispute regarding access to these 60 acres is substantially similar to the dispute in the 
present case in that Mortensen is attempting to develop land with a disputed access and sell 
parcels of land to innocent purchases, thereby leaving the innocent purchasers with potential 
disputes with adjoining landowners, Kootenai County, the Fire District and the Highway District. 
Mortensen's testimony at Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425, L. 24 - p. 1426, L. 7." ld. The Court found: 
Mortensen has utilized substantially the same development strategy in the past. If 
not deterred, he is likely to engage in this conduct in the future. Scott Rasor 
testified about Mortensen's prior land development projects that harmed innocent 
Idaho land owners. Tr. Vol. II, p. 539, L. 3 - p. 540, L. 20. Mortensen admitted 
he is now developing and selling forty acres near the subject property in spite of 
another easement road dispute similar to the present case. Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425, L. 
24 - p. 1426, L. 7. Even Mortensen's own expert Kiebert testified that he has 
testified in litigation on Mortensen's behalf on more than one occasion, that he 
has worked on subdivision projects for Mortensen before and that some ofthese 
projects the parcels Mortensen has sold have not been surveyed, that Mortensen 
works too fast in selling lots before they are surveyed, and that he has told 
Mortensen that it is not prudent to do that. 
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, p. 24, ~ 31. Thus, this is not Vernon Mortensen's first time to either the 
litigation rodeo, or the bullying rodeo. Mortensens and Whites knew that ifthey litigated the 
issue of the prescriptive easement across the western portion of Akers' land, the best they would 
have is a 12.5-foot-wide agricultural easement, and they needed much more than that to 
accomplish their subdivision. Bullying was the only option that might prove to be successful. It 
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was a calculated risk by Mortensens and Whites, and had Akers not filed this lawsuit, no doubt it 
would have been successful. 
This Court agrees with Akers: 
Before Defendant began digging and using heavy equipment across the easement, 
the road was a well maintained road. After Defendants "maintenance" efforts, the 
road was a disaster and Akers['] property was flooding due to the change in 
drainage patters caused by Defendants' excavation. 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, pp. 3-4. 
Without any support for its argument, Marti Mortensen makes the claim that "allowed use 
of the determined easement would still have caused water diversion." Marti Mortensen's 
Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 2. From a factual standpoint, this speculative claim finds 
absolutely no support in the record. From a legal standpoint, Marti Mortensen is wrong. The 
quote from Ransom immediately above demonstrates that the owner ofthe dominant estate 
cannot alter the easement so as to cause a water trespass on the servient estate. 143 Idaho 641, 
642, 152 P.3d 2,3. Beckstead tells us the owner of the dominant estate has " ... a duty to protect 
the easement so as not to create an additional burden on the servient estate or an interference that 
would damage the land, such as flooding ofthe servient estate. 146 Idaho 57, 66-67, 190 P.3d 
876,880,885-86, citing Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 455, 95 P.3d 69, 73 (2004). 
Defendants exceeded the scope of their easement on the terminus end. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs remain entitled to treble damages for "Defendant's willful trespass ... pursuant to I.C. 
§6-202." January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 26, ~ 22. Marti 
Mortensen claims that "the record does not show that notices were posted along the boundary of 
the easements required [by I.e. § 6-202]." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 3. 
Whites make the same argument. Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 3-4. There is no 
requirement under I.C. § 6-202 that the "No Trespassing" signs be posted along the boundary of 
the prescriptive easement or that they be posted where the damage occurred. In Akers' response 
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brief, Akers note several points in the record showing the location of "No Trespassing" signs in 
various locations: Plaintiffs' Exhibit 79, p. 1, photograph 13; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 84 and 176; 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 79, p. 1, photograph 8). Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand 
Re: Damages, p. 8. This Court has already decided the issue more than eight years ago: 
36. Plaintiffs revoked defendants' permission to use the curved approach and the 
driveway west of Government Lot 2 in January 2002. Plaintiffs posted same with "No 
Trespassing" signs within 660 feet of each other. 
January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 14, Finding of Fact ~ 36; 
see also p. 25, Conclusion of Law , ~ 13. (bold added). That finding has never changed in the 
intervening eight years. Akers are correct that the language of I.C. § 6-202 simply requires that 
the "No Trespassing" signs be located 600' apart in order to allow for an award of damages. 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re: 
Damages, pp. 3-4. 
Marti Mortensen claims: "In this case the Court must determine that the actions giving 
rise to punitive damages occurred outside of the now-determined easement." Marti Mortensen's 
Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 4. No citation to the record is given by Mortensen for this claim. 
There is no support in the record for that bald assertion. None ofthe "acts" of Mortensens and 
Whites changed as a result ofthis slightly different location ofthe easement at the terminus end. 
In fact, most of the "acts" of Mortensens and Whites took place at the triangle end of the 
easement. Thus, Akers remain entitled to punitive damages for Mortensens' and Whites' 
outrageous conduct. 
Whites argue that since the easement rights were uncertain in this case, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated punitive damages are not appropriate, citing R. T Nahas Co. v. Hulet, 
114 Idaho [23, 29, 752 P.2d 625, 631 (Ct.App. 1988)]. Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 5-6. 
First of all, this was an Idaho Court of Appeals decision, not an Idaho Supreme Court decision. 
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Second, as noted by Akers, what the Idaho Court of Appeals actually wrote was: 
Although we do not suggest that interference with unadjudicated rights never can 
satisfy the criteria for punitive damages, we hold that the record in this case falls 
short of showing the extreme circumstances required for such an award. 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re: 
Damages, pp. 5-6, citing R. T Nahas, 114 Idaho 23, 29, 752 P.2d 625, 631. Whites' counsel has 
wholly overstated the holding in R. T Nahas Co. v. Hulet. 
While Akers did not cite to the record in making the following recapitulation, the 
bracketed citations added by the Court show everything Akers claim is accurate: 
Defendants did much more than rely on their easement rights. They disregarded a 
court injunction. [Imposed May 8, 2002, made permanent by stipulation on June 
5, 2002, and order of the Court June 14, 2002; April 1, 2004, Memorandum 
Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, p. 19, ~ 13: "Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's 
permanent injunction (restraining Defendants from trespassing on Plaintiffs' real 
property) by trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at night, behind Plaintiffs' home, 
in an effort to intimidate and frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten 
Sherrie Akers"] They disregarded county ordinances. [January 2, 2003, Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 15, ~ 39] There were threats of 
physical violence against Plaintiffs. [April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and 
Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 20, ~ 
18; p. 21, ~ ~ 19,20,21,22; p. 22, ~~ 27,28,29] There were acts where 
Defendants tried to incite Plaintiffs to engage in physical violence. [Id] There 
was purposeful damage to property not necessitated by maintenance of the 
easement. [January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 
15, ~~ 40-45, p. 16, ~ 47] There was an attempt to manipulate the county 
prosecutor. [April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 20, ~ 17: Defendant 
Mortensen misrepresented facts to the Kootenai County prosecutor (making false 
claims of material facts) in an effort to persuade the prosecutor to prosecute 
Plaintiff Dennis Akers."] There was intimidation of witnesses during triaL [April 
1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 21, ~ 24] 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re: 
Damages, pp. 6. Vemon Mortensen and David White behaved incredibly boorishly, arrogantly, 
and intimidated the Akers and others. This Court found that even at trial: 
The Court has personally observed defendant David White while on the stand 
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testifying, raising his voice and addressing Plaintiffs in anger and has heard 
testimony that he has yelled at Plaintiffs during recesses in the trial while 
Plaintiffs were waiting in the hallway in direct contravention of this Court's order 
prohibiting the parties from speaking with each other during the trial proceedings. 
The Court has watched defendant Vernon Mortensen testify, and has noticed time 
and time again, his inability to answer a question put to him, either by the 
opposing attorney or his own attorney. At trial on December 15,2004, Mortensen 
was asked whether he sold four properties knowing there was an ongoing dispute 
over access. Mortensen went on a rant, claiming this was malicious prosecution, 
that Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed, and that he would not be intimidated by 
any of this. He claimed plaintiffs' counsel was trying to extort money from an 
insurance company and using us (he and White) as pawns to do so. 
April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, p. 22, '26. 
In spite of all that, Whites now claim that: "Early in the trial of this case the Court 
observed that if an easement existed to White's property, 'there's not going to be any punitive 
damages.' (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 364-365)" Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 6. That argument has 
no merit. A review of that entire passage shows that it was simply the Court suggesting again to 
Akers' counsel, that the issue of the easement and the issue of damages be bifurcated, because 
the nature and extent of the easement has relevance to the issue of damages. Tr. Vol. I, p. 364, L. 
19 - p. 365, L. 17. That same logic (that the location ofthe easement be decided before the 
damage issues) was used by this Court in this most recent round oflitigation following remand 
from the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Regarding the damages for the emotional distress of Sherrie Akers, Whites argue: 
The record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought herself into a confrontation 
with White or Whites' employee in each instance in which she claims the incident 
caused her distress. One who intentionally creates a circumstance in which she 
finds herself emotionally distressed by asserting an unlawful right cannot justly 
contend that the person who is engaged in the lawful exercise of their rights has 
negligently cause them emotional distress. In this case, Sherrie Akers caused the 
circumstances that create any distress that she may have suffered when she chose 
to obstruct a vehicle operating on the express easement and when she chose to 
testify falsely regarding the location of the easement road at the top of the hill. 
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 4-5. Whites cite no legal authority for their claim that if 
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you bring yourself "into a confrontation", that you are then precluded from emotional distress 
damages. Whites cite to no factual basis in the record for this claim. Whites' claim that "The 
record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought herself into a confrontation with White or Whites' 
employee in each instance in which she claims the incident cause her distress" is, quite simply, 
ludicrous. The Court has reviewed its various findings of fact, and can find no finding that 
indicates Sherrie Akers was the aggressor or brought herself into the confrontation. In fact, it is 
just the opposite. This Court has found that: "Defendants were confrontational with plaintiff 
Sherrie Akers on occasions when she sought to prevent their trespass on her property" (April 4, 
2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, p. 18, ~ 3); "Mr. White bullied, threatened and intimidated Sherrie Akers as she tried 
to assist the police in their investigation of an occasion when Defendants trespassed" (Id., ~ 4); 
D.L. White Construction, Inc.'s operator purposely ran its dump truck toward Sherrie Akers and 
within two feet of her body, acting as though he were going to run over Sherrie Akers on an 
occasion when Defendants trespassed" (Id., ~ 5); "During the same time period as above, D.L. 
White Construction, Inc.' s operator threatened to run Sherrie Akers off her property and 
threatened to dig a three-foot ditch across Plaintiffs' driveway to impede her use of the driveway" 
(Id., ~ 6); "Defendants actually impeded Sherrie Akers's access to her work (she is a cardiac 
nurse at a Spokane hospital) by intentionally dumping dirt across Plaintiffs' driveway, which 
served no purpose other than to block Plaintiffs' ingress and egress" (Id., ~ 7). This Court found: 
Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's permanent 
injunction (restraining Defendants from trespassing on Plaintiffs' real property) by 
trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at night, behind Plaintiffs' home, in an effort to 
intimidate and frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten Sherrie Akers. 
Dennis Akers testimony is found credible that the Friday before the last trial days, 
David White was found offthe easement, clearly on Akers' land, thirty feet from 
their house, that Dennis Akers ran after him and saw White get in his truck, and 
when Akers told him "I've caught you again trespassing", white responded "Go to 
hell." This is in violation of this Court's prior orders. This Court finds not 
credible David White's testimony that he was not on the Akers['] property or the 
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road on that night, that instead he was up on the other side of the barn on his own 
property. Dennis Akers testified that White has sat in his vehicle on Millsap Loop 
Road and watching the Akers' house. White did not rebut this. Dennis Akers 
testified that several times during this protracted trial, there were outbursts in the 
hallway by White and Mortensen. White did not rebut this, nor did Mortensen." 
Id., pp. 19-20, ~ 13. Whites' counsel to write: "The record reflects that Sherrie Akers 
brought herself into a confrontation with White or Whites' employee in each instance in 
which she claims the incident caused her distress", is so far from the truth it amounts to 
sanctionable conduct under I.R.c.P. II(a)(l), against Whites' attorney Robert Covington. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)( 1) reads in pertinent part: "The signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading, 
motion or other paper; that to the best ofthe signer's knowledge, information, and belief 
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that 
it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost oflitigation." It is simply false for Whites' attorney 
to write "The record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought herself into a confrontation with 
White or Whites' employee in each instance in which she claims the incident caused her 
distress." Unfortunately, as shown in the next few paragraphs of this opinion, there is 
more sanctionable conduct by Whites' attorney. 
Whites attorney also writes: 
... Akers established for this series of events a standard of conduct that was 
equally or more as problematic as that of White. In a fist fight as in this case, 
punitive damages are not appropriate against one party engaged in conduct similar 
to that of his antagonist. 
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 3. While the second sentence of that passage is simply 
argument (albeit without any merit), the first sentence is an assertion of fact, which is not "well 
grounded in fact". For the same reasons found in the record discussed immediately above, this 
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Court finds this statement of fact by Whites' counsel is completely false, unsupported by any 
legal argument, and sanctionable. 
Whites' attorney provided no citation to the record nor did he cite to any portion of any of 
the Court's previous findings to support Whites' claim that: "she [Sherrie Akers] chose to testify 
falsely regarding the location of the easement road at the top of the hill." Likewise, Whites' 
attorney failed to provide any explanation as to how, even if that were accurate that she testified 
falsely (it isn't), how that false testimony could even remotely relate to the emotional distress 
issue. This Court found" ... Sherrie Akers to be a very credible witness." Memorandum 
Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, conclusions of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 30. 
Counsel for Akers argues: "It is disappointing and disturbing to see White's counsel advance 
this unwarranted attack on Mrs. Akers." Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites 
"Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re: Damages, pp. 5. It is an unwarranted attack. It is also a 
completely unsubstantiated attack. It is additional sanctionable conduct under LR.C.P. 11(a)(1), 
against Whites' attorney Robert Covington. 
Whites attorney made the following shocking argument: 
The Court improperly awarded Akers $1939 for damage to his truck for an 
occurrence that took place within the easement area. Defendants were engaged in 
lawful use of their easement when Akers obstructed passage of a tracked vehicle 
driven by Mortensen. Defendants were the owners of the dominant estate and 
Akers was not permitted to use the easement in a manner that interfered with use 
of the easement by owners of the dominant estate. Akers is not entitled to recover 
damages that he caused by obstructing lawful use of the easement. This 
component should not be allowed to Akers. 
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 3. No legal citation is given for this argument. The only 
source for this argument that this Court can think of is "Might makes right." What difference 
does it make if Akers were parked in the easement, on Millsap Road or the mall parking lot? 
You don't run into a truck with a bulldozer, intentionally. Apparently, in the mind of Whites' 
attorney, if you have a bulldozer, you can simply move someone else's pickup out of the way if 
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you don't like where it is parked. Whether this took place on the easement is not relevant. 
Whether this took place on the portion that is an express easement or this took place on the 
portion that is an easement by prescription is not relevant. Whites' novel argument finds no 
support in the law, within the facts of this case or within a civilized society. While the Court can 
understand Whites' counsel trying to minimize the damage for which his client has already been 
found responsible, Whites' attorney's factual and legal claims must conform to I.R.C.P. II(a)(1). 
In these instances discussed, they do not. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(l) makes imposition ofa sanction mandatory when 
the court finds, as this Court does, that an attorney has violated the rule: "If a pleading, motion 
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, 
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee." The unfounded statements by Whites' counsel that Akers' were the 
aggressors, that Sherrie Akers testified falsely, that " ... Sherrie Akers brought herself into a 
confrontation with White or Whites' employee in each instance", are especially disturbing in 
light of the fact that Whites' conduct contributed to Sherrie Akers' emotional distress. In making 
these unsubstantiated statements, Whites' attorney is simply following suit on his clients' bad 
acts which began nine years ago, continued through the trial, and is perpetuated by counsel at 
present. The rule serves a separate cognizable purpose, focusing upon discrete pleading abuses 
or other types of litigative misconduct within the overall course of a lawsuit. State of Alaska ex 
reI. Sweat v. Hansen, 116 Idaho 927, 782 P.2d 50 (Ct.App. 1989). However, this Court must 
consider the attorney's conduct in the filing of pleadings, motions or other papers, and not acts 
which are part ofthe trial itself. Koehn v. Riggins, 126 Idaho 1017, 895 P.2d 1210 (1995). In 
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evaluating an attorney's conduct in filing a pleading, the district court must determine whether 
the attorney exercised reasonableness under the circumstances and made a proper investigation 
upon reasonable inquiry into the facts and legal theories before signing and filing the document. 
Chapple v. Madison County Officials, 132 Idaho 26, 80, 967 P.2d 278, 282 (1998). This Court 
finds Whites' counsel did not make a proper investigation prior to making these false statements, 
nor did he exercise reasonableness in writing those false statements and incorporating them into a 
brief which he signed. Largely due to the number ofthese false statements, this Court finds they 
were interposed by Whites' counsel for the improper purpose of harassment. The difficulty in 
determining the appropriate sanction is these false statements by Whites' attorney caused little, if 
any, delay, and caused little, if any, additional work by Akers' attorney. Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 
520,835 P.2d 1331 (Ct.App. 1992). Accordingly, the monetary amount ofthe sanction in this 
case should not be great. This Court awards to the Akers the sum of $2,000.00, imposed against 
Whites' attorney directly, as the sanction for the above described conduct. 
Marti Mortensen now claims that punitive damages in this case "duplicates" the treble 
damages allowed under the trespass action. Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 4. 
Marti Mortensen appropriately cites Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d 321 
(1993), where the focus should be on whether the defendant has incurred multiple penalties for 
the same wrongful act. Although Marti Mortensen does not direct the Court to a page number in 
Bumgarner, she apparently is referring to 124 Idaho 629,642,862 P.2d 321,334. Marti 
Mortensen, again without citing to the record, argues: "There are no 'distinct acts' here: all the 
trespass damages arise from the same conduct that gives rise to the punitive damages." Marti 
Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 4. That claim is not supported by the record. As 
noted by Akers: 
Defendants were not punished twice for the same wrongful acts. As in 
Bumgarner, this Court in granting this [sic] the punitive damages award focused 
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on the Defendants' act of subdividing and road building-undertaken in defiance 
of applicable ordinances, which acts were distinct from the damage to the road 
and property occasioned by the acts of trespass. The Court also focused on 
Defendants' action taken in violation of this Court's permanent injunction issued 
in the matter. Further consideration was given to the fact that the Defendants tried 
to bring prosecution to manipulate the legal system and intimidate Akers and that 
a witness, Bill Reynolds, was threatened to influence his testimony. 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 11. This Court agrees. 
The amounts of punitive damages awarded in favor of Akers and against Mortensens are 
different in amount from those awarded against Whites, to take into account the quality and 
quantity of their actions. There are a plethora of other actions by both Whites and Mortensens 
which warrant punitive damages, but for which statutory damages under the trespass statute, I.e. 
§ 6-202 are wholly inappropriate. The trespass damages were purely compensatory. This Court 
held: "The evidence of the reasonable and necessary costs of repairs for the above damage cause 
by Defendants multiple willful trespasses is $17,002.85." April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision 
and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 27, ~ 2. The 
purpose of punitive damages is to deter defendant's misconduct, not to compensate plaintiffs for 
their losses. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 642,862 P.2d 321, 334. That purpose was specifically 
stated by the Court as follows: 
5. Looking at the criteria of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
v. Campbell, Slip Op. No. 01-1289 (2003), p. 8, and award of punitive damage 
against Mortensen is appropriate. The harm caused to Akers was physical, 
emotion, and not just economic. Mortensen's conduct evinced an indifference to 
or reckless disregard of the health or safety of others. Mortensen's conduct was 
repeated, occurring over a lengthy period of time and even after Court order in 
this case, this was not an isolated incident. The harm resulted from intentional 
malice, trickery or deceit. Finally, compared to Mortensen and whoever is 
backing this litigation on Mortensen's behalf, the Akers are financially vulnerable 
in comparison. Campbell states" ... that a recidivist may be punished more 
severely than a first offender [because] repeated misconduct is more reprehensible 
than an individual instance of malfeasance ... " Id p. 13, citing BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 558, 577 (1996). The amount of punitive 
damages likely to deter Defendant Mortensens from engaging in like conduct in 
the future is $150,000.00. 
6. The amount of punitive damages likely to deter Defendant Whites from 
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engaging in like conduct in the future is $30,000.00. 
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, p. 28, ~~ 5,6. Whites simply did not have the track record of similar conduct 
in other real estate transactions. Whites were not nearly so brazen in their attitude before the 
Court, as compared to Mortensens. Whites seemed to be the follower, with Mortensens the 
leader. Thus, the difference in the amount of the punitive damages awards against each couple. 
Marti Mortensen claims that "large" (later referred to by Marti Mortensen as "huge") 
punitive damage awards are not appropriate in cases such as this because defendants are unlikely 
to perform similarly in the future, citing Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 688-89, 496 P.2d 682 
(1972). Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, pp. 5-6. First of all, Mortensens need 
deterrence, because, as stated above, this has been Vernon Mortensen's modus operandi. There 
is no indication in the record that Mortensen will change his conduct in the future absent a 
punitive damage award. Indeed, there is every indication in the record that the imposition of 
punitive damages in this case is simply a calculated cost of doing business factored in with all of 
Mortensens' land acquisitions. Second, Cox states: " ... the social purpose served by exemplary 
damages is the deterrence of the defendant and others from like conduct." 94 Idaho 683, 689, 496 
P .2d 682, 688. Thus, it is not just the conduct of Whites and Mortensens in this case that is 
entirely at issue. It is also the conduct of those similarly situated (buying land cheap because it 
has access problems), and similarly disposed (who, subsequently to finding themselves unable to 
buy an easement, proceed to bully and intimidate) which must be deterred. Third, the conduct of 
Mortensens and Whites in this case are much different than the conduct of Stolworthy in Cox. 
Stolworthy bulldozed part of Cox' fence down and Stolworthy ran his sheep across Cox' land on 
one occasion. 94 Idaho 683, 684, 496 P.2d 682, 683. Stolworthy at all times admitted the 
trespass but denied any malice. The jury imposed $5,000 in punitive damages; the district court 
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upheld that award and refused a motion to reduce such. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the 
award of punitive damages but felt the district court should have reduced that $5,000 award 
down to $2,000 and remanded back to the district court for such result. 94 Idaho 683, 692, 496 
P.2d 682,691. This Court agrees with Akers' argument: "As outlined above, there were 
numerous acts in the present case that far exceeded what appeared to be the relatively civil 
disagreement that was analyzed in Cox." Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: 
Damages, p. 12. The Idaho Supreme Court in Cox discussed the types of cases in which punitive 
damage awards are typically found: 
A pattern of factual situations may be discerned in the past cases decided 
by this Court which appears to be closely related to the size of the exemplary 
damage awards allowed on appeal. We believe the pattern is quite significant and 
can be usefully described for the guidance of the trial courts and will help 
determine the case at bar. The pattern seems to encompass at least three 
categories of situations. 
The first concerns those cases involving deceptive business schemes 
operated for profit and often victimizing numerous members of the public aside 
from the plaintiff. Clearly in such cases the award of exemplary damages should 
aim at making the cost of such repetitive antisocial conduct uneconomicaL Thus, 
for example, in Boise Dodge, Inc., v. Clark, supra, cross-complainant was one 
victim of a fraudulent scheme. A generous award of exemplary damages served 
to remove the profit factor from the whole scheme. See, Comment, 'Automobile 
Dealership Fraud: Punitive Damages,' 7 Idaho L.R. 117 (1970). Cf. Barth v. B. F. 
Goodrich Tire Co., 265 CaLApp.2d 228, 71 CaLRptr. 306 (1968). 
The second category is illustrated by the Village of Peck v. Denison 
decision, supra. There defendants' repeated actions endangered the physical well-
being and health of the several hundred citizens of the town. Where actual 
physical harm is threatened or actually inflicted on a person or persons the 
situation rises to a serious level of affairs. In such a case where the plaintiffs 
physical well-being is endangered, a substantial punitive damages award finds 
justification in the nature of the malicious conduct itself as well as the quality of 
the injury sustained. 
The case at bar fits neither ofthese categories. However, a third category 
of cases does seem applicable. These cases typically involve non-violent but 
nevertheless serious disputes between two parties. Often the dispute centers on an 
interest in real or personal property or an interference with a business operation. 
Here the action concerned an act of trespass to the plaintiffs' real property but no 
lives were endangered and there was no indication the defendant made a practice 
of acting in this fashion. 
In such situations in the past this Court has not looked favorably on large 
punitive damage awards for the apparent reason that the nature of the dispute did 
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not warrant a severe penalty to the wrongdoer-an award out of proportion both to 
the activity complained of and the damages incurred. 
Idaho 683, 691,496 P.2d 682, 690. It is only that third situation in which the Idaho Supreme 
Court cautioned the amount of punitive damages should bear some relationship with the amount 
of actual damages incurred. Two facts which separate the present case from this third category 
must be noted. In that third category, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "these cases typically 
involve non-violent but nevertheless serious disputes between two parties." Id. No physical 
violence was visited upon the bodies of the Akers, but emotional violence, intimidation and 
threats by Mortensens and Whites was visited upon them, even throughout the year long court 
trial. Second, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that in that third category, " ... there was no 
indication the defendant made a practice of acting in this fashion." Id. While there is no proof 
that Whites made a practice of acting in this fashion in other cases, there is ample proof that 
David White was consistent in his intimidation of the Akers in this case over the course of a 
decade now, in this case. There is certainly proof that Mortensens were very consistent in their 
intimidation in this case and in other cases prior to and during this litigation. That is the primary 
reason the punitive damage awards are in different amounts as between Mortensens and Whites. 
To sum up, there are important facts that separate the instant case from the third category 
mentioned in Cox, where the punitive damages should bear some relation to actual damages. 
That being the case, this Court finds that in the instant case there is a reasonable relation between 
punitive damages and actual damages. In the present case, the actual damages incurred were 
$17,002.85 costs of repairs for the multiple trespass damages, trebeled to $51,008.55, and 
emotional distress damages to Sherrie Akers in the amount of $1 0,000, while the amount of 
punitive damages were $30,000 against Whites and $150,000 against Mortensens. 
Moreover, this Court finds the present case has earmarks of all three types of cases 
discussed in Cox: 
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The first concerns those cases involving deceptive business schemes 
operated for profit and often victimizing numerous members of the public aside 
from the plaintiff. Clearly in such cases the award of exemplary damages should 
aim at making the cost of such repetitive antisocial conduct uneconomical. Thus, 
for example, in Boise Dodge, Inc., v. Clark, supra, cross-complainant was one 
victim of a fraudulent scheme. A generous award of exemplary damages served 
to remove the profit factor from the whole scheme. 
Id. The present case fits this first category, as Mortensens and Whites conduct was essentially 
part of a deceptive business scheme. Mortensens (and later Whites) bought Peplinskis' property 
for cents on the dollar due to lack of access or at least questionable legal access. After they 
bought the property they then tried to buy access. Failing at that attempt to gain legal access, 
they began intimidating Akers. While two people (the Akers) were primarily hurt by the conduct 
of Mortensens and Whites, others were involved. Law enforcement was brought in on more than 
one occasion, county officials were impacted as zoning orders were violated, and witnesses were 
intimidated. Whites and Mortensens are guilty of "repetitive antisocial conduct" prior to this 
litigation, which necessitated this litigation, and which continued throughout this litigation. And, 
at least as to Mortensens, that "repetitive antisocial conduct" has occurred in other litigation and 
in other land transactions which did not result in litigation. This repetitive antisocial conduct 
must be made "uneconomical" for punitive or exemplary damages to have any of the desired 
effect. In this first category, damages should be "large" or "huge" as now complained about by 
Marti Mortensen, as the Idaho Supreme Court wrote: "A generous award of exemplary damages 
served to remove the profit factor from the whole scheme." Id. This Court finds the amount of 
punitive damages awarded against Mortensens was neither "large" nor "huge", and probably not 
even "generous" given the protracted nature of Mortensens' conduct, the severity and frequency 
of the intimidation. The award of punitive damages against Mortensens was adequate. The same 
is true of the award of punitive damages against Whites. 
The second category is illustrated by the Village of Peck v. Denison 
decision, supra. There defendants' repeated actions endangered the physical well-
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being and health of the several hundred citizens of the town. Where actual 
physical harm is threatened or actually inflicted on a person or persons the 
situation rises to a serious level of affairs. In such a case where the plaintiffs 
physical well-being is endangered, a substantial punitive damages award finds 
justification in the nature of the malicious conduct itself as well as the quality of 
the injury sustained. 
Id. The present case fits this second category as well. Mortensens and Whites committed 
"repeated actions" which, while not "endanger[ing] the physical well-being and health of the 
several hundred citizens of the town", certainly that conduct endangered the physical well-being 
and health of Sherrie Akers and, to a lesser extent, Dennis Akers. This is a case "Where actual 
physical harm is threatened ... " In these cases " ... a substantial punitive damages award finds 
justification in the nature of the malicious conduct itself as well as the quality of the injury 
sustained." Id. As mentioned above, the award of punitive damages against Moretensens was 
adequate; it was not "substantial". The same is true of the award of punitive damages against 
Whites. 
Finally, as noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Cox: "In arriving at such a [punitive 
damage] figure it would seem to be reasonable and good social policy in cases such as these to 
grant such an amount that a plaintiff would be encouraged to bring the dispute to the courts for 
settlement." Id. This Court finds the amount of punitive damages sufficient to do just that, and 
no more. The irony is that had Mortensens and Whites brought litigation to have their easement 
rights against Akers decided judicially, prior to their excavation and intimidation, this could 
have ended peaceably almost a decade ago. However, peaceable litigation would have ended 
with the same result, that being Mortensens and Whites having a 12.5-foot easement, the use of 
which, on the prescriptive end at least, cannot be expanded upon beyond its historical, 
agricultural, intermittent use. That outcome would have been unacceptable to Mortensens and 
Whites given the subdivision they desired to create and the financial reward they intended to reap 
from that development. 
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Finally, Marti Mortensen argues, based on agency law: "Therefore MORTENSENS 
should not be responsible for any punitive damages occasioned by WHITE's conduct." Marti 
Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 6, citing Openshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co, 94 
Idaho 335, 487 P.2d 929 (1971). (capitalization in original). Whites make the similar argument, 
but going the opposite way: 
Mortensen correctly drew the Court's attention to the well settled principle 
that a principal is liable for punitive damages based upon the acts of its agent only 
in circumstances in which the principal participated, or in which the principal 
authorized or ratified the agent's conduct. Openshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co, 94 
Idaho 335 (1971). White personally should not be punished for conduct by 
Mortensen or the employee of D.L. White Construction, Inc. where the Openshaw 
standard is not met. 
The record does not indicate that White participated in or authorized 
events described in findings of fact from the April 1, 2004 decision numbered 
5,67,8,9,11,12,16,20,24. Punitive damages arising from those findings fail the 
Openshaw test and should not be awarded. 
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 7. It is ironic that nine years after this all started, the two 
who were specifically found by this Court to be acting in concert, would now apparently like to 
divorce themselves from each other's conduct. This protracted litigation was the result of the 
bullying tactics of Vernon Mortensen and David White, and now that the litigation appears to be 
winding down, those two appear to be turning on each other, distancing each other from the 
other, in an obvious attempt to lessen responsibility for damages caused. In doing so they fail to 
realize that damages were awarded for past actions. None of Whites and Mortensens current 
arguments change those past actions. 
This Court has already found: "As set forth in the Conclusions of Law, defendants 
Vernon Mortensen and David White at all pertinent times are jointly and severally liable for 
compensatory damages to the Akers' property, for the trebled damages, and for Sherrie Akers' 
emotional distress." April 4, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 18, Finding ofFact~ 2.n. This was because: " ... this 
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Court finds at all pertinent times they were each 'acting in concert' as defined by [I.C. § 6-803], 
in that they were 'pursuing a common plan or design which result[ ed] in the commission of an 
intentional or reckless tortuous act.'" ld., p. 28, Conclusion of Law, ~ 4. This Court's decision is 
consistent with Openshaw. Regarding punitive damages, this Court awarded an amount of 
punitive damage in favor of Akers as against Mortensens which was different than the amount of 
punitive damage in favor of Akers as against Whites. These amounts were not joint and several 
as between Mortensens and Whites. This Court engaged in careful analysis as to the factual and 
legal reasons given for the punitive damage award against the Mortensens and the different 
award against the Whites. Seven years ago, this Court found as a matter of fact: 
41. Vernon Mortensen has violated and disregarded Kootenai County ordinances 
and the orders of this Court for pecuniary gain, specifically to increase the value 
of his land development projects. In his actions, testimony and demeanor he has 
shown a conscious disregard and disrespect for the law. He has harmed innocent 
North Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, by this conscious disregard for the 
law. As such, it is highly likely that he will continue to harm Plaintiffs and other 
Idaho landowners unless he is deterred from engage in like conduct in the future. 
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, p. 25, Finding of Fact ~ 41. Nothing has changed that finding offact. This 
Court discussed Mortensen's assets at length. ld., pp. 23-25, Findings of Fact ~~ 31-39. This 
Court then found as a matter of law: 
5. Looking at the criteria of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell, Slip Op. No. 01-1289 (2003), p. 8, an award of punitive damage 
against Mortensen is appropriate. The harm caused to Akers was physical, 
emotional, and not just economic. Mortensen's conduct evinced an indifference 
to or reckless disregard for the health or safety of others. Mortensen's conduct 
was repeated, occurring over a lengthy period of time and even after Court order 
in this case, this was not an isolated incident. The harm resulted from intentional 
malice, trickery or deceit. Finally compared to Mortensen and whoever is backing 
this litigation on Mortensen's behalf, the Akers are financially vulnerable in 
comparison. Campbell states" ... that a recidivist may be punished more severely 
than a first offender [because] repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an 
individual instance of malfeasance ... " ld., p. 13, citing BMW of North America, 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.W. 559, 577 (1996). The amount of punitive damages likely 
to deter Defendant Mortensens from engaging in like conduct in the future is 
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$150,000.00. 
ld., p. 28, Conclusion of Law, ~ 5. On the other hand, as to the Whites, this Court found as a 
matter of fact: 
42. David White and D.L. White Construction, Inc., has violated and disregarded 
Kootenai County ordinances and the orders of this Court for pecuniary gain, 
specifically to increase the value of his land development project. In his actions, 
testimony and demeanor he has shown a conscious disregard and disrespect for 
the law. He has harmed innocent North Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, by 
this conscious disregard for the law. As such, it is highly likely that he will 
continue to harm Plaintiffs and other Idaho landowners unless he is deterred from 
engaging in like conduct in the future. 
ld., p. 25, Finding of Fact ~ 42. Nothing has changed that finding of fact. This Court separately 
discussed White's assets. ld., p. 40. This Court then found as a matter oflaw: 
6. The amount of punitive damages likely to deter Defendant Whites 
from engaging in like conduct in the future is $30,000.00. 
ld., p. 28, Conclusion of Law, ~ 6. Nothing in this Court's prior award, ratified today by this 
decision, is inconsistent with Openshaw. In addition to the multitude of occasions where 
Mortensens and Whites acted in concert, this Court has also taken into account the situations 
where conduct was purely that of Mortensens or purely that of Whites. This Court has assessed 
the differences in their financial situation. This Court has assessed Mortensen differently as a 
recidivist due to his conduct in other situations and other litigations. All of which result in 
differing amounts of punitive damage awards. 
Whites claim this Court: 
... did not articulate specific reasons for its award of punitive damages against 
Whites, stating only "That the amount of punitive damages likely to deter 
Defendant Whites from engaging in like conduct in the future is $30,000. The 
trial court did not specify a clear and convincing standard of proof for its findings 
of fact with respect to Whites or Mortensens, despite the requirements of Idaho 
Code Section 6-1601(9). 
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 6. First of all, it is not I.e. § 6-1601(9) that sets forth the 
"clear and convincing standard of proof'. That standard is articulated in I.C. § 6-1604(1). Ifin 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND RE: DAMAGES, AND ORD¥\ qti A~DIpONAL EVIDENCE RE: EASMENT LOCA nON 
U !) it 'I Page 37 
fact this Court seven years ago failed to mention that standard, it does so now. This Court 
specifically finds that Akers have proven, by clear and convincing evidence, oppressive, 
fraudulent, malicious and outrageous conduct (they only needed to prove one type of conduct, 
they proved them all) by both Mortensens and Whites, under I.C. § 6-1604(1). This Court seven 
years ago, as reiterated in this decision, did articulate specific reasons for its award of punitive 
damages against Whites. In addition to Finding of Fact ~42 quoted entirely immediately above, 
the Court also found: 
13. Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's permanent inj unction 
(restraining Defendants from trespassing on Plaintiffs' real property) by 
trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at night, behind Plaintiffs' home, in an effort to 
intimidate and frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten Sherrie Akers. 
Dennis Akers testimony is found credible that the Friday before the last trial days, 
David White was found off the easement, clearly on Akers' land, thirty feet from 
their house, that Dennis Akers ran after him and saw White get in his truck, and 
when Akers told him "I've caught you again trespassing", White responded "Go 
to hell." This is in violation of the Court's prior orders. This Court finds not 
credible David White's testimony that he was not on the Akers property or the 
road on that night, that instead he was up on the other side of the barn on his own 
property. Dennis Akers testified that White has sat in his vehicle on Millsap Loop 
Road and watching the Akers' house. White did not rebut this. 
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, pp. 19-20, Finding of Fact ~ 13. 
Finally, at oral argument on January 26, 2011, counsel for Whites, in discussing his 
clients' financial situation relative to punitive damages, made the claim that his clients have 
"been destroyed by this process." Counsel for Marti Mortensen made a similar argument on 
January 26, 2011, explaining the fact that Marti Mortensen has divorced Vernon Mortensen in 
the intervening eight years since trial, that "Marti Mortensen would tell you she's broke", and 
"Jerry Mortensen is in a substantially bad financial condition." First, there is no proof of this 
fact. No affidavits were submitted from the Whites. No affidavits were submitted by Marti 
Mortensen. Vernon Mortensen filed a 32-page affidavit on January 24, 2011, but it does not 
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reference his financial situation. Second, neither counsel for the Whites nor counsel for Marti 
Mortensen, nor Vernon Mortensen,pro se, have bothered to cite this Court to any legal authority 
that the financial situation of the perpetrator at the time of remand proceedings is relevant as 
compared to the perpetrator's financial situation at the time of the wrongful conduct and the trial. 
If it is the conduct of the defendant that is to be deterred, it makes no sense to consider that 
defendant's financial situation at any time other than proximate to the conduct. It would make no 
sense to consider a defendant's financial situation seven years before the bad conduct. Why then, 
as advocated by Whites' counsel and Marti Mortensen's counsel, would it make any more sense 
to consider a defendant's financial situation seven years after the bad conduct occurred? There is 
nothing in Robinson v. State Farm Insurance, 137 Idaho 173,45 P.3d 829 (2002), or IDJI 9.20.5 
that would indicate such an absurd result. 
III. ORDER. 
IT IS ORDERED White's "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement 
Location" is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendants are liable for all damages as previously set forth 
in the Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order filed April 1 ,2004, pp. 12-29. The prescriptive easement does not expand the express 
easement, and the prescriptive easement over Akers' land in Parcel B is in a slightly different 
location than defendants' excavated on that parcel. Additionally, defendants placed fill from their 
excavation on Akers' Parcel B. Accordingly, even with the finding of an easement by prescription, 
all previous findings regarding damages remain. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Akers are the prevailing party as against Mortensens and 
Whites, and Akers are entitled to costs as proven at a later hearing. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Akers are entitled to attorney fees as set forth above. The 
amount of prior attorney fees are as previously awarded. The amount of attorney fees subsequent to 
the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent Remittitur will be determined at a later hearing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Akers are awarded the sum of $2,000.00, imposed 
against Whites' attorney directly, as the sanction for the conduct described above. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' attorney prepare a judgment consistent with 
the above Opinion and this Order. 
Entered this 18th day of March, 2011. 
_.........:.tu---=---_~)-'--, ,~l~~"-/-I--"td"",-",.:::.....::J ~=_/ 
,lohn T. Mitchell, District Judge 
\ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L Case No. CV -02-222 
AKERS, husband and wife MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON REMAND 
RE: DAMAGES, AND ORDER 
DENYING WHITES' MOTION FOR 
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON 
vs EASEMENT LOCATION 
D.L WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC; 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE 
husband and wife, and VERNON J. 
Mortensen and MARTI E. 
Defendants. 
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, only became aware of this Court's most recent 
ruling yesterday evening. This Court mailed a copy of its ruling to PO Box 1922, 
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83847. Vernon Jerry Mortensen's address on file with this 
Court and with all attorneys related to this Court is PO Box 330, Naples, Idaho 
83847. Please take note. 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, was shocked to learn that while he was arguing 
before this Court to correct the record on the day of March 22, 2011, this court 
had already issued its opinion four days earlier, March 18, 2011. 
Approximately two months prior to this court writing the above Memorandum 
Decision and Order, Vernon Jerry Mortensen filled a thirty plus page Motion with 
this Court to correct the record. That motion was scheduled to be heard and was 
heard the 22nd of March 2001. However, prior to hearing Mortensen's Motion to 
Correct, this Court had already filed its Memorandum Decision and Order on the 
18th of March 2011; this Court based its decision on invented facts nonexistent in 
the Trial Transcript provided to this court with guile by Attorneys for Akers, James 
and Weeks. 
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On the 22nd of March Attorney Weeks, counsel for Akers, Attorney Deissner, 
council for Marti Mortensen as well as Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se appeared 
in this court to argue whether or not facts this court claimed to be correct and 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen claimed to be in error were in indeed correct or in error 
and in need of correction. 
At the time of the hearing Judge Mitchell was confused as to what motion had 
been scheduled to be heard. He shuffled through papers and then came to the 
conclusion that litigants and Attorneys were there to argue Attorney Covington's 
motion to include new evidence. However, Judge Mitchel had filed a 
Memorandum Decision four days earlier denying Attorney Covington's motion to 
include new evidence. Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, then stood up and 
informed the Court that the motion scheduled to be heard was Vernon Jerry 
Mortensen's motion to correct the record. Judge Mitchell then permitted Vernon 
Jerry Mortensen to present his argument. 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se informed this court that he would keep his 
presentation short to allow Attorney Weeks, Council for Akers, to respond in 
length. 
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, explained that the Court's claim that Defendant, 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen was a repeat offender; that he had been sued on 
previous occasions prior to the Akers litigation regarding matters of easement and 
access was incorrect; that there was no evidence in the Trial transcript or Court 
record to indicate he had ever been sued. 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen then requested Attorney Weeks, council, for Akers 
provide this Court with case numbers, names of litigants, the nature of the claims 
and the outcomes when it was her time to address the court knowing she could 
not because they did not exist. 
When Attorney Weeks addressed this court, she simply told Judge Mitchel that 
she knew he had had a long day and was tired; she didn't want to trouble him. 
If Susan Weeks indeed had facts to support the above claim, she could have 
provided at least some in less than a minute or two; ilWell here is a case number, 
here are some names of litigants, the nature of the case was this, and the 
outcome was this"; and if Attorney Weeks really didn't want to trouble Judge 
Mitchell's because he was tired, she could have said she would provide him with 
those facts the following day in an email. 
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, also told the Court that its conclusion that 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen had been subdividing 40 or 60 acres illegally while the 
Akers, Mortensen, White litigation was in process was not true nor were this 
Court's additional claims true that Defendant Vernon Jerry Mortensen had been 
shut down by the county for violations of county codes and innocent buyers were 
being harmed because of easement issues. 
Again Vernon Jerry Mortensen requested that Attorney Susan Weeks provide this 
court with facts to support the above claims; that she simply provide case 
numbers of law suits, records of violations, names of county officials who had 
shut Mortensen down; names of witnesses you testified regarding the above 
matters; what they said and any other information to support the above claims of 
this Court. Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, knew she couldn't. They don't exist. 
When it was Susan Weeks turn to speak she simply didn't want to trouble Judge 
Mitchell because he had had a long day and was tired. 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen asked Susan Weeks to provide a single fact to support 
Akers' claims; that Vernon Jerry Mortensen was planning a housing development 
or ever had, that he had ever excavated on Akers property, or that he had tried to 
increase the width of the road to sixty feet or that he and David White were 
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partners and who had testified did they say regarding the above claims? Vernon 
Jerry knew she couldn't; that information didn't exist in the Trial transcript and 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen's testimony refuted all the above claims. 
Susan Weeks simply stated she didn't want to trouble Judge Mitchell; he was 
tired. 
Akers' Attorney Susan Weeks did however make a short statement agreeing that 
Judge Mitchell had made an error; he had confused Mortensen for White and 
even the years and in essence, contrary to Judge Mitchells, findings of facts, a 
meeting between Akers and Mortensen prior to Mortensen purchasing the 
Peplinskis property never occurred thus it was impossible for Akers to have given 
Mortensen permission to use any part of the access road at a time when the 
supposed meeting never occurred and in fact Mortensen, contrary to Judge 
Mitchells belief, had told the court the truth that Mortensen and Dennis Akers 
had never met until many months after Mortensen had purchased the Peplinskis 
property and that meeting occurred when Mortensen went to Akers house and 
asked him to remove his truck that was blocking Mortensen's access to his 
property. 
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Fortunately, Mortensen was able to cite from the record Dennis Akers' testimony 
regarding Mortensen's and Aker's first meeting. Dennis Akers' testimony 
supported Mortensen's. 
Judge Mitchell's refusal to believe Mortensen's testimony even when supported 
by Dennis Akers' testimony, demonstrates the degree of Judge Mitchell's distain 
and bias towards Mortensen. 
The facts on which Judge Mitchell determined Vernon Jerry Mortensen's use of 
the access road including the curved portion was by permission are nonexistent. 
This Court has deprived Vernon Jerry Mortensen's right use of the curved portion 
of his access road relying on nonexistent facts. Yes Susan Weeks assured Judge 
Mitchell that all was well, not to worry, his mistake and all its implications were 
minor; of no significance. 
In the final paragraph of this court's ruling filed March 18, 2011, two days before 
the motion to correct errors was filed, this Court states. "As Akers point out, the 
road did not exist into Parcel B back in 1966. Plaintiffs Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 
3-4. Instead, the road went on to Reynolds' land in 1966, and Reynolds is not a 
party of to this litigation." 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 7 
1 , 
However, Bill Reynolds testified that the access road never entered his land; and 
of what relevance was Akers' testimony since Akers hadn't purchased their 
property until 1980; the property over which Peplinskis' access road ran. How did 
Akers know how things were in 1966? 
Akers lied about the location of the Access road. There is no way to soften that 
fact. 
Because Akers lied and because this Court believed Akers lies in direct 
contradiction to the testimony of Reynolds, Richard Peplinskis and aerial photos, 
this litigation continues into its tenth year. Yet this Court blames the prolonged 
nature of this suit on Defendants bad behavior only supported by Akers' 
testimony and Akers are proven liars who intentionally deceived this court. It is 
sad that this court continues to praise the Akers as credible witnesses and even 
awards them money sanctioned against Whites' attorney Bob Covington for 
simply pointing out that Akers had deceived this court with false testimony. 
Remove all claims and conclusions supported by Akers testimony and this Court 
has no basis of awarding any damages to Akers. 
How many times can a Plaintiff blatantly lie before damaging his credibility? 
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Akers lies are whoopers and bold considering that they most probably believed 
their lies would be challenged by many witnesses, even their own witness, Bill 
Reynolds, as well as with aerial photos. Did Akers lies because those lies were 
necessary to falsely establish that Peplinskis had no prescriptive easement across 
section B, a claim believed by this court resulting in this Court ruling that 
Mortensens and Whites were land locked; however the Supreme Court reversed 
that decision; after all Peplinskis had used that road for fourteen years prior to 
Akers purchasing the land over which the road ran. The rout of the road could be 
seen clearly in aerial Photos that corresponded with Richard Peplinski's testimony 
which the Supreme Court found credible. This Court ruled that the testimony of 
Richard Peplinski was not credible. Again, the fact that this Court believed every 
word uttered by Akers and Akers' witnesses but refused to believe Mortensen, 
White or their witnesses shows his bias. 
In the event an Akers' witness might testify in favor of Mortensens or Whites, that 
testimony is ignored by this Court as in the case when Bill Reynolds testified that 
the easement road never entered his property. 
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Could it be that Akers' attorneys coached Akers as to how to testify falsely in 
order to bring Stewart Title to the bargaining table; after all Stewart Title had 
insured that easement. 
It is peculiar that mediation was order after Akers were awarded a total victory. 
Defendants were left without access of any kind and the court granted Akers 
punitive damages in an amount to be determined during the damage phase of the 
tria I. 
Is it possible that Akers and their Attorneys believed Stewart Title would write a 
big check and all treachery and this Court's errors would be forgotten? 
Is it possible that Akers and their Attorneys are aware of every error this Court 
has made, and have even laughed at the ease with which this Court has been 
deceived? 
Is it moral and just for this this Court and Akers' Attorneys to claim Vernon Jerry 
Mortensen is a scoundrel constantly being sued for rouge practices such as 
violating county codes and bullying as well as forcing access when no easement 
exists. There is no record in the trial transcript of such happenings or of 
Mortensen ever being sued for anything except Akers suing Mortensen claiming 
he had no access across their land into his property. 
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With the aid of two appeals to the Supreme Court it has been established that 
Mortensen always had access to his property and that Akers lied. There is no way 
to get around it. If this court believes Akers told the truth then Bill Reynolds needs 
to be sanctioned, Richard Peplinskis needs to be sanctioned and the aerial photos 
need to be declared fraudulent. Neither Bill Reynolds nor Richard Peplinski had 
motives to lie and the Aerial photos speak for themselves. 
Information provided to this Court by Akers' Attorneys James and Weeks needs to 
be scrutinized as information coming for sources willing to present facts not 
contained in the Court record; in other words invented. 
Akers Attorneys lied to this Court as Recently as March 22, 2011 when Susan 
Weeks told this Court that all the Courts finding were correct except for this 
Courts incorrect belief that a meeting occurred when it didn't. 
She stated that all other facts Mortensen challenged were correct. She and 
Leander James know there are many errors in the Judge Mitchell's various 
versions of FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. They provided them 
to this Court. 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen also pointed out at the hearing to correct the record that 
The Supreme Court had determined that the width of the easement was 12.2 feet 
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and had supported that decision with Judge Mitchells finding that William Milsap 
had testified in an affidavit that the access road was a two track lane while in 
reality William Millsap stated that it was his intention that the easement should 
be 30 feet wide because of the width of equipment that would be going up that 
road and that Ba kers understood that. 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen also pointed out that Attorney Reagan, council for 
Mortensen and White had tried to get that Affidavit entered into the record 
several times because Millsap claimed an easement of 30 feet. Each effort to 
enter that affidavit into evidence was defeated by Attorney James, council for 
Akers; with his claim that Millsap's affidavit was hearsay and he could not cross 
examine Mr. Milsap because he was deceased. 
This Court has wrongfully swayed the Supreme Court in a critical decision by 
altering facts from an affidavit that was never entered into evidence; William 
Milsaps insisted that it was his intention that the easement be 30 feet wide. 
Neither did this court mention Dennis Akers testimony when he claimed that the 
easement road was supposed to be 25 feet wide. 
A summation of this case as seen by Vernon Jerry Mortensen, Pro se, is as 
follows: 
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Mortensens sold Whites acreage. Stewart Title insured Whites access but then 
contacted Akers inquiring about purchasing a small portion of land on the west 
end of the access road. 
Akers consulted attorneys and sued Mortensen and White for trespass based on a 
belief that Stewart Title would come running with money. 
After Whites purchased 80 acres, David White excavated on his property. Dennis 
Akers called the county. The county then issued a stop work order and instructed 
David White to get a permit before continuing his excavation. David White got 
the permit and continued to excavate for several days excavating only on his 
property. Even Dennis Akers testified that the Excavation was on Whites 
property. Had it been on Akers, Akers would have come to the court for an 
injunction for White to stop. The law suit had already been filed. This law suit 
had nothing to do with David White's excavation. This action was about getting 
Stewart Title to write a big check to Akers because Akers believed that Stewart 
Title believed Mortensen's and Whites had no legal access. 
During the law suit Akers blocked the road on the east end forcing Mortensens 
and Whites to drive around a locked gate and other barriers. Mortensen ask the 
court for a restraining order. Akers had beaten Mortensen up and dug up the 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 13 
area that would have allowed Mortensen and White to get around Akers locked 
gate. Akers would not allow Defendants to use the existing road and when 
Defendants placed material to the south of the locked gate and other barriers 
Akers had placed, Dennis Akers and Bill Reynolds dug it up and dumped it in 
Reynolds barn yard. It appears Akers wanted to make a statement to the court 
that Mortensen and White were not allowed to use any portion of the road or 
access their property. At that time the county issued a stop work order. That 
order was directed to all concerned, Mortensens, Whites, Akers and Reynolds. All 
had done work in the area. It was Akers and Reynolds who did the excavation. 
Mortensen and White simply filled in holes and smoothed the fill. 
At the request of Mortensens and Whites there was a hearing, Mortensens and 
Whites requested that a restraining order be placed against Akers because he was 
refusing to let Defendants use the road and had beaten up Vernon Jerry 
Mortensen as well as harassing David White. This court order that Akers not 
block the road and for Mortensens and Whites not to do any work on the road. In 
addition Mortensens and Whites were to stay away from each other. It was Akers 
who blocked the road and Akers in every instance that approached Mortensens 
and Whites. Mortensen never defied this Court's order, an order Mortensen had 
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requested, nor did Mortensen ever defy that order and there is no evidence in the 
Court transcript that he ever did. 
Akers had no right to block the only road leading to Defendants property or to 
force Defendants to drive around his blockade and then to dig up the rout 
Mortensens and Whites had created in order to get around the blockage. Not 
once has this Court mentioned that Akers blocked the road by installing a locked 
gate around four months after Akers initiated the law suit. The Supreme Court 
actually believes the cause of this lawsuit was Akers Blocking Mortensens' and 
Whites' use of the road. Akers filed the lawsuit months before installing the 
locked gate. It appears Akers were telling this Court how to rule with actions 
rather than words and seemed fearless of any consequences. 
This court responded with an order that Akers not interfere with Defendants 
access and that the road be left alone. Mortensen never disobeyed the Court's 
order. 
This Court bifurcated the trial. First establish easement rights; second, damages. 
If Defendants did have easement rights and Akers did lie and interfere with those 
rights, then Defendants had damage claims against Akers. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 15 
This court concluded Mortensen and White had no easement rights over the west 
end of the access road and granted Plaintiffs punitive damages to be determined 
in the damage phase of the trial. 
Defendants motioned this Court to reconsider its rUling. This court refused. 
Defendants motioned this Court to issue a 54 B certificate to allow an appeal 
regarding easement rights. This Court refused. Instead mediation was ordered. 
Plaintiffs insisted that Stewart Title be a party at the mediation. 
The mediation failed possibly because this court had already taken away 
Defendants' easement rights and awarded Akers punitive damages. Akers' 
expectations at mediation were more than likely excessively high. 
Without allowing the easement issue to be correctly determined with the aid of 
the Supreme Court refusing to issue a 54 B certificate, this court continued on 
with the damage phase. This in itself was very biased. 
This court then determined and imposed huge damages including punitive 
damages against Mortensen basing them on allegations and conclusions 
unsupported by fact. 
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Defendants appealed this Court's decision and Judge Mitchell was found to be in 
error when he concluded, agreeing with Akers false testimony that at the time 
Akers purchased their property the access road turned 90 degrees into Reynolds 
property without entering Akers' parcel B. 
The Supreme Courte determined Defendants did have an easement over the west 
end of the road. Testimony and aerial photos support that conclusion. 
The Supreme Court remanded this case back to this court to be fixed. Judge 
Mitchell fixed it by granting Defendants an easement that did not correspond 
with testimony or aerial photos and did not provide viable access. 
Defendants appealed again and this time the Supreme Court granted Defendants 
a new trial on every issue and a new Judge. 
The Supreme Court then provided a substitute decision claiming all parties had 
asked for it. Vernon Jerry Mortensen didn't ask for it. Something is askew. 
This case was remanded back to this Court with Susan Weeks' assurance that this 
Court could and would be objective. 
This Court has not addressed the issue of Akers' false testimony and continues to 
praise them as credible witnesses and even punished Attorney Covington to the 
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tune of $2000 for telling the truth well supported by the record that Akers 
knowingly bore false witness in Court. If Akers told the truth then why do 
Defendants now have an easement? This court was never willing to allow 
Defendants an access of any kind. An easement was imposed on this Court by the 
Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court pointed out that Peplinskis had been using the west end of 
the access road for 14 years before Akers ever bought the land that contained 
that road. That was an obvious fact pointed out to this Court again and again 
during trial. Why didn't this Court see that simple fact and acknowledge its 
ramifications and end this non sense nine years ago? 
Akers knew the course of the access road at the time they purchased their 
property. Aerial Photos demonstrate it and Reynolds testified that the road never 
entered his property. 
It appears that Akers attorneys provided Akers with the only argument that could 
defeat a prescriptive easement on the west end of road even though it was an 
absurd argument. 
It is baffling how this court bought into Akers' false testimony and still supports it 
today. 
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It is baffling how this court has built its case against Mortensen with supposed 
facts that don't exist in the trial transcript. 
It is baffling how Susan Weeks continues to propagate lies that defame Vernon 
Jerry Mortensen as she did as recently as March 22nd, 2011 when she told the 
court that with the slight exception of Akers and Mortensen not meeting as the 
Court claimed everything else was correct. She, Leander James and Akers know 
all the lies. They created them and fed them to this Court. 
To a great extent Leander James' Finding of Fact and Conclusions of law 
submitted to this Court without foundation have be accepted blindly by this 
Court. In fact this Court incorporated their many groundless allegations in its 
most recent Memorandum Decision and Order before even hearing Vernon Jerry 
Mortensens motion to correct the record. 
What is being done to the Mortensens is much more egregious than thieves 
braking into someone's home and robbing them of a few hundred thousand 
dollars, or someone embezzling large sums of money. In this case, attorneys who 
are officers of the court have used this Court to unjustly harass, defame, and 
cause Mortensens to lose money and time not to mention the stress of the 
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ordeal. These abuses cannot be ignored. They have been ever present for ten 
years, costly and emotionally draining. 
It appears that Akers and their attorneys planned on putting pressure on 
Mortensens and Whites so they would put pressure on Stewart Title to write a big 
check to stop this unjust litigation and to allow Plaintiffs' and their Attorneys' 
tactics to go unnoticed and filed away to never be scrutinized. 
It appears Akers weren't satisfied with Stewart Title's offer possibly because this 
court had raised the bar by granting Akers a hands' down victory ruling they had 
been granted punitive damages in a sum to be established during the damage 
phase of the trial and Defendants had no access. 
Wouldn't a fair mediation be one conducted prior to one party being proclaimed 
the victors in every way with punitive damages and Mortensens and White left 
land locked? 
It appears that Stewart Title decided it would be less expensive to adjudicate the 
prescriptive easement than to deal with Akers. 
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It appears that Akers and their attorneys schemed to sue Mortensens and Whites 
using this court, providing false testimony, basically that Peplinskis', Mortensens' 
and Whites right to access their land was by permission now withdrawn. 
Possibly, in minds of Akers, Weeks and James, nothing would come of the false 
information they used to baffle this court, after all Stewart Title would put an end 
to the nonsense and nothing would come of their misrepresentations and 
malicious goals. 
It is Vernon Jerry Mortensens belief that this Court has been deceived by Akers 
and their Attorneys schemes and has because biased and unable to be objective. 
How can this Court allow the defamation of Vernon Jerry Mortensen with 
unsupported claims? 
How could this court write a forty pages attacking mainly Vernon Jerry Mortensen 
before even considering his Motion to correct the record? 
PRAYER 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen prays for this Court to consider all Akers testimony as 
testimony of liars with the objective to deceive this court. 
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen prays for this court to consider all allegations of Akers, 
Weeks, and James groundless and irrelevant unless supported by specific facts. 
How much effort would it take for Susan Weeks and Leander James to provide 
any of the below mentioned: 
Case numbers of lawsuits, names of litigants, nature of claims, times when he was 
ever issued a citation for disobeying country regulation, what where they, who 
issued them, what are the names of all these innocent victims, identify when 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen disobeyed any Court order, how did he do it? Why 
would Susan Weeks not want to provide these facts unless they just don't exist? 
Vernon Jerry Mortensen, pro se, requests this Court to reconsider its entire ruling 
based on the fact that Akers have not been truthful and that this courts initial 
ruling and sequential rulings were based on lies and unsupported facts and all this 
has filtered down to the present time. The initial ruling was a cut and paste of 
Leander James' FINDINGS of FACTS and CONCLUSIONS of LAW which for the most 
part were never grounded in fact and his claims are untrue. Not only are Akers' 
claims untrue, they were refuted by Mortensen and White. Is it possible that 
Akers lied throughout the trial as they did about the location of the access road? 
Is it possible that Mortensens and Whites were truthful? 
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VERNON J MORTENSEN, PRO 
SE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Vernon J. Mortensen certifies: 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document by the methods indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
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Coeur d' Alene, 10. HAND DELIVERD 
Robert Covington 
8884 N. Government Way, Stc. A 
Hayden Lake 1083835. HAND DELIVERED 
Van Camp and Deissner 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. 
Spokane, WA 99201 U.S. Mail and Electronic Mail 
Dated, LJ/5 / 1/ 
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Vernon J. Mortensen 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
D.L. WHITE CONST., INC., DAVID L. WHITE 
and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and wife; 
and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. 
MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
Defrndants. 
) Case No, CV 2002 222 
) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
) DENYING: 1) DEFENDANT VERNON 
) MORTENSEN'S "AFFIDAVIT ON MOTION 
) TO CORRECT FINDINGS OF FACT, 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, 
) FILED 1-2-3 AND MEMORANDUM 
) DECISION AND ORDER ON 
) RECONSIDERATION ON NEW TRIAL 
) ISSUES, AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF 
) FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) REGARDING DAMAGES AND ORDER 
) FILED 4-1-04" AND 2) DEFENDANT 
) VERNON MORTENSEN'S MOTION TO 
) RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) AND ORDER ON REMAND RE: DAMAGES. 
) AND ORDER DENYING WHITE'S MOTION 
) FOR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON 
) EASMENT LOCATION ---------------------------------
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 
The present issue before this Court is defendant Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Correct 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04." 
On January 26,2011, this Court held a hearing on damages issues on remand from the 
Idaho Supreme Court. On January 24,2011, two days before that scheduled hearing, defendant 
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Vernon Mortensen, pro se, filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04", an "Affidavit in Support of Motion to Correct 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04" (all ofthe "argument" by Vernon Mortensen is 
found in this 32-page "Affidavit") and a "Motion for Shortening Time" to have that "motion" 
heard on January 26,2011. On January 25,2011, plaintiffs filed "Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum 
to Defendants Whites' "Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re: Damages." Later in the day on 
January 25,2011, defendants Whites filed "Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway" and 
various notices of hearing purporting to schedule a hearing on White's Motion to Admit 
Additional Evidence and a hearing on a motion to shorten time on that motion, all for hearing on 
January 26, 2011. [Recall from the procedural history reiterated above from this Court's 
September 29, 20lO, decision, that on June 30, 2010, Whites had filed a "Motion to Admit 
Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location", but failed to notice such up for a hearing.] A 
"Motion to Shorten Time" was filed by Whites, but no "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence" 
has ever been filed by Whites. 
At the hearing on January 26,2011, which plaintiffs had scheduled for the hearing on 
damages, the Court heard argument on the damage issue as well as the issue of presenting any 
other evidence. The Court allowed plaintiffs until February 16,2011, to file a brief on the issue 
of presentation of new evidence. Vernon Mortensen requested his motions he had filed two days 
before be heard. The Court denied that request, as the Court had yet to read those pleadings 
Vemon Mortensen had filed, because counsel for plaintiffs had not yet had the opportunity to 
read those pleadings, and because Vernon Mortensen had failed to clear such with the Court's 
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Clerk for scheduling purposes. 
On February 11,2011, plaintiffs filed "Response to Motion to Correct Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Motion for Reconsideration on New Trial Issues and Additional 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages" (defendant Vernon Mortensen's 
motion). On February 15,2011, counsel for defendant Marti Mortensen filed an "Amended 
Notice of Hearing: Jerry Mortensen's Motion to Amend Correct Findings" for argument on 
March 22, 2011. While it is unusual for one party to notice up for hearing the motion of another 
party, such is permitted. On February 16,2011, plaintiffs filed "Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: 
White's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location", and later that day, 
Whites filed "Supplemental Citation Re: Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement 
Location." On February 18, 2011, defendant Vernon Mortensen, pro se, filed his "Reply to 
Akers Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Whites' Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: 
Easement Location." 
On March 18, 2011, this Court issued its "Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand 
Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement 
Location." On March 22,2011, this Court heard oral argument on Vernon Mortensen's "Motion 
to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04." At the conclusion of that 
hearing, this Court took under advisement Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Correct Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04". Then, on AprilS, 2011, Vernon Mortensen filed 
his "Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and 
Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location." Vernon 
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Mortensen has yet to schedule a hearing for this motion. 
At the March 22,2011, hearing, Vernon Mortensen was openly critical ofthe Court and 
counsel for plaintiffs. Mortensen claimed that the Court had found him to be a "repeat offender" 
and he disagreed with this Court's findings of credibility. In order to examine these claims, the 
substantive portion of this Court's March 18, 2011, "Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement 
Location", must be reviewed: 
III. DECISION ON REMAND REGARDING DAMAGES. 
This is the fourth time this Court has addressed the damage issue. The 
first was in this Court's 27-page Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
dated January 2, 2003. The decision simply found that defendants had trespassed, 
plaintiffs had been damaged, punitive damages were warranted, and the extent of 
all damages to be proven at the second phase of trial on damages. January 2, 
2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 25-27, ~~ 13-28. The 
second was in this Court's 29-page Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration, on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order dated April 1,2004. The 
third was in this Court's 20-page Order on Remand dated September 6,2006. 
Order on Remand, pp. 13-16. In that most recent decision, five years ago, this 
Court held: "This Court finds most of defendants' actions of trespass involved 
activity outside the boundaries of this 12.2 foot easement." Order on Remand, p. 13. 
Nothing has changed in the past five years in that regard. 
This disputed easement has two ends. 
One end, the "triangle" area, or the east end, is where this easement begins 
at its intersection with Millsap Road. Much of the wrongful activity by 
defendants against plaintiffs took place in this "triangle" area. The two Idaho 
Supreme Court cases and this remand have nothing to do with the "triangle" area. 
Thus, as to this area of the easement, none of the damage issues have changed. 
The other end is where, after leaving Millsap Road, traveling west along 
plaintiffs' southern boundary, the easement goes up a hill and then at its terminus, 
bends into defendants' Mortensens' 260-acre parcel. January 2, 2003, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 12, ~31, p. 13, ~32. In 2001, defendants 
Whites purchased from Mortensens the northern 80 acres of Moretensens' 260 
acre parcel, and that 80 acres was contiguous to the southern boundary of Akers' 
land. Id., p. 14, ~34. On remand, this Court determined the location of the 
easement at this "terminus" end changed slightly. 
The fact that one small portion of the exact location of the easement across 
Akers' land changed slightly due to this Court's decision on remand [the 
September 29,2010, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order Re: Easement Location] does not change this Court's decision as 
to damages suffered by the Akers. It is uncontroverted that White and Mortensen 
excavated and deposited soil on plaintiffs' land in the area of this slight change. 
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In other words, the claim simply cannot be made that White and Mortensen 
performed all their earthwork within the boundaries of the easement. Such a 
claim would simply be an impossibility, and not in any way supported by the 
evidence before this Court. Also, the work performed by defendants on this 
terminus end caused specific damage to plaintiffs caused by defendants' actions in 
changing the water drainage of the area. Thus, even if all the earthwork 
performed by defendants were within the boundaries of the easement (again, an 
impossibility), there was collateral damage caused by defendants' actions. 
The Court will examine the arguments made by the parties. But first, 
because the location of the prescriptive easement changed only slightly, and this 
Court now finds that change has no effect on damages, a review of this Court's 
most recent decision on the issue of damages, written five years ago, is in order: 
D. DAMAGES. 
Defendants argue at length that trespass damages, emotional 
distress damages and punitive damages are not appropriate. 
(Defendants') Briefon Remand, pp. 9-41. Defendants' argument is 
premised on their claim they have done nothing wrong if they have a 
25 foot wide easement by prior use or by prescription. As stated 
above, this Court finds no easement by necessity and the prescriptive 
easement is limited to 12.2 feet. The Idaho Supreme Court wrote: 
"[T]he question of whether and to what degree the Defendants' 
conduct constituted trespass on the Akers' property is intertwined 
with the scope and boundaries of the Appellants' easement." 127 
P.3d at 207. This Court finds most of defendants' actions oftrespass 
involved activity outside the boundaries of this 12.2 foot easement. 
There were wrongs visited by defendants upon the Akers at 
various points along this road. The Idaho Supreme Court decision 
did nothing to disturb this district court's decision regarding the 
ownership of the eastern portion of the roadway, or the express 
easements along the southern portion of Government Lot 2. This 
Court now finds no expansion of that express easement by 
prescriptive acts of defendants or their predecessors, and the Court 
finds no easement by prior use. Thus, the damages visited by 
defendants upon Akers along those locations does not change. This 
Court now finds the defendants have a 12.2 foot easement along 
Akers' Parcel B. However, as stated above, the use that defendants 
are allowed is "confined to the right as exercised during the 
prescriptive period" and "is limited by the purpose for which it is 
acquired and the use to which it is put." Idaho Forest Indus., v. 
Hayden Lake Watershed Imporvement Dist., 112 Idaho 512, 515, 
733 P.2d 733, 736 (1987); citing Azteck Limited, Inc. v. Creekside 
Inv. Co., 100 Idaho 566, 568, 602 P.2d 64,66 (1979). Thus, 
defendants had no right to take their 12.2 foot wide easement and 
excavate into the earth on Akers' land in their attempt to reduce the 
grade of the road to in tum attempt to meet minimum criteria for a 
subdivision. This is an express easement for agricultural purposes, 
that is now extended in length only, across Akers' Parcel B. It is not 
extended in width beyond 12.2 feet, it is not extended in purpose, 
and it is not extended in defendants' right to excavate. It is beyond 
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cavil how defendants could have thought that they had any right to 
perform such earthwork, when at best they had to litigate to have any 
prescriptive right established across Parcel B. 
Defendants argue at length that they did no excavation on 
Akers'land. (Defendants') Brief on Remand, pp. 18-19. This 
argument is not supported by the record. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 681, Ll. 3-6; 
p. 683, L. 13 - p. 684, L. 2; p. 685, L. 5 - p. 684, L. 4. Exhibit 24, 
46,47,48,49 and 55. Additionally, defendants' argument that they 
did no excavation is inconsistent with defendants' argument that the 
excavation they did was pursuant to their right to maintain or 
improve their easement (discussed immediately below). Finally, this 
issue has already been decided by this Court in Finding of Fact 44: 
44. On or about January 3,2002, defendants, without 
authority or proper permits, commenced excavation work on 
plaintiffs' real property in an attempt to widen plaintiffs' 
driveway and lower its grade for access to defendants' 
housing development. In doing so, defendants excavated 
portions of plaintiffs' real property, dumped dirt and gravel 
on plaintiffs' real property, damaged plaintiffs' fence, gate, 
lock, tree and other parts of plaintiffs' property. 
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 
15, Finding of Fact ~ 44; p. 25, Conclusion of Law ~1O. Defendants 
argue that since they have an easement they have the right to 
maintain the easement. (Defendants') Brief on Remand, p. 9. 
Defendants make the same claim regarding the right to make 
"improvements" on the easement. Id p. 15. Defendants cited no 
case law to support this position. There is no case law which allows 
what defendants were trying to do: establish a 60-foot-wide right of 
way and reduce the grade of a steep hill so they could get approval 
for a subdivision over a strip ofland that at best they had 
questionable easement rights upon. January 2,2003, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 18, Findings of Fact ~ 51-53. 
That conduct is far beyond "maintenance". While such conduct 
amounts to "improvements", it is not allowed under the law. Idaho 
Forest Indus., v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imporvement Dist., 112 
Idaho 512,515, 733 P.2d 733, 736 (1987); Azteck Limited, Inc. v. 
Creekside Inv. Co., 100 Idaho 566, 568, 602 P.2d 64, 66 (1979); 
Gibbensv. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 570 P.2d 870 (1977); 
Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 628, 277 
P. 542,545 (1929). 
This Court has already dismissed defendants' arguments 
regarding "improvements" or "maintenance" of the easement, 
finding as a matter of law: 
11. Defendants have a duty to maintain the easement, but do 
not have a right to develop the easement beyond the 
parameters as defined in the deed reserving the easement. 
Defendants specifically do not have the right to widen the 
driveway surface on plaintiffs' property, to reduce the grade 
of plaintiffs' driveway or to lengthen plaintiffs' driveway. 
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January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 
25, Conclusion of Law ~ 11. 
The Court has previously found as an established fact that 
Mortensen's bad actions are not unusual in this case: "Defendant 
Mortensen has violated the Subdivision Ordinance on prior 
occasions and had thereby hanned innocent purchasers of property." 
January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 
18, Finding of Fact ~ 50. 
This Court has previously found that: 
Mortensen knew he had access problems when he purchased 
this land from Peplinskis. This Court finds credible William 
Reynolds' testimony that Mr. Mortensen approached him to 
sell an easement or trade some ground so Mr. Mortensen 
could get into his land through the easement over the south 
part of plaintiffs' land in Government Lot 2, but Reynolds 
refused. On re-cross examination of Mr. Mortensen by his 
own attorney, Mr. Mortensen first denied asking Reynolds if 
he could buy some of his property, but then sort of admitted 
William Reynolds could be telling the truth about that 
conversation. 
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 
22, Conclusion of Law ~ 7. 
This Court finds all damages previously awarded remain. 
Specifically, all aspects of this Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order filed April 1,2004, pp. 12-29 are re-affirmed. 
Order on Remand, pp. 13-16. 
The following factual summary written by Akers is completely accurate, 
and this Court agrees with the conclusion that follows the accurate factual 
recitation: 
This Court found that Defendants, without authority or 
proper permits, commenced excavation work on plaintiffs' real 
property. Finding No. 44. Defendants were red tagged by Kootenai 
County and issued a stop work order. Finding No. 45. Defendants 
knew prior to excavation that the scope of the easement had been at 
issue between Plaintiffs and Defendants' predecessor in interest. 
Finding No. 46. Defendants intentionally ignored Plaintiffs' 
requests not to trespass. Finding No. 47. Defendants were cited a 
second time by Kootenai County for dumping fill dirt and 
excavating without a proper site disturbance permit. Finding No. 
49. Defendant Mortensen has violated the subdivision ordinance on 
prior occasions and harmed innocent purchasers of property. 
Finding No. 50 
Nothing related to the location of the prescriptive easement 
across Parcel B changes these findings. 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 9. 
Defendant Marti Mortensen cites Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., 143 
Idaho 641, 152 P.3d 2 (2006), for the proposition that "When a road easement is 
developed, the land may be modified: trees may be cleared, gravel may be laid, 
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and fences may be built." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 2. 
Marti Mortensen does not favor the Court with a page citation, but this is an 
accurate quote found at 143 Idaho 641, 644, 152 P.3d 2, 4. As noted by Akers in 
their briefing, Ransom dealt with an express easement, where this case deals with 
an express easement over part of Akers' land, and then a prescriptive easement 
over a different portion of Akers' land, and under Idaho law the possible 
expansion of a prescriptive easement is much narrower than that allowed under an 
express easement. Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: 
Damages, pp. 2-3, citing Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61 [64-65], 190 P.3d 
876, 880, 883-884 (2008). But even as to an express easement, with which one is 
allowed to do much more than with a prescriptive easement, the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Ransom noted what one cannot do (which actions also describe what 
happened in the instant case): 
While it's not clear from the parties' briefing on appeal or 
the record, it appears that problems arose when, in creating the 
road, Lower pushed dirt onto other property owned by Farr West 
and made cuts onto Farr West's property, which had nothing to do 
with the creation or maintenance of the road itself. Additionally, 
during construction, Lower blocked off areas where water had 
traditionally crossed Farr West's property, altering the natural flow 
of the water runoff causing sink holes and sloughs. 
143 Idaho 641, 642, 152 P.3d 2,3. And, as the Idaho Supreme Court in Beckstead 
held: 
Recognizing that "[p ]rescription acts as a penalty against a 
landowner[,]" this Court has stated prescriptive rights "should be 
closely scrutinized and limited by the courts." Gibbens v. 
Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 638, 570 P.2d 870, 875 (1977). The 
scope of a prescriptive easement is fixed by the use made during 
the prescriptive period. Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., 101 Idaho 
356,359,613 P.2d 367, 370 (1980); Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 638, 
570 P.2d at 875 (quoting Bartholomew v. Staheli, 86 Cal.App.2d 
844, 195 P.2d 824, 829 (1948)). The holder of the prescriptive 
easement "may not use it to impose a substantial increase or 
change of burden on the servient tenement." Gibbens, 98 Idaho at 
638,570 P.2d at 875 (quoting Bartholomew, 195 P.2d at 829). 
As to use, the Prices assert that during the prescriptive 
period there was no continuous use of the various means of 
transportation named in the Becksteads' complaint: trucks, 
campers, livestock trailers, four-wheelers, pedestrian traffic, and 
heavy equipment needed to improve the Beckstead Property. In the 
past, this Court has not required the scope of the easement specifY 
particular vehicles or types of vehicles that can use the easement; 
rather, we have characterized easement uses as residential, 
agricultural, or recreational. See Brown, 140 Idaho at 443-44, 
95 P .3d at 61-62. Thus, the scope ofthe easement should include 
any reasonable means of transportation for the character of use 
made during the prescriptive period. 
146 Idaho 57,64-65, 190 P.3d 876, 880, 883-84. (bold added). The first 
paragraph of this quote from Beckstead shows the restrictive nature of a 
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prescriptive easement, which is all Mortensens and Whites have across the 
western portion of Akers' land, the terminus end of the easement. At most, the 
historical use of this prescriptive easement across the western portion of Akers' 
land was for very occasional use for agricultural purposes only. "The scope of a 
prescriptive easement is fixed by the use made during the prescriptive period." Id. 
But Mortensens and Whites completely ignored this. Mortensens and Whites 
knew that, at best, all they had was a prescriptive easement across the western 
portion of Akers' land. Mortensens and Whites knew there was a serious question 
as to their ability to access their land across Akers' land because that is the sale 
reason why Mortensen was able to buy this land so cheap. January 2,2003, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 12, ~ 31; p. 17, ~ 48; p. 22, ~ 
7. Vernon Mortensen testified proudly at trial that he had purchased the first 160 
acres for $250,000, at "a fraction of the price", due to the existence of the prior 
lawsuit Akers had with Peplinskis, from whom Mortensens bought this property. 
Id., p. 12, ~ 31. After the sale to Moretensens the title company that wrote the 
policy in Mortensens' favor wanted to obtain an express easement from Akers. 
Id. They were unable to do so. Id. Mortensen then sued his own title company. 
Id., ~ 33. Mortensens and Whites were all developers. Id., p. 14, ~ 34. Without 
any required permits, Mortensens and Whites excavated to lower the percentage 
of grade and tried to widen this easement across Akers' land to sixty feet, which 
historically had only been 12.5 feet wide. Id., p. 15, ~ 44; p. 18, ~ 53; p. 16, ~ 10. 
"The holder of the prescriptive easement "may not use it to impose a substantial 
increase or change of burden on the servient tenement. '" 146 Idaho 5 7, 65, 190 
P.3d 876, 880, 884. That is exactly what Mortensens and Whites tried to do. 
Unable to get access legitimately, the Mortensens and Whites bullied their way 
against Akers to create their own access. Their reason for doing this was to 
subdivide at least the 80 acres which Whites bought from Mortensens into sixteen 
five-acre parcels. January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, p. 14, ~ 34. 
This returns us back to the bolded portion of Beckstead, quoted above: 
In the past this Court has not required the scope of the easement 
specify particular vehicles or types of vehicles that can use the 
easement; rather, we have characterized easement uses as 
residential, agricultural, or recreational. 
146 Idaho 57, 65, 190 P.3d 876, 880, 884. (bold added). Mortensens and Whites 
attempted to take what was at best occasional, seasonal, agricultural use, and 
attempted to turn it into full-time, year-round, fairly high volume, residential use. 
Since Akers were unwilling to simply "give" Mortensens an easement over the 
western portion of their land, Mortensens and Whites knew they would have to 
litigate any prescriptive easement. However, instead of choosing the civil 
alternative of filing a civil lawsuit, Mortensens and Whites chose to simply start 
excavating and widening. Instead of acting civilly, Mortensens and Whites chose 
to threaten and intimidate the Akers. And, at least for Mortensens, according to 
the testimony of Scott Rasor, whom this Court found to be credible, this was 
consistent with prior conduct. Vernon Mortensen had violated the subdivision 
ordinances on prior occasions and doing so had harmed innocent purchasers of 
other properties. January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, p. 18, ~ 50; Tr. Vol. II, p. 539, L. 3 -po 540, L. 20; Aprill, 2004, 
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
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of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 31. This Court found that after the present lawsuit 
began, Mortensen purchased sixty acres near Akers' property, subdivided that 
property into five-acre parcels, sold four parcels and then found himself in a legal 
dispute with the adjoining landowner regarding the legality of the subdivision and 
access to that subdivision. April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and 
Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 31. This 
Court wrote: "The easement-road dispute regarding access to these 60 acres is 
substantially similar to the dispute in the present case in that Mortensen is 
attempting to develop land with a disputed access and sell parcels of land to 
innocent purchases, thereby leaving the innocent purchasers with potential 
disputes with adjoining landowners, Kootenai County, the Fire District and the 
Highway District. Mortensen's testimony at Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425, L. 24 - p. 1426, 
L. 7." Id The Court found: 
Mortensen has utilized substantially the same development strategy 
in the past. If not deterred, he is likely to engage in this conduct in 
the future. Scott Rasor testified about Mortensen's prior land 
development projects that harmed innocent Idaho land owners. Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 539, L. 3 - p. 540, L. 20. Mortensen admitted he is now 
developing and selling forty acres near the subject property in spite 
of another easement road dispute similar to the present case. Tr. 
Vol. III, p. 1425, L. 24 - p. 1426, L. 7. Even Mortensen's own 
expert Kiebert testified that he has testified in litigation on 
Mortensen's behalf on more than one occasion, that he has worked 
on subdivision projects for Mortensen before and that some of 
these projects the parcels Mortensen has sold have not been 
surveyed, that Mortensen works too fast in selling lots before they 
are surveyed, and that he has told Mortensen that it is not prudent 
to do that. 
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 24, ~ 31. Thus, this is not Vernon 
Mortensen's first time to either the litigation rodeo, or the bullying rodeo. 
Mortensens and Whites knew that if they litigated the issue of the prescriptive 
easement across the western portion of Akers' land, the best they would have is a 
12.5-foot-wide agricultural easement, and they needed much more than that to 
accomplish their subdivision. BUllying was the only option that might prove to be 
successful. It was a calculated risk by Mortensens and Whites, and had Akers not 
filed this lawsuit, no doubt it would have been successful. 
This Court agrees with Akers: 
Before Defendant began digging and using heavy equipment across 
the easement, the road was a well maintained road. After 
Defendants "maintenance" efforts, the road was a disaster and 
Akers['] property was flooding due to the change in drainage 
patters caused by Defendants' excavation. 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, pp. 3-4. 
Without any support for its argument, Marti Mortensen makes the claim 
that "allowed use of the determined easement would still have caused water 
diversion." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 2. From a factual 
standpoint, this speculative claim finds absolutely no support in the record. From 
a legal standpoint, Marti Mortensen is wrong. The quote from Ransom 
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immediately above demonstrates that the owner of the dominant estate cannot 
alter the easement so as to cause a water trespass on the servient estate. 143 Idaho 
641,642, 152 P.3d 2, 3. Beckstead tells us the owner of the dominant estate has 
" ... a duty to protect the easement so as not to create an additional burden on the 
servient estate or an interference that would damage the land, such as flooding of 
the servient estate. 146 Idaho 57,66-67,190 P.3d 876,880,885-86, citing 
Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 455, 95 P.3d 69, 73 (2004). 
Defendants exceeded the scope of their easement on the terminus end. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs remain entitled to treble damages for "Defendant's willful 
trespass ... pursuant to I.C. §6-202." January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 26, ~ 22. Marti Mortensen claims that "the 
record does not show that notices were posted along the boundary of the 
easements required [by I.C. § 6-202]." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: 
Damages, p. 3. Whites make the same argument. Whites' Reply Brief on 
Remand, pp. 3-4. There is no requirement under I.C. § 6-202 that the "No 
Trespassing" signs be posted along the boundary of the prescriptive easement or 
that they be posted where the damage occurred. In Akers' response brief, Akers 
note several points in the record showing the location of "No Trespassing" signs 
in various locations: Plaintiffs' Exhibit 79, p. 1, photograph 13; Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 84 and 176; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 79, p. 1, photograph 8). Plaintiffs' Reply 
Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 8. This Court has already 
decided the issue more than eight years ago: 
36. Plaintiffs revoked defendants' permission to use the curved approach 
and the driveway west of Government Lot 2 in January 2002. Plaintiffs 
posted same with "No Trespassing" signs within 660 feet of each 
other. 
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 14, Finding 
of Fact ~ 36; see also p. 25, Conclusion of Law , ~ 13. (bold added). That finding 
has never changed in the intervening eight years. Akers are correct that the 
language of I.C. § 6-202 simply requires that the "No Trespassing" signs be 
located 600' apart in order to allow for an award of damages. Plaintiffs' Reply 
Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second Remand Re: 
Damages, pp. 3-4. 
Marti Mortensen claims: "In this case the Court must determine that the 
actions giving rise to punitive damages occurred outside of the now-determined 
easement." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 4. No citation to 
the record is given by Mortensen for this claim. There is no support in the record 
for that bald assertion. None of the "acts" of Mortensens and Whites changed as a 
result of this slightly different location of the easement at the terminus end. In 
fact, most of the "acts" of Mortensens and Whites took place at the triangle end of 
the easement. Thus, Akers remain entitled to punitive damages for Mortensens' 
and Whites' outrageous conduct. 
Whites argue that since the easement rights were uncertain in this case, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has stated punitive damages are not appropriate, citing R. T 
Nahas Co. v. Hulet, 114 Idaho [23,29,752 P.2d 625,631 (Ct.App. 1988)]. 
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 5-6. First of all, this was an Idaho Court of 
Appeals decision, not an Idaho Supreme Court decision. Second, as noted by 
Akers, what the Idaho Court of Appeals actually wrote was: 
Although we do not suggest that interference with unadjudicated 
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rights never can satisfy the criteria for punitive damages, we hold 
that the record in this case falls short of showing the extreme 
circumstances required for such an award. 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second 
Remand Re: Damages, pp. 5-6, citing R. T Nahas, 114 Idaho 23, 29, 752 P.2d 
625,631. Whites' counsel has wholly overstated the holding in R. T Nahas Co. 
v. Hulet. 
While Akers did not cite to the record in making the following 
recapitulation, the bracketed citations added by the Court show everything Akers 
claim is accurate: 
Defendants did much more than rely on their easement rights. 
They disregarded a court injunction. [Imposed May 8, 2002, made 
permanent by stipUlation on June 5, 2002, and order of the Court 
June 14, 2002; April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, 
and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 
19, , 13: "Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's 
permanent injunction (restraining Defendants from trespassing on 
Plaintiffs' real property) by trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at 
night, behind Plaintiffs' home, in an effort to intimidate and 
frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten Sherrie Akers"] 
They disregarded county ordinances. [January 2,2003, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 15,'39] There were 
threats of physical violence against Plaintiffs. [April 1, 2004, 
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 20,'18; p. 21,"19,20, 
21,22; p. 22, "27,28,29] There were acts where Defendants 
tried to incite Plaintiffs to engage in physical violence. [Id.] There 
was purposeful damage to property not necessitated by 
maintenance of the easement. [January 2, 2003, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 15, " 40-45, p. 16, , 47] There 
was an attempt to manipulate the county prosecutor. [April 1, 
2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 20, , 17: Defendant 
Mortensen misrepresented facts to the Kootenai County prosecutor 
(making false claims of material facts) in an effort to persuade the 
prosecutor to prosecute Plaintiff Dennis Akers."] There was 
intimidation of witnesses during trial. [April 1, 2004, 
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 21,'24] 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on Second 
Remand Re: Damages, pp. 6. Vernon Mortensen and David White behaved 
incredibly boorishly, arrogantly, and intimidated the Akers and others. This Court 
found that even at trial: 
The Court has personally observed defendant David White while 
on the stand testifying, raising his voice and addressing Plaintiffs 
in anger and has heard testimony that he has yelled at Plaintiffs 
during recesses in the trial while Plaintiffs were waiting in the 
hallway in direct contravention of this Court's order prohibiting the 
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parties from speaking with each other during the trial proceedings. 
The Court has watched defendant Vernon Mortensen testify, and 
has noticed time and time again, his inability to answer a question 
put to him, either by the opposing attorney or his own attorney. At 
trial on December 15, 2004, Mortensen was asked whether he sold 
four properties knowing there was an ongoing dispute over access. 
Mortensen went on a rant, claiming this was malicious prosecution, 
that Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed, and that he would not be 
intimidated by any of this. He claimed plaintiffs' counsel was 
trying to extort money from an insurance company and using us (he 
and White) as pawns to do so. 
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 22, ~ 26. 
In spite of all that, Whites now claim that: "Early in the trial of this case 
the Court observed that if an easement existed to White's property, 'there's not 
going to be any punitive damages.' (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 364-365)" Whites' Reply Brief 
on Remand, p. 6. That argument has no merit. A review of that entire passage 
shows that it was simply the Court suggesting again to Akers' counsel, that the 
issue of the easement and the issue of damages be bifurcated, because the nature 
and extent of the easement has relevance to the issue of damages. Tr. Vol. I, p. 
364, L. 19 - p. 365, L. 17. That same logic (that the location of the easement be 
decided before the damage issues) was used by this Court in this most recent 
round of litigation following remand from the Idaho Supreme Court. 
argue: 
Regarding the damages for the emotional distress of Sherrie Akers, Whites 
The record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought herself into a 
confrontation with White or Whites' employee in each instance in 
which she claims the incident caused her distress. One who 
intentionally creates a circumstance in which she finds herself 
emotionally distressed by asserting an unlawful right cannot justly 
contend that the person who is engaged in the lawful exercise of 
their rights has negligently cause them emotional distress. In this 
case, Sherrie Akers caused the circumstances that create any 
distress that she may have suffered when she chose to obstruct a 
vehicle operating on the express easement and when she chose to 
testify falsely regarding the location of the easement road at the top 
of the hill. 
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, pp. 4-5. Whites cite no legal authority for their 
claim that if you bring yourself "into a confrontation", that you are then precluded 
from emotional distress damages. Whites cite to no factual basis in the record for 
this claim. Whites' claim that "The record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought 
herself into a confrontation with White or Whites' employee in each instance in 
which she claims the incident cause her distress" is, quite simply, ludicrous. The 
Court has reviewed its various findings of fact, and can find no finding that 
indicates Sherrie Akers was the aggressor or brought herself into the 
confrontation. In fact, it is just the opposite. This Court has found that: 
"Defendants were confrontational with plaintiff Sherrie Akers on occasions when 
she sought to prevent their trespass on her property" (April 4, 2004, Memorandum 
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Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, p. 18, ~ 3); "Mr. White bullied, threatened and intimidated Sherrie Akers 
as she tried to assist the police in their investigation of an occasion when 
Defendants trespassed" (Jd, ~ 4); D.L. White Construction, Inc.'s operator 
purposely ran its dump truck toward Sherrie Akers and within two feet of her 
body, acting as though he were going to run over Sherrie Akers on an occasion 
when Defendants trespassed" (Jd, ~ 5); "During the same time period as above, 
D.L. White Construction, Inc.' s operator threatened to run Sherrie Akers off her 
property and threatened to dig a three-foot ditch across Plaintiffs' driveway to 
impede her use of the driveway" (Id, ~ 6); "Defendants actually impeded Sherrie 
Akers's access to her work (she is a cardiac nurse at a Spokane hospital) by 
intentionally dumping dirt across Plaintiffs' driveway, which served no purpose 
other than to block Plaintiffs' ingress and egress" (Jd, ~ 7). This Court found: 
Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's 
permanent injunction (restraining Defendants from trespassing on 
Plaintiffs' real property) by trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at 
night, behind Plaintiffs' horne, in an effort to intimidate and 
frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten Sherrie Akers. 
Dennis Akers testimony is found credible that the Friday before the 
last trial days, David White was found off the easement, clearly on 
Akers' land, thirty feet from their house, that Dennis Akers ran 
after him and saw White get in his truck, and when Akers told him 
"I've caught you again trespassing", white responded "Go to hell." 
This is in violation of this Court's prior orders. This Court finds 
not credible David White's testimony that he was not on the 
Akers['] property or the road on that night, that instead he was up 
on the other side of the bam on his own property. Dennis Akers 
testified that White has sat in his vehicle on Millsap Loop Road 
and watching the Akers' house. White did not rebut this. Dennis 
Akers testified that several times during this protracted trial, there 
were outbursts in the hallway by White and Mortensen. White did 
not rebut this, nor did Mortensen." 
Id, pp. 19-20, ~ 13. Whites' counsel to write: "The record reflects that Sherrie 
Akers brought herself into a confrontation with White or Whites' employee in 
each instance in which she claims the incident caused her distress", is so far from 
the truth it amounts to sanctionable conduct under LR.C.P. 11(a)(1), against 
Whites' attorney Robert Covington. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(1) reads 
in pertinent part: "The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate 
that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the 
best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it 
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost oflitigation." It is simply false for Whites' 
attorney to write "The record reflects that Sherrie Akers brought herself into a 
confrontation with White or Whites' employee in each instance in which she 
claims the incident caused her distress." Unfortunately, as shown in the next few 
paragraphs of this opinion, there is more sanctionable conduct by Whites' 
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attorney. 
Whites attorney also writes: 
... Akers established for this series of events a standard of conduct 
that was equally or more as problematic as that of White. In a fist 
fight as in this case, punitive damages are not appropriate against 
one party engaged in conduct similar to that of his antagonist. 
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 3. While the second sentence of that passage 
is simply argument (albeit without any merit), the first sentence is an assertion of 
fact, which is not "well grounded in fact". For the same reasons found in the 
record discussed immediately above, this Court finds this statement of fact by 
Whites' counsel is completely false, unsupported by any legal argument, and 
sanctionable. 
Whites' attorney provided no citation to the record nor did he cite to any 
portion of any of the Court's previous findings to support Whites' claim that: "she 
[Sherrie Akers] chose to testify falsely regarding the location of the easement road 
at the top of the hill." Likewise, Whites' attorney failed to provide any 
explanation as to how, even if that were accurate that she testified falsely (it isn't), 
how that false testimony could even remotely relate to the emotional distress 
issue. This Court found" ... Sherrie Akers to be a very credible witness." 
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, conclusions 
of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 30. Counsel for Akers argues: "It is disappointing and 
disturbing to see White's counsel advance this unwarranted attack on Mrs. 
Akers." Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites "Reply" Brief on 
Second Remand Re: Damages, pp. 5. It is an unwarranted attack. It is also a 
completely unsubstantiated attack. It is additional sanctionable conduct under 
LR.C.P. 11(a)(1), against Whites' attorney Robert Covington. 
Whites attorney made the following shocking argument: 
The Court improperly awarded Akers $1939 for damage to 
his truck for an occurrence that took place within the easement 
area. Defendants were engaged in lawful use of their easement 
when Akers obstructed passage of a tracked vehicle driven by 
Mortensen. Defendants were the owners of the dominant estate 
and Akers was not permitted to use the easement in a manner that 
interfered with use of the easement by owners of the dominant 
estate. Akers is not entitled to recover damages that he caused by 
obstructing lawful use of the easement. This component should not 
be allowed to Akers. 
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 3. No legal citation is given for this 
argument. The only source for this argument that this Court can think of is 
"Might makes right." What difference does it make if Akers were parked in the 
easement, on Millsap Road or the mall parking lot? You don't run into a truck 
with a bulldozer, intentionally. Apparently, in the mind of Whites' attorney, if 
you have a bulldozer, you can simply move someone else's pickup out of the way 
if you don't like where it is parked. Whether this took place on the easement is 
not relevant. Whether this took place on the portion that is an express easement 
or this took place on the portion that is an easement by prescription is not relevant. 
Whites' novel argument finds no support in the law, within the facts of this case 
or within a civilized society. While the Court can understand Whites' counsel 
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trying to minimize the damage for which his client has already been found 
responsible, Whites' attorney's factual and legal claims must conform to LR.C.P. 
11 (a)(l). In these instances discussed, they do not. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(1) makes imposition of a sanction 
mandatory when the court finds, as this Court does, that an attorney has violated 
the rule: "If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, 
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person 
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee." The unfounded statements by Whites' 
counsel that Akers' were the aggressors, that Sherrie Akers testified falsely, that 
" ... Sherrie Akers brought herself into a confrontation with White or Whites' 
employee in each instance", are especially disturbing in light of the fact that 
Whites' conduct contributed to Sherrie Akers' emotional distress. In making 
these unsubstantiated statements, Whites' attorney is simply following suit on his 
clients' bad acts which began nine years ago, continued through the trial, and is 
perpetuated by counsel at present. The rule serves a separate cognizable purpose, 
focusing upon discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct 
within the overall course of a lawsuit. State of Alaska ex reI. Sweat v. Hansen, 
116 Idaho 927, 782 P.2d 50 (Ct.App. 1989). However, this Court must consider 
the attorney's conduct in the filing of pleadings, motions or other papers, and not 
acts which are part of the trial itself. Koehn v. Riggins, 126 Idaho 1017, 895 P.2d 
1210 (1995). In evaluating an attorney's conduct in filing a pleading, the district 
court must determine whether the attorney exercised reasonableness under the 
circumstances and made a proper investigation upon reasonable inquiry into the 
facts and legal theories before signing and filing the document. Chapple v. 
Madison County Officials, 132 Idaho 26,80,967 P.2d 278, 282 (1998). This 
Court finds Whites' counsel did not make a proper investigation prior to making 
these false statements, nor did he exercise reasonableness in writing those false 
statements and incorporating them into a brief which he signed. Largely due to 
the number of these false statements, this Court finds they were interposed by 
Whites' counsel for the improper purpose of harassment. The difficulty in 
determining the appropriate sanction is these false statements by Whites' attorney 
caused little, if any, delay, and caused little, if any, additional work by Akers' 
attorney. Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 520, 835 P.2d 1331 (Ct.App. 1992). 
Accordingly, the monetary amount of the sanction in this case should not be great. 
This Court awards to the Akers the sum of $2,000.00, imposed against Whites' 
attorney directly, as the sanction for the above described conduct. 
Marti Mortensen now claims that punitive damages in this case 
"duplicates" the treble damages allowed under the trespass action. Marti 
Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 4. Marti Mortensen appropriately 
cites Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d 321 (1993), where the 
focus should be on whether the defendant has incurred multiple penalties for the 
same wrongful act. Although Marti Mortensen does not direct the Court to a page 
number in Bumgarner, she apparently is referring to 124 Idaho 629, 642, 862 P.2d 
321,334. Marti Mortensen, again without citing to the record, argues: "There are 
no 'distinct acts' here: all the trespass damages arise from the same conduct that 
gives rise to the punitive damages." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: 
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Damages, p. 4. That claim is not supported by the record. As noted by Akers: 
Defendants were not punished twice for the same wrongful 
acts. As in Bumgarner, this Court in granting this [sic] the 
punitive damages award focused on the Defendants' act of 
subdividing and road building-undertaken in defiance of 
applicable ordinances, which acts were distinct from the damage to 
the road and property occasioned by the acts of trespass. The 
Court also focused on Defendants' action taken in violation of this 
Court's permanent injunction issued in the matter. Further 
consideration was given to the fact that the Defendants tried to 
bring prosecution to manipulate the legal system and intimidate 
Akers and that a witness, Bill Reynolds, was threatened to 
influence his testimony. 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 11. This 
Court agrees. The amounts of punitive damages awarded in favor of Akers and 
against Mortensens are different in amount from those awarded against Whites, to 
take into account the quality and quantity of their actions. There are a plethora of 
other actions by both Whites and Mortensens which warrant punitive damages, 
but for which statutory damages under the trespass statute, I.C. § 6-202 are wholly 
inappropriate. The trespass damages were purely compensatory. This Court held: 
"The evidence of the reasonable and necessary costs of repairs for the above 
damage cause by Defendants multiple willful trespasses is $17,002.85." April 1, 
2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 27, ~ 2. The purpose of punitive damages is to 
deter defendant's misconduct, not to compensate plaintiffs for their losses. 
Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 642,862 P.2d 321, 334. That purpose was 
specifically stated by the Court as follows: 
5. Looking at the criteria of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, Slip Op. No. 01-1289 (2003), p. 8, and 
award of punitive damage against Mortensen is appropriate. The 
harm caused to Akers was physical, emotion, and not just 
economic. Mortensen's conduct evinced an indifference to or 
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others. Mortensen's 
conduct was repeated, occurring over a lengthy period of time and 
even after Court order in this case, this was not an isolated 
incident. The harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery or 
deceit. Finally, compared to Mortensen and whoever is backing 
this litigation on Mortensen's behalf, the Akers are financially 
vulnerable in comparison. Campbell states " ... that a recidivist 
may be punished more severely than a first offender [because] 
repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual 
instance of malfeasance ... " ld. p. 13, citing BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 558, 577 (1996). The amount of 
punitive damages likely to deter Defendant Mortensens from 
engaging in like conduct in the future is $150,000.00. 
6. The amount of punitive damages likely to deter 
Defendant Whites from engaging in like conduct in the future is 
$30,000.00. 
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April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 28, ~~ 5, 6. Whites simply did not have 
the track record of similar conduct in other real estate transactions. Whites were 
not nearly so brazen in their attitude before the Court, as compared to Mortensens. 
Whites seemed to be the follower, with Mortensens the leader. Thus, the 
difference in the amount of the punitive damages awards against each couple. 
Marti Mortensen claims that "large" (later referred to by Marti Mortensen 
as "huge") punitive damage awards are not appropriate in cases such as this 
because defendants are unlikely to perform similarly in the future, citing Cox v. 
Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 688-89, 496 P.2d 682 (1972). Marti Mortensen's 
Memorandum Re: Damages, pp. 5-6. First of all, Mortensens need deterrence, 
because, as stated above, this has been Vernon Mortensen's modus operandi. 
There is no indication in the record that Mortensen will change his conduct in the 
future absent a punitive damage award. Indeed, there is every indication in the 
record that the imposition of punitive damages in this case is simply a calculated 
cost of doing business factored in with all of Mortensens' land acquisitions. 
Second, Cox states: " ... the social purpose served by exemplary damages is the 
deterrence of the defendant and others from like conduct." 94 Idaho 683,689,496 
P .2d 682, 688. Thus, it is not just the conduct of Whites and Mortensens in this 
case that is entirely at issue. It is also the conduct of those similarly situated 
(buying land cheap because it has access problems), and similarly disposed (who, 
subsequently to finding themselves unable to buy an easement, proceed to bully 
and intimidate) which must be deterred. Third, the conduct of Mortensens and 
Whites in this case are much different than the conduct of Stolworthy in Cox. 
Stolworthy bulldozed part of Cox' fence down and Stolworthy ran his sheep 
across Cox' land on one occasion. 94 Idaho 683, 684, 496 P.2d 682, 683. 
Stolworthy at all times admitted the trespass but denied any malice. The jury 
imposed $5,000 in punitive damages; the district court upheld that award and 
refused a motion to reduce such. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the award of 
punitive damages but felt the district court should have reduced that $5,000 award 
down to $2,000 and remanded back to the district court for such result. 94 Idaho 
683,692,496 P.2d 682,691. This Court agrees with Akers' argument: "As 
outlined above, there were numerous acts in the present case that far exceeded 
what appeared to be the relatively civil disagreement that was analyzed in Cox." 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum on Second Remand Re: Damages, p. 12. The 
Idaho Supreme Court in Cox discussed the types of cases in which punitive 
damage awards are typically found: 
A pattern of factual situations may be discerned in the past 
cases decided by this Court which appears to be closely related to 
the size of the exemplary damage awards allowed on appeal. We 
believe the pattern is quite significant and can be usefully 
described for the guidance of the trial courts and will help 
determine the case at bar. The pattern seems to encompass at least 
three categories of situations. 
The first concerns those cases involving deceptive business 
schemes operated for profit and often victimizing numerous 
members of the public aside from the plaintiff. Clearly in such 
cases the award of exemplary damages should aim at making the 
cost of such repetitive antisocial conduct uneconomical. Thus, for 
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example, in Boise Dodge, Inc., v. Clark, supra, cross-complainant 
was one victim of a fraudulent scheme. A generous award of 
exemplary damages served to remove the profit factor from the 
whole scheme. See, Comment, 'Automobile Dealership Fraud: 
Punitive Damages,' 7 Idaho L.R. 117 (1970). Cf. Barth v. B. F. 
Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal.App.2d 228, 71 Cal.Rptr. 306 (1968). 
The second category is illustrated by the Village of Peck v. 
Denison decision, supra. There defendants' repeated actions 
endangered the physical well-being and health of the several 
hundred citizens of the town. Where actual physical harm is 
threatened or actually inflicted on a person or persons the situation 
rises to a serious level of affairs. In such a case where the 
plaintiffs physical well-being is endangered, a substantial punitive 
damages award finds justification in the nature of the malicious 
conduct itself as well as the quality ofthe injury sustained. 
The case at bar fits neither of these categories. However, a 
third category of cases does seem applicable. These cases typically 
involve non-violent but nevertheless serious disputes between two 
parties. Often the dispute centers on an interest in real or personal 
property or an interference with a business operation. Here the 
action concerned an act of trespass to the plaintiffs' real property 
but no lives were endangered and there was no indication the 
defendant made a practice of acting in this fashion. 
In such situations in the past this Court has not looked 
favorably on large punitive damage awards for the apparent reason 
that the nature of the dispute did not warrant a severe penalty to the 
wrongdoer-an award out of proportion both to the activity 
complained of and the damages incurred. 
Idaho 683, 691, 496 P.2d 682,690. It is only that third situation in which the 
Idaho Supreme Court cautioned the amount of punitive damages should bear 
some relationship with the amount of actual damages incurred. Two facts which 
separate the present case from this third category must be noted. In that third 
category, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that "these cases typically involve non-
violent but nevertheless serious disputes between two parties." Id. No physical 
violence was visited upon the bodies of the Akers, but emotional violence, 
intimidation and threats by Mortensens and Whites was visited upon them, even 
throughout the year long court trial. Second, the Idaho Supreme Court noted 
that in that third category, " ... there was no indication the defendant made a 
practice of acting in this fashion." Id. While there is no proof that Whites made a 
practice of acting in this fashion in other cases, there is ample proof that David 
White was consistent in his intimidation of the Akers in this case over the course 
of a decade now, in this case. There is certainly proof that Mortensens were very 
consistent in their intimidation in this case and in other cases prior to and during 
this litigation. That is the primary reason the punitive damage awards are in 
different amounts as between Mortensens and Whites. To sum up, there are 
important facts that separate the instant case from the third category mentioned in 
Cox, where the punitive damages should bear some relation to actual damages. 
That being the case, this Court finds that in the instant case there is a reasonable 
relation between punitive damages and actual damages. In the present case, the 
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actual damages incurred were $17,002.85 costs of repairs for the multiple trespass 
damages, trebeled to $51,008.55, and emotional distress damages to Sherrie Akers 
in the amount of$10,000, while the amount of punitive damages were $30,000 
against Whites and $150,000 against Mortensens. 
Moreover, this Court finds the present case has earmarks of all three types 
of cases discussed in Cox: 
The first concerns those cases involving deceptive business 
schemes operated for profit and often victimizing numerous 
members of the public aside from the plaintiff. Clearly in such 
cases the award of exemplary damages should aim at making the 
cost of such repetitive antisocial conduct uneconomical. Thus, for 
example, in Boise Dodge, Inc., v. Clark, supra, cross-complainant 
was one victim of a fraudulent scheme. A generous award of 
exemplary damages served to remove the profit factor from the 
whole scheme. 
Id. The present case fits this first category, as Mortensens and Whites conduct 
was essentially part of a deceptive business scheme. Mortensens (and later 
Whites) bought Peplinskis' property for cents on the dollar due to lack of access 
or at least questionable legal access. After they bought the property they then 
tried to buy access. Failing at that attempt to gain legal access, they began 
intimidating Akers. While two people (the Akers) were primarily hurt by the 
conduct of Mortensens and Whites, others were involved. Law enforcement was 
brought in on more than one occasion, county officials were impacted as zoning 
orders were violated, and witnesses were intimidated. Whites and Mortensens are 
guilty of "repetitive antisocial conduct" prior to this litigation, which necessitated 
this litigation, and which continued throughout this litigation. And, at least as to 
Mortensens, that "repetitive antisocial conduct" has occurred in other litigation 
and in other land transactions which did not result in litigation. This repetitive 
antisocial conduct must be made "uneconomical" for punitive or exemplary 
damages to have any of the desired effect. In this first category, damages should 
be "large" or "huge" as now complained about by Marti Mortensen, as the Idaho 
Supreme Court wrote: "A generous award of exemplary damages served to 
remove the profit factor from the whole scheme." Id. This Court finds the 
amount of punitive damages awarded against Mortensens was neither "large" nor 
"huge", and probably not even "generous" given the protracted nature of 
Mortensens' conduct, the severity and frequency of the intimidation. The award 
of punitive damages against Mortensens was adequate. The same is true of the 
award of punitive damages against Whites. 
The second category is illustrated by the Village of Peck v. 
Denison decision, supra. There defendants' repeated actions 
endangered the physical well-being and health of the several 
hundred citizens of the town. Where actual physical harm is 
threatened or actually inflicted on a person or persons the situation 
rises to a serious level of affairs. In such a case where the 
plaintiffs physical well-being is endangered, a substantial punitive 
damages award finds justification in the nature of the malicious 
conduct itself as well as the quality of the injury sustained. 
Id. The present case fits this second category as well. Mortensens and Whites 
committed "repeated actions" which, while not "endanger[ing] the physical well-
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being and health of the several hundred citizens of the town", certainly that 
conduct endangered the physical well-being and health of Sherrie Akers and, to a 
lesser extent, Dennis Akers. This is a case "Where actual physical harm is 
threatened ... " In these cases " ... a substantial punitive damages award finds 
justification in the nature of the malicious conduct itself as well as the quality of 
the injury sustained." Id. As mentioned above, the award of punitive damages 
against Moretensens was adequate; it was not "substantial". The same is true of 
the award of punitive damages against Whites. 
Finally, as noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Cox: "In arriving at such 
a [punitive damage] figure it would seem to be reasonable and good social policy 
in cases such as these to grant such an amount that a plaintiff would be 
encouraged to bring the dispute to the courts for settlement." Id. This Court finds 
the amount of punitive damages sufficient to do just that, and no more. The irony 
is that had Mortensens and Whites brought litigation to have their easement rights 
against Akers decided judicially, prior to their excavation and intimidation, this 
could have ended peaceably almost a decade ago. However, peaceable litigation 
would have ended with the same result, that being Mortensens and Whites having 
a 12.5-foot easement, the use of which, on the prescriptive end at least, cannot be 
expanded upon beyond its historical, agricultural, intermittent use. That outcome 
would have been unacceptable to Mortensens and Whites given the subdivision 
they desired to create and the financial reward they intended to reap from that 
development. 
Finally, Marti Mortensen argues, based on agency law: "Therefore 
MORTENSENS should not be responsible for any punitive damages occasioned 
by WHITE's conduct." Marti Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages, p. 6, 
citing Openshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co, 94 Idaho 335, 487 P.2d 929 (1971). 
(capitalization in original). Whites make the similar argument, but going the 
opposite way: 
Mortensen correctly drew the Court's attention to the well 
settled principle that a principal is liable for punitive damages 
based upon the acts of its agent only in circumstances in which the 
principal participated, or in which the principal authorized or 
ratified the agent's conduct. Openshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co, 
94 Idaho 335 (1971). White personally should not be punished for 
conduct by Mortensen or the employee ofD.L. White 
Construction, Inc. where the Openshaw standard is not met. 
The record does not indicate that White participated in or 
authorized events described in findings of fact from the April 1, 
2004 decision numbered 5,67,8,9,11,12,16,20,24. Punitive 
damages arising from those findings fail the Openshaw test and 
should not be awarded. 
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 7. It is ironic that nine years after this all 
started, the two who were specifically found by this Court to be acting in concert, 
would now apparently like to divorce themselves from each other's conduct. This 
protracted litigation was the result of the bullying tactics of Vernon Mortensen 
and David White, and now that the litigation appears to be winding down, those 
two appear to be turning on each other, distancing each other from the other, in an 
obvious attempt to lessen responsibility for damages caused. In doing so they fail 
to realize that damages were awarded for past actions. None of Whites and 
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Mortensens current arguments change those past actions. 
This Court has already found: "As set forth in the Conclusions of Law, 
defendants Vernon Mortensen and David White at all pertinent times are jointly 
and severally liable for compensatory damages to the Akers' property, for the 
trebled damages, and for Sherrie Akers' emotional distress." April 4, 2004, 
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, p. 18, Finding of Fact ~ 2.n. This was because: " ... this Court 
finds at all pertinent times they were each 'acting in concert' as defined by [I.e. § 
6-803], in that they were 'pursuing a common plan or design which result[ ed] in 
the commission of an intentional or reckless tortuous act.'" Id., p. 28, Conclusion 
of Law, ~ 4. This Court's decision is consistent with Openshaw. Regarding 
punitive damages, this Court awarded an amount of punitive damage in favor of 
Akers as against Mortensens which was different than the amount of punitive 
damage in favor of Akers as against Whites. These amounts were not joint and 
several as between Mortensens and Whites. This Court engaged in careful 
analysis as to the factual and legal reasons given for the punitive damage award 
against the Mortensens and the different award against the Whites. Seven years 
ago, this Court found as a matter of fact: 
41. Vemon Mortensen has violated and disregarded Kootenai 
County ordinances and the orders of this Court for pecuniary gain, 
specifically to increase the value of his land development projects. 
In his actions, testimony and demeanor he has shown a conscious 
disregard and disrespect for the law. He has harmed innocent 
North Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, by this conscious 
disregard for the law. As such, it is highly likely that he will 
continue to harm Plaintiffs and other Idaho landowners unless he is 
deterred from engage in like conduct in the future. 
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 25, Finding of Fact ~ 41. Nothing has 
changed that finding of fact. This Court discussed Mortensen's assets at length. 
Id., pp. 23-25, Findings of Fact ~~ 31-39. This Court then found as a matter of 
law: 
5. Looking at the criteria of State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, Slip Op. No. 01-1289 (2003), p. 8, an 
award of punitive damage against Mortensen is appropriate. The 
harm caused to Akers was physical, emotional, and not just 
economic. Mortensen's conduct evinced an indifference to or 
reckless disregard for the health or safety of others. Mortensen's 
conduct was repeated, occurring over a lengthy period of time and 
even after Court order in this case, this was not an isolated 
incident. The harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery or 
deceit. Finally compared to Mortensen and whoever is backing 
this litigation on Mortensen's behalf, the Akers are financially 
vulnerable in comparison. Campbell states" ... that a recidivist 
may be punished more severely than a first offender [because] 
repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual 
instance of malfeasance ... " Id., p. 13, citing BMW o.!North 
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.W. 559, 577 (1996). The amount of 
punitive damages likely to deter Defendant Mortensens from 
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engaging in like conduct in the future is $150,000.00. 
Id, p. 28, Conclusion of Law, ~ 5. On the other hand, as to the Whites, this Court 
found as a matter of fact: 
42. David White and D.L. White Construction, Inc., has violated 
and disregarded Kootenai County ordinances and the orders of this 
Court for pecuniary gain, specifically to increase the value of his 
land development project. In his actions, testimony and demeanor 
he has shown a conscious disregard and disrespect for the law. He 
has harmed innocent North Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, 
by this conscious disregard for the law. As such, it is highly likely 
that he will continue to harm Plaintiffs and other Idaho landowners 
unless he is deterred from engaging in like conduct in the future. 
Id, p. 25, Finding of Fact ~ 42. Nothing has changed that finding of fact. This 
Court separately discussed White's assets. ld, p. 40. This Court then found as a 
matter of law: 
6. The amount of punitive damages likely to deter 
Defendant Whites from engaging in like conduct in the future is 
$30,000.00. 
Id, p. 28, Conclusion of Law, ~ 6. Nothing in this Court's prior award, ratified 
today by this decision, is inconsistent with Openshaw. In addition to the 
multitude of occasions where Mortensens and Whites acted in concert, this Court 
has also taken into account the situations where conduct was purely that of 
Mortensens or purely that of Whites. This Court has assessed the differences in 
their financial situation. This Court has assessed Mortensen differently as a 
recidivist due to his conduct in other situations and other litigations. All of which 
result in differing amounts of punitive damage awards. 
Whites claim this Court: 
... did not articulate specific reasons for its award of punitive 
damages against Whites, stating only "That the amount of punitive 
damages likely to deter Defendant Whites from engaging in like 
conduct in the future is $30,000. The trial court did not specify a 
clear and convincing standard of proof for its findings of fact with 
respect to Whites or Mortensens, despite the requirements of Idaho 
Code Section 6-1601 (9). 
Whites' Reply Brief on Remand, p. 6. First of all, it is not I.C. § 6-1601 (9) that 
sets forth the "clear and convincing standard of proof'. That standard is 
articulated in I.e. § 6-1604(1). If in fact this Court seven years ago failed to 
mention that standard, it does so now. This Court specifically finds that Akers 
have proven, by clear and convincing evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious 
and outrageous conduct (they only needed to prove one type of conduct, they 
proved them all) by both Mortensens and Whites, under I.C. § 6-1604(1). This 
Court seven years ago, as reiterated in this decision, did articulate specific 
reasons for its award of punitive damages against Whites. In addition to Finding 
of Fact ~42 quoted entirely immediately above, the Court also found: 
13. Defendant White consciously disregarded the Court's 
permanent injunction (restraining Defendants from trespassing on 
Plaintiffs' real property) by trespassing on Plaintiffs' property at 
night, behind Plaintiffs' home, in an effort to intimidate and 
frighten Plaintiffs, and did intimidate and frighten Sherrie Akers. 
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Dennis Akers testimony is found credible that the Friday before the 
last trial days, David White was found off the easement, clearly on 
Akers' land, thirty feet from their house, that Dennis Akers ran 
after him and saw White get in his truck, and when Akers told him 
"I've caught you again trespassing", White responded "Go to hell." 
This is in violation of the Court's prior orders. This Court finds 
not credible David White's testimony that he was not on the Akers 
property or the road on that night, that instead he was up on the 
other side of the barn on his own property. Dennis Akers testified 
that White has sat in his vehicle on Millsap Loop Road and 
watching the Akers' house. White did not rebut this. 
Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, pp. 19-20, Finding of Fact ~ 13. 
Finally, at oral argument on January 26,2011, counsel for Whites, in 
discussing his clients' financial situation relative to punitive damages, made the 
claim that his clients have "been destroyed by this process." Counsel for Marti 
Mortensen made a similar argument on January 26,2011, explaining the fact that 
Marti Mortensen has divorced Vernon Mortensen in the intervening eight years 
since trial, that "Marti Mortensen would tell you she's broke", and "Jerry 
Mortensen is in a substantially bad financial condition." First, there is no proof 
of this fact. No affidavits were submitted from the Whites. No affidavits were 
submitted by Marti Mortensen. Vernon Mortensen filed a 32-page affidavit on 
January 24,2011, but it does not reference his financial situation. Second, neither 
counsel for the Whites nor counsel for Marti Mortensen, nor Vernon Mortensen, 
pro se, have bothered to cite this Court to any legal authority that the financial 
situation of the perpetrator at the time of remand proceedings is relevant as 
compared to the perpetrator's financial situation at the time of the wrongful 
conduct and the trial. If it is the conduct of the defendant that is to be deterred, it 
makes no sense to consider that defendant's financial situation at any time other 
than proximate to the conduct. It would make no sense to consider a defendant's 
financial situation seven years before the bad conduct. Why then, as advocated by 
Whites' counsel and Marti Mortensen's counsel, would it make any more sense to 
consider a defendant's financial situation seven years after the bad conduct 
occurred? There is nothing in Robinson v. State Farm Insurance, 137 Idaho 173, 
45 P.3d 829 (2002), or IDJI 9.20.5 that would indicate such an absurd result. 
III. ORDER. 
IT IS ORDERED White's "Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: 
Easement Location" is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendants are liable for all damages as 
previously set forth in the Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order filed April 1, 2004, pp. 12-29. The 
prescriptive easement does not expand the express easement, and the prescriptive 
easement over Akers' land in Parcel B is in a slightly different location than 
defendants' excavated on that parcel. Additionally, defendants placed fill from their 
excavation on Akers' Parcel B. Accordingly, even with the finding of an easement 
by prescription, all previous findings regarding damages remain. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Akers are the prevailing party as against 
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Mortensens and Whites, and Akers are entitled to costs as proven at a later hearing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Akers are entitled to attorney fees as set 
forth above. The amount of prior attorney fees are as previously awarded. The 
amount of attorney fees subsequent to the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent 
Remittitur will be determined at a later hearing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Akers are awarded the sum of 
$2,000.00, imposed against Whites' attorney directly, as the sanction for the 
conduct described above. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' attorney prepare ajudgment 
consistent with the above Opinion and this Order. 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion 
for Additional Evidence on Easement Location, pp. 11-40. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Vernon Mortensen sets forth no rule basis for his "Motion to Correct", nor is a rule 
referenced in Mortensen's "Affidavit in Support of Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04". Because Vernon Mortensen is requesting this 
Court to revisit decisions from 2003 and 2004, his motion is untimely under LR.C.P. 60(b)(I)(2) 
and (3). Vernon Mortensen is not making a motion to reconsider under LR.C.P. 60(b)(4) (void 
judgment) or (5) judgment has been satisfied. Vernon Mortensen's motion could be viewed as 
one made under LR.C.P. 60(b)(6) ("any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment"), but those "other reasons" cannot include the reasons found in subsection (1) 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"; subsection (2) "newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b)" or subsection (3) "fraud or other misconduct of an adverse party." 
Whether to grant a motion to set aside a judgment, pursuant to LR.C.P. 60(b), is 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Clear Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, 123 
Idaho 141,143,845 P.2d 559, 561 (1992); Johnston v. Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414,599 P.2d 985 
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(1979). Denial of an LR.C.P. 60(b) motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Alderson v. 
Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 743, 132 P.3d 1261, 1271 (Ct.App.2006). Where a motion invokes 
discretionary grounds for relief from a judgment, the standard is review of discretion; however, 
where the grounds are non-discretionary, as when a judgment is void, the question presented is 
one of law over which reviewing courts exercise free review. Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 109 
Idaho 56, 704 P.2d 960 (Ct.App.1985). 
"A motion to reconsider a dismissal order properly should be treated as a motion to alter 
or amend ajudgment under LR.C.P. 59(e) if the motion was timely filed." Ross v. State, 141 
Idaho 670, 671, 115 P.3d 761, 762 (Ct.App. 2005); Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 
754, 760 (2007). A motion to alter or amend ajudgment, pursuant to Rule 59(e) "shall be served 
not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment." LR.C.P.59(e). In Straub, the 
Smiths made a motion to reconsider under LR.C.P. 11(a). The Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
However, a party may only make a motion to reconsider interlocutory order or 
orders entered after the entry of final judgment. LR.C.P. 11(a)(2). The dismissal 
was a final judgment and, thus, the Smith's motion to reconsider should be treated 
as a motion to modify or amend the order of dismissal. 
Id. (emphasis added). It is Rule 59(e) under which this Court may correct any alleged legal and 
factual errors before it. In Straub, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of 
reconsideration, treating the motion as one to alter or amend under LR.C.P. 59(e). 145 Idaho 65, 
71, 175 P .3d 754, 760. The Smiths had supported their motion with an affidavit alerting the 
court to the fact that they had stipulated to dismissal with prejudice, but had not agreed to waive 
costs. Id. "Thus, if the court entered the order denying costs and fees because it understood that 
to be part of the stipulation terms, the Smiths' motion alerted it to the factual error and the 
motion gave it the opportunity to correct that error." Id. Vernon Mortensen's instant motion 
could be considered as one to alter or amend a judgment, but the Court will not consider new 
evidence in motions to alter or amend under LR.C.P. 59(e). 
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Rule 59(e) motions were discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Coeur d'Alene Mining 
Co. v. First National Bank of Idaho, where the Court stated: 
A Rule 59(e) motion to amend a judgment is addressed to the discretion of the 
court. An order denying a motion made under rule 59(e) to alter or amend a 
judgment is appealable, but only on the question of whether there has been a 
manifest abuse of discretion. Rule 59(e) proceedings afford the trial court the 
opportunity to correct both errors of fact and law that had occurred in its 
proceedings; it thereby provides a mechanism for corrective action short of an 
appeal. Such proceedings must of necessity, therefore, be directed to the status of 
the case as it existed when the court rendered the decision upon which the 
judgment is based. 
118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990) (quoting Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 646 
P.2d 1030,1034 (Ct.App. 1982». 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592,21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). A party 
making a motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new evidence, but is not required to 
do so. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct.App. 2006). 
III. ANALYSIS. 
A. Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration 
on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04" Must be Dismissed. 
1. Vernon Mortensen's Motion is Untimely. 
Vernon Mortensen's motion must be dismissed as it is untimely. While Vernon 
Mortensen does not favor the Court with a rule basis for his motion, no rule allows the relief he 
requests. Vernon Mortensen is complaining about decisions and orders made by this Court back 
in 2003 and 2004. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) requires such motion, when made under 
subsections (1), (2) or (3) of that rule, must be made "not more than six (6) months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." Thus, if Vernon Mortensen's motion is 
made under I.R.C.P. (1), (2) or (3), it is time barred. 
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Subsections (4) ( void judgment) and (5) (judgment has been satisfied) are not applicable. 
Subsection (6), the "catchall" provision, could be applicable because as of July 1,2008, 
subsection (6) is not limited by the six-month limitation. However, subsection (6) has a fatal 
problem in its applicability to Vernon Mortensen in the present case. Subsection (6) allows relief 
for "any other reason justifYing relief from the operation of the jUdgment." All of Vernon 
Mortensen's complaints "sound" like motions made under LR.C.P. 60(b) subsection (1) 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"; subsection (2) "newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b)" or subsection (3) "fraud or other misconduct of an adverse party." rfVernon 
Mortensen is moving to set aside prior orders entered by this Court years ago, pursuant to the 
catch-all provision ofl.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), he is mistaken as to its applicability. As stated by the 
Idaho Supreme Court, in Hopkins v. Troutner, Rule 60(b)(6) "obviously gives wide latitude to 
the trial court in determining those circumstances under which to relieve a party from the effects 
of an order." 134 Idaho 445,447,4 P.3d 557, 559 (2000). However, the Supreme Court has also 
held, in Lease First v. Burns, that Rules (60(b)(1) and 60(b )(6) are mutually exclusive provisions. 
131 Idaho 158, 163,953 P.2d 596, 603 (citing Pullin v. City of Kimberly, 100 Idaho 34, 37, 592 
P.2d 849, 852, n. 2 (1979). Because the defendants in Lease First had not asserted additional 
facts beyond those they offered in support of their Rule 60(b)(1) mistake/surprise/excusable 
neglect/satisfaction argument, relief could not be granted for equitable reasons under 60(b)( 6). 
This Court may "entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order, or proceeding." l.R.C.P. 60(b). Idaho courts have inherent powers to entertain an 
independent action for equitable relief and these powers are not subj ect to Rule 60(b) or its time 
restrictions. Harper v Harper, 122 Idaho 535,537,835 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Ct.App. 1992); 
Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328 334, 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980). Such an independent 
action must be brought within a reasonable time. Id. In turn, what constitutes a reasonable time 
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is a matter within the Court's sound legal discretion. Gregory v. Hancock, 81 Idaho 221, 227-28, 
340 P.2d 108, 112 (1959). This Court does not find it proper to grant its discretion as Vernon 
Mortensen's complaints are not brought within a reasonable time. The time to make these 
arguments was to the Idaho Supreme Court on the prior appeals, not after the Court has reviewed 
the matters on remand and issued a decision not to Vernon Mortensen's liking. 
2. Even if Timely, Vernon Mortensen's Motion Lacks Merit. 
While Vernon Mortensen in his "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial 
Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 
4-1-04" agues the Court's findings are not supported by the evidence, the arguments Vernon 
Mortensen uses in making that claim and his conduct at the March 22, 2011, hearing, 
demonstrate his consistent behavior. While it is unexpected that Vernon Mortensen would 
change his stripes after nearly a decade of litigating this case, it is also unexpected that this Court 
would not give much credence to Mortensens' unsupported claims that he was treated unfairly. 
Most of Mort ens ens' argument at the March 22,2011, hearing seemed to be focused on 
this Court's finding that Mortensen was a "repeat offender". First, this Court has never used 
"repeat offender" in any of its prior decisions in this case. Second, as to Mortensen's prior 
conduct [to which he extrapolates the "repeat offender" moniker], as shown above in this Court's 
March 18, 2011, Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order 
Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location, even the people who 
have worked for Mortensen testified against Mortensen regarding his overreaching conduct on 
other occasions. 
Mortensens and Whites attempted to take what was at best occasional, seasonal, 
agricultural use, and attempted to turn it into full-time, year-round, fairly high 
volume, residential use. Since Akers were unwilling to simply "give" Mortensens 
an easement over the western portion of their land, Mortensens and Whites knew 
they would have to litigate any prescriptive easement. However, instead of 
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choosing the civil alternative of filing a civil lawsuit, Mortensens and Whites 
chose to simply start excavating and widening. Instead of acting civilly, 
Mortensens and Whites chose to threaten and intimidate the Akers. And, at least 
for Mortensens, according to the testimony of Scott Rasor, whom this Court found 
to be credible, this was consistent with prior conduct. Vernon Mortensen had 
violated the subdivision ordinances on prior occasions and doing so had harmed 
innocent purchasers of other properties. January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 18, ~ 50; Tr. Vol. II, p. 539,1. 3 - p. 540,1. 
20; April 1,2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 23, ~ 31. This Court found that after the 
present lawsuit began, Mortensen purchased sixty acres near Akers' property, 
subdivided that property into five-acre parcels, sold four parcels and then found 
himself in a legal dispute with the adjoining landowner regarding the legality of 
the subdivision and access to that subdivision. April 1,2004, Memorandum 
Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, p. 23, ~ 31. This Court wrote: "The easement-road dispute regarding 
access to these 60 acres is substantially similar to the dispute in the present case in 
that Mortensen is attempting to develop land with a disputed access and sell 
parcels of land to innocent purchases, thereby leaving the innocent purchasers 
with potential disputes with adjoining landowners, Kootenai County, the Fire 
District and the Highway District. Mortensen's testimony at Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425, 
1. 24 - p. 1426,1. 7." Id The Court found: 
Mortensen has utilized substantially the same development strategy 
in the past. If not deterred, he is likely to engage in this conduct in 
the future. Scott Rasor testified about Mortensen's prior land 
development projects that harmed innocent Idaho land owners. Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 539,1. 3 - p. 540,1. 20. Mortensen admitted he is now 
developing and selling forty acres near the subject property in spite 
of another easement road dispute similar to the present case. Tr. 
Vol. III, p. 1425,1. 24 - p. 1426,1. 7. Even Mortensen's own 
expert Kiebert testified that he has testified in litigation on 
Mortensen's behalf on more than one occasion, that he has worked 
on subdivision projects for Mortensen before and that some of 
these projects the parcels Mortensen has sold have not been 
surveyed, that Mortensen works too fast in selling lots before they 
are surveyed, and that he has told Mortensen that it is not prudent 
to do that. 
April 1, 2004, Memorandum Decision and Order, and Additional Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 24, ~ 31. Thus, this is not Vernon 
Mortensen's first time to either the litigation rodeo, or the bullying rodeo. 
Mortensens and Whites knew that if they litigated the issue ofthe prescriptive 
easement across the western portion of Akers' land, the best they would have is a 
12.5-foot-wide agricultural easement, and they needed much more than that to 
accomplish their subdivision. Bullying was the only option that might prove to be 
successful. It was a calculated risk by Mortensens and Whites, and had Akers not 
filed this lawsuit, no doubt it would have been successful. 
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for Additional Evidence on Easement Location, pp. 18-19. Most importantly, Vernon Mortensen 
at trial produced no credible evidence to contradict this damaging testimony by the people who 
had worked for Mortensen. For Vernon Mortensen to now argue: "I am demanding Susan 
Weeks provide the case numbers [of this prior litigation]" entirely misses the point. It is not 
plaintiffs' burden to now prove the truth of what Vernon Mortensen failed to rebut at trial. 
At the March 22,2011, oral argument, Vernon Mortensen argued this Court's finding that 
he had subdivided and sold properties is incorrect and that "no one had testified to that effect." 
Vernon Mortensen ignores the fact that he testified to that effect. As shown above: 
This Court wrote: "The easement-road dispute regarding access to these 60 
acres is substantially similar to the dispute in the present case in that Mortensen is 
attempting to develop land with a disputed access and sell parcels of land to 
innocent purchases, thereby leaving the innocent purchasers with potential 
disputes with adjoining landowners, Kootenai County, the Fire District and the 
Highway District. Mortensen's testimony at Tr. Vol. III, p. 1425, L. 24 - p. 1426, 
L. 7." ld 
ld, p. 18. The citation is wrong, it was in Volume II of the transcript, not Volume III. The 
following excerpt of Vernon Mortensen's testimony provides the point in the record proving this 
matter regarding the sixty acres, and provides a glimpse into Vernon Mortensen's reluctance to 
answer any question directly: 
Q. [by Mr. Vernon, plaintiffs' attorney] And you have not obtained a subdivision, 
approval for subdivision for either of these parcels, correct? 
A. [Vernon (Jerry) Mortensen] No, I have not. One wasn't required. 
Q. And you've divided them into five-acre parcels to sell, correct? 
A. I didn't do the divisions. The fellow who I bought them from had already 
done them, and they had been grandfathered in. 
Q. And there's a stop work order up there right now on some of this property? 
A. I don't know that. 
Mr. Reagan [defendant Vernon Mortensen's attorney]: Objection, Your Honor. 
This far exceeds the scope of the examination. 
The Witness: I have no problems-
The Court: Overruled. 
Q. (by Mr. James) So you're not aware whether or not there's a stop work order 
up there; is that correct? 
A. I am not. I don't own the property. I'm not building the house. 
Q. And are you aware that there is a stop - or that the county has stopped realtors 
from selling any more of this property because of an illegal subdivision? 
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A. I know that's not true because I'm the one who is in charge of selling it. The 
realtors don't sell it. I have my own personal- I have my own personal people 
who do that, and nobody's stopped them and nobody's notified me and nobody's 
notified them, so I don't believe you. 
Q. And is it fair to say you have no plans at this time to resolve the legal dispute 
between you and Mr. Reynolds prior to selling more of the property? In other 
words, you're gonna continue to sell the property? 
Mr. Reagan: Objection again, your Honor? 
The Witness: I, uh - with the information-
The Court: Wait. Stop. What's the nature of the objection? 
Mr. Reagan: Again, we've far exceeded the scope of the examination, your 
Honor. 
The Court: Still dealing with the subject matter that you opened up so it's 
overruled. 
Q. (by Mr. James) You plan to continue to sell these parcels even though you 
have a dispute going on with Mr. Reynolds, correct? 
A. I'll give you, the Court and Judge Mitchell my personal pledge that I will not 
sell another parcel until any questions that are in your mind or Judge Mitchell's 
mind are resolved. I'll tell you right not that, uh, those issues don't exist in my 
mind, but I will give you my pledge that I will do nothing to sell any property up 
there until any misgivings have been removed from either of your minds. 
Q. Okay. My question to you is do you plan to still sell this property, correct, 
even though you have a dispute with Mr. Reynolds? 
A. The question was -
Q. It's a simple question. 
A. Would I do it knowing before the dispute's cleared up with Mr. Reynolds, and 
my answer is no, I won't. 
Q. Well, let's back up. You've had this property on the market since you've been 
having this dispute with Mr. Reynolds. Isn't that fair to say? 
A. Well it's - he hasn't filed a suit against me or anything or he hasn't - he 
hasn't, uh - he hasn't filed a suit against me, hasn't put a lis pendens on there. 
He's given me no notice that I don't have a right to do whatever I'm doing. 
Q. Well, you just testified with all his interferences and his complaints and such 
you have continued to sell this property, and you've testified that you've sent 
people up there to view the property even though you have this ongoing dispute 
with Mr. Reynolds. Isn't that fair to say? 
A. Yes, that's fair to say that. 
Q. Thank you. Are you gonna force him to sue you and go through a lawsuit then 
before you will legally resolve the issues for these innocent purchasers corning up 
to buy this property? 
A. Now that you've brought this up the issue I think the sensible thing is - I think 
they have something in the Court and, like I say, I'm not an attorney and I don't 
spend, uh-I spend very little time in the courtroom, but I think there's actually a 
mechanism where you go before the Court and they resolve it without a lawsuit, 
or maybe you just sue them to resolve it. 
I have no desire to sue, uh, Mr. Reynolds for any money, any damages, 
anything. All I want is that issue of the gate, uh-I want the-I want it taken care 
of, and I believe that, uh, I am not in the wrong at all, but I wish no malice on Mr. 
Reynolds. I wish no harm for him. I wish no malice today, tomorrow, whatever. 
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I just want to be left alone so I can conduct my business and do what, uh, I have 
the legal rights to do. 
Q. You've already sold four of these properties, Mr. Mortensen, to these people. 
With an ongoing dispute with Mr. Reynolds, having already gone through 
substantial litigation with my clients over similar issues, wouldn't you agree with 
me that you're subjecting and continuing to subject innocent purchasers of 
property to ongoing disputes with Mr. Reynolds as well as potentially the county 
over their rights to build up there? 
Mr. Reagan: Object to the form, your Honor. 
The Court: What specifically? 
Mr. Reagan: There's no evidence that any purchaser is an innocent purchaser. 
The Court: Overruled. 
The Witness: I believe that what is happening here is malicious prosecution, and 
I'm not going to be intimidated on what I do in my life based on what I believe is 
malicious prosecution, and I believe you have the duty of 11 (b) to do your 
research and actually see whether or not I was trespassing in the first place before 
you started this lawsuit because I feel it's really a matter of entrapment. You filed 
the lawsuit against me for doing something I wasn't doing, and then you've 
maneuvered things to try to, uh, create all kinds of damages, I won't be 
intimidated by that. 
If I were that type of person, I wouldn't be the author of Mortensen Math 
that's made a gigantic impact all over the world, that's used in all of the schools 
with the aborigines. It's used by the eskimos, Montessori schools, public schools. 
If I were that mindset, that I was going to be fearful and intimidated from doing 
anything, then I wouldn't be Jerry Mortensen, but on the other hand, I also am not 
the type of person that needs to take out any vindictiveness on anyone, and if it 
will make, uh, the people in this court feel better and Mr. Reynolds feel better, I'm 
giving everyone my personal pledge that nothing will happen on that property 
until things are solved with Mr. Reynolds. 
Tr. Vol. II, p. 1434, L. 15 -po 1439, L. 24. Keep in mind this questioning was to try to get 
Vernon Mortensen to admit he had in the past sold parcels which had a problem with access, in 
an area adjacent to the land at dispute in this litigation. Vernon Mortensen would not answer the 
question directly, but indirectly, by claiming he would no longer sell such in the future until he 
resolves the issue between himself and Mr. Reynolds; Vernon Mortensen answered the question 
as to past sales by him where he knew there was an access problem, in the affirmative. 
Vernon Mortensen has done nothing in his "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04", to cause this Court to reconsider its prior findings. 
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Vernon Mortensen has acted in an overreaching, boorish, and intimidating way. Vernon 
Mortensen's decision to unilaterally begin excavating onto plaintiffs' land (Tr. Vol. I, p. 88, L. 9 
- p. 89, L. 20, Testimony of Shaun Montee) when at best he knew his easement rights were 
unknown, and then intimidate when Akers resisted, is consistent with his other conduct discussed 
above. Vernon Mortensen's behavior at the March 22,2011, argument on his "Motion to Correct 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04" is certainly consistent with his prior conduct at 
trial, and his prior conduct vis a vis the Akers. 
None of Mortensen's arguments have any support in the facts or basis in the law. 
B. Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional 
Evidence on Easement Location" Must be Denied. 
On April 5, 2011, Vernon Mortensen filed his "Motion to Reconsider Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional 
Evidence on Easement Location." In the intervening seven weeks, Vernon Mortensen has yet to 
schedule a hearing for this motion. The Court has reviewed such motion. Under LR.C.P. 
7 (b )(3)( C), the moving party must indicate on the face of the motion whether the party desires to 
present oral argument. If the moving party (Vernon Mortensen) fails to request oral argument 
upon the motion, the court may deny the motion without notice if the court deems the motion has 
no merit. LR.C.P.7(b)(3)(D). This Court finds Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Reconsider 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion 
for Additional Evidence on Easement Location" has no merit. The motion is simply reiteration 
of Vernon Mortensen's complaints set forth in his Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and "Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
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Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04", with the addition of Vernon Mortensen's 
complaints as to what happened at the March 22, 2011, hearing on that motion. Motion to 
Reconsider, pp. 1-7. Vernon Mortensen sets forth unsubstantiated and speculative argument 
about what occurred in Stewart Title Company's involvement in this case. Jd., pp. 10, 20. 
Vernon Mortensen now makes the claim that this Court" ... wrongfully swayed the [Idaho] 
Supreme Court ... " Jd., p. 12. Vernon Mortensen then gave his version of the facts of this case 
(Jd., pp. 12-18) before returning to his attack on the Court and counsel for plaintiffs. Jd., pp. 19-
23. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
For the reasons set forth above, Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04", and Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Reconsider 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion 
for Additional Evidence on Easement Location" must be denied. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-1-04" is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Vernon Mortensen's "Motion to Reconsider Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional 
Evidence on Easement Location" is DENIED. 
Entered this 23rd day of May, 2011. 
Mitchell, District Judge 
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Certificate of Service 
I certify that on the .:A cr day of May, 2011, a true copy of the foregoing was 




Robert Covington Richard Deissner Vernon J. Mortensen 
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Susan P. Weeks, ISB # 4255 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
FAX: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for: Plaintiffs 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF KOOTE 
FILED: ~-;;:::;-/'f-t-!~.2..2.....,.....--
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. 
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-02-222 
FOURTH AMENDED JUDGMENT 
AND DECREE ON SECOND 
REMAND 
The Court previously entered its Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement Location and Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for 
Additional Evidence on Easement Location. The Court further heard Mortensens' 
"Affidavit on Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial 
Issues and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages in 
Order filed 4-1-04" and 2) Defendant Vemon Mortensens' Motion to Reconsider 
FOURTH AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE ON SECOND REMAND - 1 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying 
White's Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location. For the reasons 
stated in the previous memorandums and the Findings and Conclusions enunciated 
therein; 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: Defendants do not have any implied easement rights in Plaintiffs' 
property. 
1. The Court hereby enters a decree granting an easement by prescription to 
Defendants which is described as follows: a tvvelve point two foot (12.2') 
wide strip located just inside the northeast comer of the Defendants' 
land, turning south immediately west of the west boundary of 
Government Lot 2 (where the express easement ends) and the east 
boundary of Parcel B as depicted by "hatch" marks on Exhibit "B" 
attached hereto. The legal description of the easement is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "C". 
2. Plaintiffs are awarded compensatory damages for willful trespass in the 
amount of $17,002.85, which amount of trespass damages are trebled 
pursuant to I.e. §6-202 for the total amount of $51,008.55, which 
amount IS awarded against Defendants D. L. WHITE 
CONSTRUCTION, INe.; DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and 
MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, jointly and severally 
pursuant to I.C. §6-803. 
3. ShelTi Akers is awarded compensatory damages for emotional distress in 
the amount of $10,000.00 against Defendants D. L. WHITE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and 
MARTI E. MORTENSEN, husband and wife, jointly and severally 
pursuant to I.C. §6-803. 
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4. Plaintiffs are awarded punitive damages against Defendants Vernon J. 
Mortensen and Marti E. Mortensen, husband and wife, in the amount of 
$150,000.00. 
5. Plaintiffs are awarded punitive damages against Defendants David L. 
White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife, in the amount of 
$30,000.00. 
6. Plaintiffs' award of costs and attorney fees jointly and severally against 
each defendant in the amount of One Hundred Five Thousand, Five 
Hundred Thiliy-Four Dollars and Six Cents ($105,534.06) together with 
interest at the applicable statutory rate is reinstated; 
7. Plaintiffs shall further be entitled to seek a judgment of costs and 
attorney fees as permitted by rule or statute. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _/1_ day of M~k.;r, 2011, I caused 
to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Vernon J. Mortensen ·11 U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 1922 0 Hand Delivered 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 0 Overnight Mail 
0 T elecopy (FAX) 
Robert Covington 0 U.S. Mail 
8884 N. Government Way, Ste. A 0 Hand Delivered 
Hayden Lake, ID 83835 ~ Overnight Mail Telecopy (FAX) (208) 762-4546 
Dustin Deissner 0 U.S. Mail 
Van Camp & Deissner 0 Hand Delivered 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. 0 Overnight Mail 
Spokane, W A 99201 'E1 Telecopy (FAX) (509) 326-6978 
Susan P. Weeks 0 U.S. Mail 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 0 Hand Delivered 
Attorneys at Law 0 Overnight Mail 
1626 Lincoln Way ~ Telecopy (F AX) (208) 664-1684 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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o 
STATI: IF !UAHO 'J J 
COUN Y Of KOOTENAI " ~ 
ROBERT E. COVINGTON 
Attorney at Law 
FILED: C;q 
8884 North Government Way, Suite A 
Hayden, ID 83835 




Attorney for D.L. White Construction, Ine., David L. White and 
White 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOO ENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. ) 







D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
DA VID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. ) 
WHITE, husband and wife; and ) 
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. ) 




CASE NO. CV -02- 22 
MOTION TO REC NSTDER 
Comes now defendants David L. White and Michelle V. White nd D.L. 
White Construction, Inc., through their attorney Robert Covington and 
move the Court pursuant to IRep II(a)(2)(8) for a reconsideration of its 
determinations in the .Judgment entered on August 10, 2011 and pri r 
interlocutory orders to the extent that they are embodied in the abo e 
referenced Judgment. This motion includes, without limitation, the decision 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 1 
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of tht Court regarding the location of .be easement at the top of th hill 8S 
de8crihed in paragrapb 1 of tbe Judgment, tbe decision regarding t e scope 
and willfulness of trespasses by tbe moving parties, the award of 
compensatory damages to Sherri Akers for emotional distress, the 
punitive damages against the moving parties and the award and am unt of 
attorney fees to plaintiffs. 
The moving parties will submit their initial brief in support of t is 
motion on or before September 14, 2011 and request oral argument of this 
motion, 
DATED this 24th day of August, 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I bereby certify that on tbe 24tb day of August, 2011, I cause to be 
st:rved a true and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by facs'mile 
transmission to: 
Leander James 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, Idabo 83814 
Fax: 208-664-1684 
And by mail to: 
Vernon J. Mortensen 
PO Box 330 
Naples, TD 83847 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
vlv 30'1d 
Dustin Deissncr 
Van Camp & Deissner 
1707 W. Broadway Avenue 
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Susan P. Weeks, ISB # 4255 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur dt Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
FAX: (208) 664-l684 
Attorneys for: PlaIntiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husban.d and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION. INC.; 
DAVID t. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. 
MORTENSEN and MARTT E. MORTENSEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -02-222 
PLAINTIFFS'SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
(INCLUDING ATIORNEY FEES 
INCURRED THROUGH AUGUST 24, 
2011) 
COME NOW Plaintiffs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 and hereby 
submit Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs. Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. S4(d), Plaintiffs recite that to the best of Plaintiffs' knowledge 
and belief, the items of costs set forth below (including attorney fees) 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (INCLUDING 
ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED THROUGH AUGUST 24,2011) - 1 
08/24/2011 12:37 JAMES VERN PAGE 02/04 
are correct a.nd that the costs claimed are in compliance with 
I.R.C.P. S4(d): 
I. 
ADDITIONAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
S4(1)(d)(C)6: Reasonable costs of the preparation 
of models, maps, pictures, etc., 
admitted at hearing (survey) 
TOTAL SUPPLEMENTAL COSTS TO DATE 





Plaintiffs have incurred attorney fees through August 24, 2011, 
in the minimum amount as follows: J. 12.75 attorney hrs. x $175/hr. 
:= $18,620.00. $18,620.00 
TOTAL COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES $19,170.00 
DATED this 24th day of Augu~ 201 J. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
~ O.2i~ 
~ANP.WEEKS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (INCLUDING . 0 /' "I ...., 
ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED THROUGH AUGUST 24,2011) ·2 . b I ::> 
08/ 24/ 2011 12:37 JAMES VERN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before n1e this 24th day of August, 2011. 
dL.lzu . ~t M,k' 
Not~ Publi~O~ / / ~IJ 
Residing at: ~ 
Commission Expires: (~1/.P/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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1 hereby certify that on the 24th day of August, 2011, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument by the method indicated below, 
and addr.essed to the following: 
/ 
Vernon J. Mortensen Ii! U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 1922 0 Hand Delivered 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 0 Overnight Mail 
0 Telecopy (FAX) 
Robert Covington 0 U.S. Mail 
8884 N. Government Way, Ste. A 0 Hand Delivered 
Hayden Lake, ID 83835 ~ Overnight Mai.l Telecop):, (F AX~ (208} 762-4546 
Dustin Deissner 0 U.S. Mail 
VanCamp & Dej ssn.er. 0 Hand Delivered 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. 0 Ovemi ght Mail 
Spokane, W A 99201 ~/ TeJecopy (FAX) (509) 326·6978 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF COSTS (TNCLUDING 
ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED THROUGH AUGUST 24~ 2011) - 3 061 4 
08/24/2011 12: 37 
Engjn~ering & Surveying 
JAMES VERN 
. Meckel Engineering & Surveying 
3906 North Schreiber Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815. 
Office: 20B/667·4638 .. Fax: 208/664·3347 
PAGE 04/04 
----------------,--------To: Dennis Akers 
3003 S. Millsap Loop 
Post Falls, 10 83854 
Project; Legal Description by request 
of Susan Weeks 
Survey Description: 
Legal Description 
CADD Exhibit for Legal Description 
PLS Project Review, Analysis and Review 
and Certification of Deliverables 
Prior Invoices: 0.00 
Total Project Costs To Date: 550.00 
Payments Received: 0.00 
Balance Due This Project: 550.00 
March 10, 2010 
Invoice Number 
04.113-3 




Invoice Total: $550.00 
~====~==~~ 
Due and Payable Upon Receipt of This Invoice, Thank YOu 
Accounts 30 Days P.Ir Due will be SUbject to , late chtll'(Je of 1.55 pet mtmth or an .nn/Jllt perclmtggf "r 1 B% 
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Susan P. Weeks, ISB # 4255 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
FAX: (208) 664·1684 
Attorneys for: Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife~ 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
D. L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE, husband and wife; and VERNON J. 
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
SS. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV·02-222 
LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) and (e)(5) AFFIDAVIT OF 
SUSAN P. WEEKS IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY 
FEES ON SECOND RE:MAND 
I, SUSAN P. WEEKS, first being du.ly sworn upon oath depose and say: 
1. T am. the attorney of record for the Plaintiffs in the above-captioned 
action. 
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2. The infonnation contained herein is based upon. my own information 
and is true and correct, and I am. competent to testify thereto. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct itemization of attorney 
time expended on this case following the Supreme Court's flling of its opinion with the 
District Court on January 26, 2009, together with the calculation of attorney fees. 
4. The legal and factual bases of Plaintiffs' attorney tees claim are: 
Legal: The Court's Order on Remand filed September 7~ 2006; Idaho Code 
Section §6·202 (Actions for trespass), including all applicable case law, specifically 
includi.ng Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1993); 
Idaho Code §12·121 (Attorney's fees); Idaho Code §12-123 (Sanctions for frivolous 
conduct in. a civil case), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure S4(e)(J) - 54(e)(5) and 
54(e) (7)~54(e)(9); Idaho Ru1e of Civil Procedurell(a)(1); and all applicable case 
law. 
Factual bases: 
a) The entire file in this case~ specifically including all prior :filings in 
support of Plain.tiffs' claims for costs and attorney fees and the Court's prior findings 
regarding Plaintiffs' claims for costs and attorney fees, including the testim.ony, 
matters and exhibits set forth jn IR.C.P. 54(e)(3) Affidavit of Leander L. James in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for Attomey Fees, filed February 4, 2003, the 
Supplemental Affidavit filed March 19,2003, Amended Affidavit filed March 7, 2004, 
the Memorandunl of Cost and Affidavit of Attorney Fees filed October 18, 2006 
following the first remand, together with all other affidavits ftled in support of 
Plaintiff.~ ~ claims for attorney fees, in.corporated by reference herein. 
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b) The conttactual relationship between the ftnn. and Plaintiffs which 
provides in pertinent part: 
2. Client agrees to pay Attorneys for professional services 
the greater of $175.00/hour or thirty-three and one-third percent (33-
1/3%) of the gross recovery of any and all funds received in settlement 
without an action having been filed in. any court or administrative 
agency; forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery of any and aU funds 
received in settlement or recovered after filing an action in any court or 
admini.strative agency; or forty-five percent (45%) of said sums if said 
matter is settled upon appeal or following post·verdict proceedings, and 
said sums payable to Attorneys for professional services are to be a lien 
upon any sums received in settlement or payment of any said claim, or 
upon any judgment recovered. "Gross recovery!' shaH include any 
atto01ey's fees and costs recovered from. any adverse .party. 
5. Method of Calculating Attorney fees: Plaintiffs' attorney fees are calculated 
pursuant to the attorney-client COl1tract with my clients, specifically paragraph "2'~ 
cited above, by multiplying the hourly attorney work by $175/hr., which render.s a total 
amount of additional fees claim.ed on the second. remand of $1.8,620.00. Attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of a summary of hours billed for work done on the 
second remand, together with an additional two hours for preparation of the fourth 
amended judgment, the m.emorandum of supplemental costs and the affidavit of 
attorney fees following the second remand. 
DATED this 24th day of August, 2011. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
SUSAN P. VJEEKS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24th day of Augm;t~ 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J hereby certify that on the 24tll day of August, 2011, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the fo Howing: 
/ 
Vernon J. Mortensen ~ U.S. Mall 
P.O. Box 1922 CI Hand Delivered 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 0 Overnight Mail 
0 Telecopy (F AX) 
Robert Covingto11. 0 U.S. Mail 
8884 N. Government Way, Ste. A CI Hand Delivered 
Hayden Lake, 1D 83835 0 Overnight Mail 
~ Telecopy {F AX) ~2082 762-4546 
Dustin Deissner 0 U.S. Mall 
Van Camp & Dcissner 0 Hand Delivered 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. ~ Overnight Mail Spokane, VVA 99201 Te1ecopy (FAX) (509) 326·6978 
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Matter History Report Date: 08/24/201l Report Time: 7:05AM 
Page: 1 of 11 
Requ.ested .By: Susan.p Weeks 
Ja.mes, Vernon & Weeks, PA 
Client Number 10041 Dennis Akers 
MlItter Number: JVW~07"OI14 Akers, Dennis & Sherrie v. D.L. Vilhite Constructi.on 
Matter Type: Billin1l Mode: Hourly 
Dateli 'neluded on Report: 0110112009 Thru 08/24/2011 
Date' T'keeper Description Time Spent Amount 
FEES 
03/09/2009 SPW Telephone with Dennis regarding 0.60 No Charge 
Picken's petition for rehearing. 
04/3012009 SPW Review and respond to 0.20 $35.00 
correspondence from T errt Pickens 
office regarding motion and affidavit. 
05/14/2009 SPW Prepare reply bri.ef in Opposlti on to 6.00 $1,050.00 
disqualification of judge. 
05/19/2009 SPW Telephone call with Dusti:o Dessnier 0.75 $131.25 
regarding settling Marty out of the 
case; telephone call. with client 
regarding same; review motion to 
strike brief filed. by Plckens. 
0511912009 SPW Telephon.e caJl from Dustin Dessnier 0.25 $43.75 
regarding moti(ln to dsisqualify Judge 
Mitchell, bond release and request to 
mediate. 
05120/2009 SPW Prepare response in opposition to 1.50 $262.50 
motion to strike and affidavit in 
support of opposition to motion to 
strike. 
06/0112009 SPW Telephone call from Court Clerk; 0.25 $43.75 
transm.it requested tTanseript pages for 
judge. 
06/09/2009 LLJ PIC iTom Mr. Dessner about bond and 0.20 $35.00 
settlement offer. 
06/11/2009 LLJ Review correspondence and lltip tram 0.30 $52.50 
Mr. Dessner. Dictate response letter. 
06/12/2009 SPW Review motions and letter from. 0.25 $43.75 
Dessnier regarding payment ftom 
appcal bond. 
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Requested By: Susan P Weeks 
.James, Vernon & Weeks, PA 
Client Number 1004) Denni1: Akers 
MAtter Number: JVW-07·0114 Akers. Dennis & Sherrie v. D.t. White Construction 
MAtter Type: Billing Mode: Hourly 
Oates Included nn Report: 01/0112009 Thro 08/24/2011 
Date' T'keeper Description Time Spent Amount 
06/17/2009 SPW Review motion by Pickens forrelease 0.75 $131.25 
of bond to pay her attomey fees; 
revi.ew Marti Mortensen's objection; 
prepare Akers' objection to motion. 
06117/2009 LLJ PIC with Bob Covington. regarding 0.30 $52.50 
status and his suggestion to mediate. 
07/17/2009 SPW Review order denying motion to 0.20 $35.00 
release bond. 
08/20/2009 T..T...J PIc from Dusty Dejsner requesting 0.10 $17.50 
response to $25K offer. 
08/20/2009 LLJ Strategy conf. re:gardingjo.int and 0.10 $] 7.50 
several liablity and its effects Of) any 
settlement with Marty Mort. 
08/2712009 SPW Attend status conference with Judge 1.25 $218.75 
Hosack; review files wi.th client. 
08/28/2009 SPW Meeting with Lce regarding status of 0.25 $43.75 
pending settlement offers. 
10/05/2009 LLJ PIc from client 0.10 $17.50 
10/0512009 LU PIc with Dennis regarding couner 0.30 $52.50 
offer to Marti. 
10/08/2009 LLJ Client consuJt, bearing and 1.50 $262.50 
negotiations, 
10/19/2009 SPW Telephone call with client. 0.30 $52.50 
11/09/2009 SPW Review correspondence from Jerry 0.25 $43.75 
Mortensen regarding motion. 
J 1/1812009 SPW Prepare med.iation statem.ent. 1.50 $262.50 
11/19/2009 SPW Telephone call with client. 0.25 $43.75 
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Requested By: Susan P Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA 
Client Number 10041 Denni:; Akers 
Matter Number: JVW·07'()114 Akers .• Dennis & Sherrie v. D.L. White Construction 
Matter Type: Billing Mode: HOllrly 
Dates Included nn ·R.eport: 0110112009 Thru 08/24/2011 
Date' T'keeper Description Time Spent Amount 
) 1/20/2009 LU Mediation prep. and med.iation. 5.00 $875.00 
J 112012009 SPW Prepare for and attend media.tion. with 5.00 No Charge 
Cbuck Lempesis. 
11/23/2009 SPW Retu.rn call to client regarding 0.30 $52.50 
mediation.; locati.on of easement and 
procedure going forward. 
11125/2009 SpW Meet with client; review road profile 0.25 $43.75 
question. 
11130/2009 SPW Meet with Bob Covington and review 1.40 $245.00 
Exhibits 6 and 174 on road location 
over prescriptive area as descn"bed by 
Scott Rasor; attend hearing before 
Judge Mitchell. 
12/21/2009 SPW Telephone call with Bob Covington 0.25 $43.75 
regarding survey maps. 
0111112010 SPW R.eview decision from court on bond 0.30 $52.50 
release. 
01112/2010 S.PW Telephone call with Bob Covington 0.25 $43.75 
regarding extension of brief. 
01125/2010 SPW Review correspondence from Jerry 0.50 $87.50 
Mortensen; review brief 
02/02/2010 SPW Telephone call with Bob Covington 0.25 $43.75 
regarding site inspection. Telephone 
caU to client regarding same. 
02/03/2010 SPW Telephone call with Bob Covington; 0.25 $43.75 
rev;ew correspondence from 
Covington regarding release ofboncl.. 
02/0412010 SPW Respond to CovIngton's motion fOT 0.25 $43.75 
re.lease ofbond. 
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Matter ,History Report 
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA 
Client Number 10041 Dennis Akers 
Matter Number: JVW-07-0114 Akers, Dennis & Sherrie v. DJ .... White Construction 
MAtter Type: Billing Mode: Hourly 
Dates Included nn Report: 01/01/2009 Thru 08/24/2011 
T'keeper Description 
02/05120] 0 SPW Site visit with opposjng counsel and 
surveyor; meet with clients. 
02/] 0120 I 0 SPW TeJepbone call with client On. 
photographs 
02/1112010 SPW Meet with client; review documents. 
02/2312010 SPW Telephone call with Scott Rasor; 
prepare fax to Scott for legal 
description.. 
03/0112010 SPW Telephone call with Dennis about 
briefing location of easement. 
03/04/2010 SPW Meet with client. 
03/0812010 SPW Review remand exhibit; Telephone 
call with Ed Rintamaki regarding 
same. 
03/16/2010 SPW Telephone caU with Jerry Monensen 
regarding briefing on remand. 
04/09/2010 SPW 'Telephone call with client. 
04/12/2010 SPW Telephone calls wit.h Dennis; 
Telephone call with court regarding 
resclleduJing matter. 
04114/2010 SPW Legal research on scope of remand; 
prepare motion to strike; prepare 
memorandum in support of motion to 
strike. 
04/15/2010 SPW Review Mortensen's boef on easement 
location 
04/19/20 I 0 SPW Telephone call with elm regarding 
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Matter History Report 
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA 
Client Number 10041 Dennis Akers 
JAMES VI:J~N 
Matter Number: JVW·07·01 14 Akers. Dennis & Sherrie v. DJ ... White Construction 
Mauer Type: Billing Mode: Hourly 
DatCA .neluded on Report: 01/0)/2009 Thru 08124/2011 
Date' T'keeper .Description 
04/2112010 SPW Telephone call with .Bob Covington 
regarding remand hearing date; meet 
with Covington and review map from 
1975. 
04/27/2010 SPW Telephone call with clerk; Prepare 
amended notice ofheari.ng on motion 
to strU<e. 
04/28/2010 SPW Prepare fOT and atte.nd hearing on 
motion to strike. 
05/0312010 SPW Review court decision on motion to 
strike partial summary judgment filed 
by Marti Mortensen. 
05112/2010 SPW Review exhibits at court. 
05/]3/2010 SPW Read White's brief; outline reply 
argument; Telephone call with Meckel 
regarding correcting date on legal 
description. 
0.5/]4/2010 SPW Review updated exhibit &.om Meckel. 
05119/2010 SPW Attend motion to strike 
06/11/2010 SPW Telephone call with client regarding 
billing. 
0611512010 Sl'W Finalize testimony synopsis; begin 
exhibit synopsis for use in remand 
brief. 
06/16/2010 SPW Work on remand brief. 
06/17/2010 SPW Finalize remand memorandum. 
07/0112010 SPW Telephone call with cUent; review 
brief by Covington; pt'eparc for 
hearing; attend hearing 
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Matter History Report 
.James, Vernon & Weeks, PA 
Client Numher 10041 
Matter Number: NW-07-0114 
M.lltter Type: 
Dennis Akers 
Akers. Dennis & Sherrie v. D.L. White Construction 
Billin~ Mode: Hourly 
Dates Included on Report: 01101/2009 Thl'll 08/24/20 II 
Date' T'keeper Description 
09129/20J.0 SPW Review decision from court; leave 
message for client. 
09/30/2010 SPW Telephone call with Dennis regarding 
damage phase of litigation. 
11110/2010 SPW Review record; prepare remand brief 
on damages 
11/18/20JO SPW Review materials from Jerry 
Mortenson. 
1111912010 SPW Prepare am.ended notice ofheanng. 
01/13/2011 SPW Telephone call from Jerry Mortensen 
regardin.g 1126111 hearing and. motion 
to strike and/or reconsider and. 
extending offer (If settlement to 
clients. 
01/18/20 J 1 SPW Begiu working on damage reply brief 
on remand. 
01/191201,. SPW Finaljze reply brief; telephone call 
from Jerry Motcnsen regarding motion 
for reconsideration. 
01120/2011 SPW Telephone call with Jerry Mortensen 
regarding hearing. 
01124/20J 1 SPW Review late filed response ofWh.ite; 
prepare motlot) to strike; begin. reply 
brief. 
01126/2011 SPW Prepare for and attend hearing on 
motion for damages on remand. 
OJ128/2011 SPW Review Mortensen's affidavit on 
issues to be reconsidered .. 
02/07/2011 SPW Review correspondence fTOm 
opposing parties regarding hearing 
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0.25 $43.75 
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Matter, History Report 
James, Vern,on & Weeks, .PA 
CI,,:nt Number 10041 Dennis Akers 
Matter Number: JVW-07-0t14 
Matter Type: 
Akers, Dennis &. Sherrie v. D.1 ... White Construction 
Billing Mode: Hourly 
Date$ Included on Report: 0 I 10 1/2009 Thru 08/24/201.1 
Date' T'keeper Description 
02/09/2011 SPW Work on response to Jerry 
Mortenson's motion for 
reconsideration. 
02/10/20J 1 SPW Continue working on brief in 
opposition to motion to correct; ii.le 
motion for additional time to respond 
with court 
02/11/2011 SPW Fi.nalize response memorandum for 
court and tile. 
02/16/20.11 S PW Prepare response to request for 
submission of additiolUll evidence. 
02118/20 t 1 SPW Review Mortensen's reply brief on 
reconsideration. 
03/02/2011 SPW Telephone call with cliontregaroing 
questions on bill. and procedures. 
03/2112011 SPW Telephone call from Jeannie at Judge 
Mitchell's ohambers regarding 
transmission of decision; prepare 
correspondence to client regarding 
same; leave message for client. 
03/22/201l SPW Prepare for anti attend Jerry 
Mortensen's motion to amend/correct 
and reconsider. discuss matter with 
client following hearing. 
03/24/2011 SPW Review decision. 
04/06/2011 SPW Review pleadings of Jerry Mortensen 
05/27/2011 SPW Review file; Prepare Fourth Amended 
Judgment 
SUMMARY· By Time Ticket Type 
Oatc; 08/24/201 I 
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Matter History Report 
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA 
Client Number 10041 Denn is Akers 
Motter Number: JVW-07·0114 
M.atter Type: 
Akers, Dennis & Sheme v. D.1 ... Wltite Construction 
Billing Mode: Hourly 













01101/2009 Thru 08/24/2011 
T'keeper Description 
SUMMARY· By Timekeeper 
SPW Billable Timekeeper Hours & Fees .. 
tLJ Billable Timekeeper Hours & Fees .. 
SPW No Charge Hours ......... . 
Misc. Fee Debits & Credits .... . 
TeJephon,e Charges from June 09 
Mediati(ln Fee 
Balance Due from Akers v. White 
Mediation 
Telephone Charges from March 
Research on WestLaw from April 
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, ROBERT E. COVINGTON 
A ttorney at Law 
STI\Tf:. Or I AHO l ('c 
pUNTY 01 KOOTENAI I (~;-
dLED:lf[~ ~ 
8884 North Government Way, Suite A 




, . ~ 
Attorney fnr D.L. White Construction, Inc., David L. White and M chelle . 
White 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT F 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOO ENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. ) 







D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
DAVID L. WHITE lind MICHELLE V. ) 
WHITE, busband and wife; and ) 
VERNON .J. MORTENSEN aDd MARTI E. ) 




CASE NO. CV-02-2 2 
OBJECTION TO 
AND MOTION TO 
DISALLOW CLAIM "D 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Come now Defendants D.L. White Construction, Inc., David L. bite and 
Michelle V. White by and througb their attorney of record, Robert 
Covington, to object to attorney fees claimed by the plaintiff in this action 
in the amounts of $105,534.06, $6,037.50 and $19,170 and move the uurt 
OBJECTION TO CLAIMED ATTORNEY FEES 1 
:S17SV G9L eOG :AS J.N3~ 
pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(6) and S4(e)(6) to disallow all or a portion f said 
fees and costs on the following grounds and for the following feaso 
J. Ph.intiffs are not entitled to an award of costs and attorney f es as a 
matter of right for the reason that they are not the prevailing parties 
in this litigation in comparison to the relief and damages they sought 
in this litigation nor in comparison to the relief and damages ought 
by Defendants White in this litigation. 
2. Total awarded costs for maps, surveys, etc. may not exceed $ .. 00. 
3. Pursuant to I.C. 6-202 no attorney fees may be awarded wher "No 
Trespassing" signs are not posted as therein required. The r 
this case does not demonstrate that the required signage was osted to 
provide the notice to Defendants White that is cODtemplated 
202. (n addition, tbe actions of Defendants White were found to 
constitute a trespass not willfully or intentionally undertaken with 
knowledge tbat a trespass was occurring. All such acts were 
undertaken ill the reasonable belief that the conduct did not onstitute 
a trespass or proteeted by order of the Court. Any conduct 0 
Defendant Mortensen tbat may be willful or intentional may ot be 
attributed to Defendants White under I.e. 6·202 unless auth rized by 
White or reasonably within the scope of autbority that may h ve be 
granted by White to Mortensen. Attorney fees are not theref re 
allowable pursuant to I.C. 6-202. 
OBJECTION TO CLAIMED ATTORNEY FEES 
2 
I I ~ ,_ l~t""'I ~ Hl 11\1::1' 
4. Alternately, tbe plaintiffs should only be aJlowed to recover a torney 
fees that were reasonably incurred in that portion of tbe adio tbat 
provides a statutory basis for an award of attorney t'ces, Idah Code 
Section 6.202. The attorney fees that have been sought by pia 'ntitIs 
fail to segregate those made necessary to establish the trespas daim 
to the extent determined hy the Court. The Court should use U· 
discretion to apportion tbe fees sought in a reasonable manne 
between tbe established trespass daim and those daims that ere not 
establisbed, e.g. quiet title against the easement claim, and tb se for 
whieh no there is no statutory or contractual basis for an awa d of 
attorney fees, punitive damages and damages for emotional di tress. 
S. Idaho Code Section 12-121 does not provide a basis on which Horney 
fees may be awarded in this ease as tbe defendants White pre 
establishin~ tbat they bad an easement across the plaintiffs' roperty 
to access White's property and to the extent tbey defended ag inst the 
plaintiffs' claims, none of sucb defenses were frivolous or wit 
foundation nor unreasonably presented to tbe Court. 
DA TED tbis 7th day of Septem 
OBJECTION TO CLAJMED ATTORNEY FEES 
3 
C t 1 t"I I I\I"::1C 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify tbat on the 7tb day of September, 2011, I cau cd to be 
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoi11g instrument by facs mile 
transmission to: 
And by mail to: 
Vernon J. Mortensen 
PO Box 330 
Naples, ID 83847 
Susan Weeks 
JamcR, Vernon & Vernon P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax: 208-664-1684 
Dustin Deissner 
Van Camp & Deissner 
1707 W. Broadway Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Fax: 509·326-6978 
OBJECTION TO CLAJMRD ATTORNEY FEES 
Cu, ,..",....,.., •• t 1-'11'"'1. 
4 
, • 10 IM::l( 
Dustin Deissner 
DEISSNER LAW OFFICE 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. 





Attorneys for Defendant 
Marti Mortensen 
STATE OF IDAHO • 
~0l!JHY OF KOOTENAli 55 
flLt.O: 3'6::LCJ3 
2nn SfP -8 PM 4: 4 f 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
VERNON 1. and MARTI MORTENSEN, 
Defendants, 
and 
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. 
WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE, 
Defendants. 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. 




VERNON 1. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. 
MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 









) Case No. CV -2002-222 
) 
) 













Pursuant to Idaho Appeal Rule 17 MARTI MORTENSEN hereby appeals as 
follows: 
(a) Title. The title of the action or proceeding is set out above. 
(b) Court or Agency Title. The title of the court which heard the trial or proceeding is 
set out above, the Hon. JOHN T. MITCHELL, District Judge, Presiding. 
© Case Number. The number assigned to the action is set out above. 







Deissner Law Office' 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. 
Spokane W A 99201 
509-326-6935 
Deissnerlaw@aol.com 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS 
Susan Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P. A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Co-Appellant: D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. WHITE 
and MICHELLE V. WHITE 
Attorney: Robert Covington, 
8884 N Government Way, Ste A 
Hayden, ID 83835 
Co-Appellant: VERNON J. MORTENSEN 
POBOX 1922 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 
Pro Se. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL p. 2 
( e) Designation of Appeal. (1) A Designation of the Judgment or Order Appealed 
From: Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand, 8110/2011, All 
interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment, order or decree 
appealed from, All final judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or order 
appealed from for which the time for appeal has not expired, and All interlocutory or 
final judgments and orders entered after the judgment or order appealed from. 
(f) Issues. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal: 
(1) Whether evidence supports the location and size of the easement 
determined by the Court; 
(2) Whether the evidence supports the award of damages, punitive damages and 
attorneys fees; 
(3) Whether MARTI Mortensen should be permitted to raise new issues as to 
the applicability of punitive damages to her in light of her divorce from 
Vernon Mortensen. 
(4) Whether Judge Mitchell should have disqualified himself. 
(g) Jurisdictional Statement. A statement as to the basis for the right to 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the judgments or orders described in 
paragraph 1 of the notice of appeal. 
This appeal is from a final judgment and is permitted under IAR 4 relating to a 
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person aggrieved by a decision of the District Court, and IAR 11(a)(1), final judgment. 
(h) Transcript. No transcript of arguments will be requested. There was no new 
testimony taken. 
(I) Record. A designation of documents, if any, to be included in the clerk's or agency's 
record in addition to those automatically included pursuant to the following Rule 28: 
Cause 
05/04/2009 Memorandum In Support Of Motion to DQ 
05/04/2009 Motion to Disqualify 
0511512009 Memorandum in Response to DefVJ Mortensen's Motion to DQ for 
05119/2009 Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to 
V.J. Mortensen's Motion to Disqualify for Cause 
05/20/2009 Memorandum in response to Defendant V.J. Mortensen's motion to 
strike Plaintiffs response to V.J. Mortensen's motion to disqualify for cause 
05/20/2009 Affidavit of weeks in support of opposition to motion to strike 
05/29/2009 Order RE: Defendant VJ Mortensen's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause 
06101/2009 Order on Defendat Vernon Mortensen's Motion to Disqualify 
06/19/2009 Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion to Disqualify 
06/30/2009 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Vernon Mortensen's 
Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to 
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Disqualify 
10/22/2009 Brief of Defendants White Re: Proof of Easement Location 
10/22/2009 Memorandum Re: Burden of Proof by MARTI Mortensen 
10/30/2009 Brief of Defandant Vernon J Mortensen 
12/0112009 Order Regarding Burdens of Proof, and Order Establishing Briefing 
Schedule on Easement Location 
01122/2010 Brief Of Vernon J Mortensen Supporting Location Of Easement 
03/29/2010 Brief Of Defendants White RE: Section 24 Easement Location 
03/30/2010 Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Punitive Damages 
Against MARTI Mortensen 
03/30/2010 Affidavit of MARTI Mortensen 
04114/2010 Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Strike MARTI Mortensen's 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
04/27/2010 Response to Motion to Strike 
05/03/2010 Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Strike Defendant Marti Mortensen's Motion for Summary Judgment 
0611712010 Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand Regarding Location of Easement 
06/24/2010 Reply Brief Of Defendants White RE: Section 24 Easement Location 
06/30/2010 Affidavit of Mike Hathaway 
06/30/2010 Motion to Admit Additional Evidence RE: Easement Location 
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09/29/2010 Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order RE: Easement Location 
11 II 0/20 1 0 Plaintiffs Memorandum on Second Remand re Damages 
11117/2010 MARTI Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages 
01118/2011 Reply Brief Of Defendants White 
01119/2011 Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway 
01119/2011 Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum On Second Remand Re: Damages 
01124/2011 Motion To Correct Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order 
Filed 01102/03 AND Memorandum Decision And Order On Reconsideration, On New 
Trial Issues And Additional Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law Regarding Damages 
and Order filed on 04/01104 
01124/2011 Affidavit In Support of Motion To Correct Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law And Order Filed 01102/03 AND Memorandum Decision And Order 
On Reconsideration, On New Trial Issues And Additional Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law Regarding Damages and Order Filed on 04/01104 
01125/2011 Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum To Defendants Whites' Reply Brief 
On Second Remand RE Damages 
01125/2011 Supplemental Affidavit Of Mike Hathaway 
02/11/2011 Response to Motion to Correct Findings of Fact & Conclusions of 
Law & Motion for Reconsideration on New Trial Issues & Additional Findings of Fact 
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& Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages 
02116/2011 Post-Hearing Memorandum RE White's Motion To Admit Additional 
Evidence RE Easement Location 
02/18/2011 Reply to Akers Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Whites' Motion to 
Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location 
03118/2011 Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand RE: Damages, and 
Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location 
04/05/2011 Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand 
Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement 
Location 
05/23/2011 Memo Decision & Order Denying: 1) Deft Vernon Mortensen's Affd 
on Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order, Filed 1-2-3 & 
Memo Decision & Order on Reconsideration of New Trial Issues & Additional Findings 
of Fact, Conclusion of Law Regarding Damages & Order Filed 4-1-04 & 2) Deft Vernon 
Mortensen's Motion to Reconsider Memo Decision & Order on Remand RE: Damages & 
Order Denying White's Motion for Additional Evidence on Easment Location 
08/10/2011 Fourth AMENDED Judgment and Decree on Second Remand 
08/24/2011 Motion To Reconsider 
08/24/2011 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum Of Costs (Including Attorney 
Fees Incurred Through August 24,2011) 
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08/24/2011 IRCP 54( e )(3) and (e)( 5) Affidavit Of Susan P Weeks In Support of 
Plaintiffs' Claims For Attorney Fees On Second Remand 
09/07/2011 Objection to the Motion to Disallow Claimed Attorney Fees 
U) Exhibits-Civil Cases. A designation of documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits in a trial or hearing to be copies and sent to the Supreme Court: All 
exhibits referred to by the Court in its memorandum opinion filed 9/29/2010. 
(k) Sealed Record. Not Applicable. 
(1) Certification: Dustin Deissner Certifies: 
(1) A copy of the of the notice of appeal has been served upon the reporter of the 
trial or proceeding, JULIE FOLAND, PO Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000, 
julie foland@yahoo.com. 
(2) That appellant is exempt from payingthe clerk of the district court or 
administrative agency the estimated fees for preparation of the designated reporter's 
transcript because no transcript has been ordered 
(3) That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record have 
been paid, in the current amount of $100.00 pursuant to IAR 27(d). 
(4) That all appellate filing fees have been paid. 
(5) That service has been made upon all other parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
So Certified: 
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September 8, 2011 
'" Dustin Deissner 
Attorney for MARTI Mortensen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Dustin Deissner certifies: 
I have on this date served the foregoing document upon the following parties by 
the following means: 
TO: BY: 
VERNON J. MORTENSEN [X] US Mail 1st Class Postage Prepaid 
POBOX 1922 [ ] Delivery Service 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 [] Email 
Robert Covington, [x ] US Mail 1st Class Postage Prepaid 
8884 N Government Way, Ste A [ ] Delivery Service 
Hayden, ID 83835 [ ] Facsimile to: 208-762-4546 
Susan Weeks [X ] US Mail 1st Class Postage Prepaid 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P. A. [ ] Delivery Service 
1626 Lincoln Way [ ] Facsimile to: (208) 664-1684 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
JULIE FOLAND, PO Box 9000, Coeur [X ] US Mail 15t Class Postage Prepaid 
d'Alene, ID 83816-9000, [ ] Delivery Service 
julie _ foland@yahoo.com [ ] Facsimile to: 
Dated ----
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Vernon Jerry Mortensen 
PO Box 330 
Naples, Idaho 83847 
208-946- 8274 
Pro Se 
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THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO AND IN THE COUNTY OF 
KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE and SHERRIE L. AKERS 
husband and wife ) Case No. CV 2002-229-
Plaintiffs, NOTICE of APPEAL 
v. 
VERNON J. and MARTI MORTENSEN ) 
Defendants, ) 
Pursuant to Idaho Appeal Rule 17 VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN hereby 
appeals as follows: 
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(a) Title. The title of the action or proceeding is set out above. 
(b) Court or Agency Title. The title of the court which heard the trial or 
proceeding is set out above, the Hon. JOHN T. MITCI{ELL, District Judge, 
Presiding. 
(c) Case Number. The number assigned to the action is set out above. 
(d) Parties. The names of the parties and the parties' attorneys: 
Appellant: 
Respondent: 
VERNON JERRY MORTENSEN 
Attorney: pro se 
PO Box 330 
Naples, Idaho 83847 
208-946-8275 
jerrymortensen@hotmail.com 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SFIERRIE L. AKERS 
Attorney: Susan Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P. A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Co-Appellant: D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. WHITE 
and MICFIELLE V. WHITE 
Attorney: Robert Covington, 
8884 N Government Way, Ste A 
Hayden, ID 83835 
Co-Appellant: Marti Mortensen 
Attorney: Dustin Deissner 
Deissner Law Office 
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1707 W. Broadway Ave 




(e) Designation of Appeal. (1) A Designation of the Judgment or Order 
~ppealed From: Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second 
IRemand, 8/1012011, All interlocutory judgments and orders entered 
prior to the judgment, order or decree appealed from, All final 
judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or order appealed 
from for which the time for appeal has not expired, and All 
interlocutory or final judgments and orders entered after the judgment 
or order appealed from. 
(fJ Issues. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the 
appellant then intends to assert in the appeal: 
(1) Whether evidence supports the location and size of the easement 
determined by the Court. 
(2) Whether the evidence supports the award of damages, punitive 
damages and attorney's fees. 
(3) Whether the Court's conclusions were tainted with errors, 
supposed facts not supported by the trial transcript. 
( 4) Whether the Court was biased. 
(5) Whether Judge Mitchell should have disqualified himself. 
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(g) Jurisdictional Statement. A statement as to the basis for the right to 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the judgments or orders 
described in paragraph 1 of the notice of appeal. 
This appeal is from a final judgment and is permitted under IAR 4 
relating to a person aggrieved by a decision of the District Court, and 
IAR 11(a)(1), final judgment. 
(h) Transcript. No transcript of arguments will be requested. There was no 
new testimony taken. 
(I) Record. A designation of documents, if any, to be included in the clerk's 
or agency's record in addition to those automatically included pursuant 
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Memorandum In Support Of Motion to Disqualify 
Motion to Disqualify 
Memorandum in Response to Defendant VJ 
Mortensen's Motion to Disqualify for Cause 
Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Memorandum 
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Memorandum in response to Defendant V.J. 
Mortensen's motion to strike Plaintiffs response to V.]. 
Mortensen's motion to disqualify for cause. 
Affidavit of weeks in support of opposition to motion 
to strike 
Order RE: Defendant VJ Mortensen's Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion to 
Disqualify Judge for Cause 
Order on Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to 
Disqualify 
Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion to 
Disqualify 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant 
Vernon Mortensen's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Denial of Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to 
Disqualify. 
Brief of Defendants White Re: Proof of Easement 
Location 
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Brief of Defendant Vernon J Mortensen 
Order Regarding Burdens of Proof, and Order 
Establishing Briefing Schedule on Easement Location. 
Brief Of Vernon J Mortensen Supporting Location Of 
Easement 
Brief Of Defendants White RE: Section24 Easement 
Location 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Punitive 
Damages against MARTI Mortensen 
Affidavit of MARTI Mortensen 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion to Strike MARTI 
Mortensen's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Response to Motion to Strike 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Strike Defendant Marti Mortensen's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand Regarding 
Location of Easement 
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Affidavit of Mike Hathaway 
Motion to Admit Additional Evidence RE: Easement 
Location 
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact Conclusions 
of Law and Order RE: Easement Location 
Plaintiffs Memorandum on Second Remand re 
Damages 
MARTI Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages 
Reply Brief Of Defendants White 
Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum On Second Remand Re: 
Damages 
Motion to Correct Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of 
Law And Order Filed 01/02/03 AND Memorandum 
Decision And Order On Reconsideration, On New 
Trial Issues and Additional Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law Regarding Damages and Order 








NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Affidavit In Support of Motion To Correct Findings Of 
Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order Filed 01/02/03 
AND Memorandum Decision And Order On 
Reconsideration, On New Trial Issues And Additional 
Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law Regarding 
Damages and Order Filed on04/0l/04 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum to Defendants Whites' 
Reply Brief on Second Remand RE Damages 
Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway 
Response to Motion to Correct Findings of Fact & 
Conclusions of Law & Motion for Reconsideration on 
New Trial Issues & Additional Findings of Fact & 
Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages 
Post-Hearing Memorandum RE White's Motion To 
Admit Additional Evidence RE Easement Location 
Reply to Akers Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: 
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Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand RE: 
Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for 
Additional Evidence on Easement Location 
Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying 
Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement 
Location 
Memo Decision & Order Denying: (1) Deft Vernon 
Mortensen's Affidavit on Motion to Correct Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order, Filed 1-2-3 & 
Memo Decision & Order on Reconsideration of New 
Trial Issues & Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusion 
of Law Regarding Damages & Order Filed 4-1-04 & 
(2)Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to 
Reconsider Memo Decision & Order on Remand RE: 
Damages & Order Denying White's Motion for 







Fourth AMENDED Judgment and Decree on Second 
Remand 
Motion to Reconsider 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs 
(Including Attorney Fees Incurred Through August 
24, 2011) 
IRCP Sa( e) (3) and (e) (5) Affidavit Of Susan P Weeks 
In Support of Plaintiffs' Claims For Attorney Fees On 
Second Remand 
Objection to the Motion to Disallow Claimed Attorney 
Fees 
(D Exhibits-Civil Cases. A designation of documents, charts, or pictures 
offered or admitted as exhibits in a trial or hearing to be copies and sent 
to the Supreme Court: All exhibits referred to by the Court in its 
memorandum opinion filed 9/29/2010. 
(k) Sealed Record. Not Applicable. 
(1) Certification: Vernon Jerry Mortensen Certifies: 
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Dustin Deissner 
DEISSNER LAW OFFICE 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. 





Attorneys for Defendant 
Marti Mortensen 
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THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS, 
husband and wife, 
Respondents, 
v. 
VERNON J. and MARTI MORTENSEN, 
Appellants, 
and 
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. 
WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE, 
Defendants 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS, 
husband and wife, 
Respondents, 
v. 
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. 




VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. 
MORTENSEN, husband and wife, 
Appellants. 









) Case No. CV-2002-222 
) 
) 













TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT(S), DENNIS LYLE AKERS and 
SHERRIE L. AKERS, husband and wife, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, 
Susan Weeks AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants VERNON J. and MARTI MORTENSEN appeal 
against the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court frorrFourth 
Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand,entered in the above entitled 
action on the 10th day of August, 2011, Honorable Judge John T. Mitchell presiding; all 
interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment, order or decree 
appealed from, All final judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or order 
appealed from for which the time for appeal has not expired, and All interlocutory or 
final judgments and orders entered after the judgment or order appealed from. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to Rule 11 (a)( 1) LA.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on apeal which the appellant 
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on 
appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on 
appeal: 
(1) Whether evidence supports the location and size of the easement determined 
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by the Court; 
(2) Whether the evidence supports the award of damages, punitive damages and 
attorneys fees; 
(3) Whether MARTI Mortensen should be permitted to raise new issues as to 
the applicability of punitive damages to her in light of her divorce from 
Vernon Mortensen. 
(4) Whether Judge Mitchell should have disqualified himself. 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? NO 
If so, what portion? 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? NO. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in 
the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included 
under Rule 28, LA.R. 
Cause 
05/04/2009 Memorandum In Support Of Motion to DQ 
05/04/2009 Motion to Disqualify 
0511512009 Memorandum in Response to DefVJ Mortensen's Motion to DQ for 
05/19/2009 Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to 
V.J. Mortensen's Motion to Disqualify for Cause 
05/20/2009 Memorandum in response to Defendant V.J. Mortensen's motion to 
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strike Plaintiffs response to V.J. Mortensen's motion to disqualify for cause 
05/20/2009 Affidavit of weeks in support of opposition to motion to strike 
05/29/2009 Order RE: Defendant VJ Mortensen's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause 
06/01/2009 Order on Defendat Vernon Mortensen's Motion to Disqualify 
06/19/2009 Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant's Motion to Disqualify 
06/30/2009 Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant Vernon Mortensen's 
Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to 
Disqualify 
10/22/2009 Brief of Defendants White Re: Proof of Easement Location 
10122/2009 Memorandum Re: Burden of Proof by MARTI Mortensen 
10/30/2009 Brief of Defandant Vernon J Mortensen 
12/01/2009 Order Regarding Burdens of Proof, and Order Establishing Briefing 
Schedule on Easement Location 
01122/2010 Brief Of Vernon J Mortensen Supporting Location Of Easement 
03/29/2010 Brief Of Defendants White RE: Section 24 Easement Location 
03/30/2010 Motion For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Punitive Damages 
Against MARTI Mortensen 
03/30/2010 Affidavit of MARTI Mortensen 
04/14/2010 Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Strike MARTI Mortensen's 
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Motion For Summary Judgment 
04/27/2010 Response to Motion to Strike 
05/03/2010 Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Strike Defendant Marti Mortensen's Motion for Summary Judgment 
0611 712010 Plaintiffs' Brief on Second Remand Regarding Location of Easement 
06/2412010 Reply Brief Of Defendants White RE: Section 24 Easement Location 
06/30/2010 Affidavit of Mike Hathaway 
06/3012010 Motion to Admit Additional Evidence RE: Easement Location 
09/29/2010 Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order RE: Easement Location 
11/10/2010 Plaintiffs Memorandum on Second Remand re Damages 
11/17/2010 MARTI Mortensen's Memorandum Re: Damages 
0111812011 Reply Brief Of Defendants White 
01119/2011 Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway 
01119/2011 Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum On Second Remand Re: Damages 
01/24/2011 Motion To Correct Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order 
Filed 01102/03 AND Memorandum Decision And Order On Reconsideration, On New 
Trial Issues And Additional Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law Regarding Damages 
and Order filed on 04/01/04 
01/24/2011 Affidavit In Support of Motion To Correct Findings Of Fact, 
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Conclusions Of Law And Order Filed 01/02/03 AND Memorandum Decision And Order 
On Reconsideration, On New Trial Issues And Additional Findings Of Fact, Conclusions 
Of Law Regarding Damages and Order Filed on 04/01/04 
0112512011 Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum To Defendants Whites' Reply Brief 
On Second Remand RE Damages 
01/25/2011 Supplemental Affidavit Of Mike Hathaway 
02/11/2011 Response to Motion to Correct Findings of Fact & Conclusions of 
Law & Motion for Reconsideration on New Trial Issues & Additional Findings of Fact 
& Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages 
02/1612011 Post-Hearing Memorandum RE White's Motion To Admit Additional 
Evidence RE Easement Location 
0211812011 Reply to Akers Post-Hearing Memorandum Re: Whites' Motion to 
Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement Location 
03118/2011 Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand RE: Damages, and 
Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location 
04/05/2011 Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand 
Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement 
Location 
05/23/2011 Memo Decision & Order Denying: 1) Deft Vernon Mortensen's Affd 
on Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order, Filed 1-2-3 & 
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Memo Decision & Order on Reconsideration of New Trial Issues & Additional Findings 
of Fact, Conclusion of Law Regarding Damages & Order Filed 4-1-04 & 2) Deft Vernon 
Mortensen's Motion to Reconsider Memo Decision & Order on Remand RE: Damages & 
Order Denying White's Motion for Additional Evidence on Easment Location 
08110/2011 Fourth AMENDED Judgment and Decree on Second Remand 
08/24/2011 Motion To Reconsider 
08/24/2011 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum Of Costs (Including Attorney 
Fees Incurred Through August 24,2011) 
08/24/2011 IRCP 54( e )(3) and (e)( 5) Affidavit Of Susan P Weeks In Support of 
Plaintiffs' Claims For Attorney Fees On Second Remand 
09/07/2011 Objection to the Motion to Disallow Claimed Attorney Fees 
7. Civil Cases Only. The appellant requests the following documents, 
charts, or pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and 
sent to the Supreme Court. 
All exhibits referred to by the Court in its memorandum opinion filed 9/29/2010. 
8. I certify: 
( a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Reporter: JULIE FOLAND, 
PO Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000, 
julie foland@yahoo.com. 
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(b) (1) [X] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid 
the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. THAT FEE WAS $ 0 
BECAUSE NO TRANSCRIPT IS REQUESTED. 
(c) (1) [X] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has 
been paid in the current amount of $1 00.00 pursuant to IAR 27( d). 
(d) (1) [X] That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 







Deissner Law Office' 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. 
Spokane WA 99201 
509-326-6935 
Deissnerlaw@aol.com 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS 
Susan Weeks 
J ames, Vernon & Weeks, P. A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Co-Appellant: D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. WHITE and 
MICHELLE V. WHITE 
Attorney: Robert Covington, 
8884 N Government Way, Ste A 
Hayden, ID 83835 
Co-Appellant: VERNON J. MORTENSEN 
PO BOX 1922 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 
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Pro Se. 
So Certified: September 29,2011 
Dustm Issner 
Attorney for MARTI Mortensen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Dustin Deissner certifies: 
I have on this date served the foregoing document upon the following parties by 
the following means: 
TO: BY: 
VERNON J. MORTENSEN [X] US Mail 151 Class Postage Prepaid 
POBOX 1922 [ ] Delivery Service 
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805 [] Email 
Robert Covington, [x ] US Mail 151 Class Postage Prepaid 
8884 N Government Way, Ste A [ ] Delivery Service 
Hayden, ID 83835 [ ] Facsimile to: 208-762-4546 
Susan Weeks [X ] US Mail 1 sl Class Postage Prepaid 
J ames, Vernon & Weeks, P. A. [ ] Delivery Service 
1626 Lincoln Way [] Facsimile to: (208) 664-1684 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
JULIE FOLAND, PO Box 9000, Coeur [X ] US Mail 1 sl Class Postage Prepaid 
d'Alene, ID 83816-9000, [ ] Delivery Service 
julie _ foland@yahoo.com [ ] Facsimile to: 
Dated September 29, 2011 ® 
Dustm DeIssner --
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ROBERT E. COVINGTON 
Attorney at Law 
8884 North Government Way, Suite A 
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COU. N.'TYsjiO'r,,'n:N" l (. FILED ) SLf ~'c... f\). 
Attorney for D.L. White Construction, Int., David 
Michelle V. White 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA l'E OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
KOOTENAI 
DENNiS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. ) 







D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
DA VJD L. WHTTE Hnd MICHELLE V. ) 
WHITE, husband aDd wife; and ) 
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. ) 




CASE NO. CV-02-222 
MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF 
OBJECT) ON TO 
CLAIM FOR 
A TTORNEY FEES 
Defendants D.L. White Construction, Inc., David 1. White and 
Michelle V. White, hereinafter "Whitcs'\ by and through their attorney, 
Robert Covington. submit herewith their Memorandum Tn Support of 
Objection to Claim for Attorney Fees submitted in this action by 
Plaintiffs. Each of the remands in this proceeding has vacated the tria) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW 
ATTORNEY'S FEES·! 
1 
court's entire award of attorney fees. Though the trial court has 
reinstated its previous awards of attorney fees, Whites object to an award 
of attorney fees during the entire course of these proceedings, including 
$105,534.06 prior to the initial appeal, $6,037.50 after the initial remand 
and $19,170 after the second remand from the Supreme Court. Because 
previous awards of attorney fees were entirely vacated, Whites submit 
that the trial court must now review and determine what attorney fees, if 
any, are appropriately awarded from the inception of this case to the 
present tjme. 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs seek award of a total of $130,741 in athlTneys' fees. 
Defendants object to this request on the grounds and for reasons inc1uding 
without limitation those set forth in Whites Objection to and Motion to 
Disal10w C1aimed Attorney Fees. 
1:. Failure to Comply with l.R.C . .i!:. 
In making an award of attorney fees, the court should consider 
several factors in determining the amount of such fees. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
The attorneys' fees must be reasonably and necessarily incurred and the 
fees must be commensurate with fees charged by other attorneys in the 
area for litigation of this type. 
The Plaintiffs did not address the factors that must be taken into 
consideratjon in charging attorneys~ fees. Those factors are: 1) the time 
and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 3) the 
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skill requisite to perfornl the legal service properly and the experience 
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; 4) the prevailing 
charges for like work; 5) whether the fee is fixed or contingtmt; 6) the 
time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstance!'; or the case; 7) 
the amount involved and the results obtained; 8) the undesirability of the 
ca~e; 9) the nature and length of the professiona1 relationship with the 
client; 10) awards in similar cases; and 11) the reasonable costs of 
automated legal research. 
After these factors are addressed, the party seeking fees must 
verify, under ollth, that the fees were reasonably, necessarily and actual1y 
incurred. Plaintiffs failed to follow all of the foregoing requirements and 
therefore, this Court should disallow those attorneys fees altogether. 
2. Any Fees Should Be Apportjoned 
A Judge may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part 
and did not prevail in part, and thus the judge may apportion the costs 
between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after 
considering all of the jssues al1d claims involved in lh~ action and the 
resultant judgment or judgments obtained. Smith v. MitlOn, 140 Jdaho 893, 
104 P .3d 367 (2004). The Idabo Court of Appeals made it clear in Nalen 
v. Jenkins. 113 ID 79 (Idaho App. ] 987). that in considering a claim for 
attorney fees, '·It is important to keep in mind the di stinction between 
multiple "claims" and multiple "theories". In this case, the Plaintiffs 
made a variety of claims for relief, some of which are successful to this 
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point and some unsuccessful, to this point, e.g. trespass, emotional 
distress, quiet title, punitive damages. The appropriateness of an award 
of aLtorney fees to Plaintiffs depends upon careful application of relevant 
criteria and appropriate law. Trespass claims under 6·202 have statutory 
support for attorney fees; punitjye damages, quiet title, and emotional 
distress have no such "UPPOTt. The trial count should award fees only 
where supported by statute for claims under that Slalute. Thus, the 
Plaintiffs claims for fees must be parsed among the vari()us claims. The 
Plainti ffs have provided no basis to this point for such apportionment. 
In this case, if Plaintiffs are entitled to any fees on the claims that 
they prevailed, i.e. trespass, the fees should be apportiolled to the amount 
of fees actual1y incurred prosecuting the succe8sful trespass claim. No 
fees should be awarded for unsuccessfu1 trespass claims, e.g. over Parcel 
B and within the 12.2 foot easement area. There is no basi sunder T daho 
law t.o award fees associated with the emotional distress claim or punitive 
damages claims. Thus, this Court should apportion the attorney fees 
requested accordingJy. 
The successful claim of Plaintiffs for lrespass occurred in the area 
of the disputed triangle. A claim for attorney fees dependR entirely on 
whether the Plaintiffs posted signa.ge to indicate that the disputed triangle 
was thei r property. The photographic evidence in this case shOWlil only 
that the Plaintiffs' signage claims property to their gate location which 
did nut include the disputed triangle. Hence, no attorney fees for trespass 
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under 6-202 are appropriate for trespass proved in the di sputed triangle. 
Likewise, an award of attorney fees under 6-202 is appropriate only where 
t.he conduct of Defendants was willful and intentional. Gi yen the course 
of conveyancing. fencing and use in this case, it cannot be fairly 
determined that Whites use of the disputed triangle was willful or 
intentional within the meaning of 6·202. No trespass attorney fees are 
therefore approprial~. 
If any attol11ey fees are nevertheless to be awarded under 6-202. 
they must be reasonably related to prevailing on the claim for trespass in 
the disputed triangle. not in Parcel B and not on the express easement. 
P1aintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating attorney fees incurn:d in 
prosecuting that claim. The matters presented in support of Plaintiffs 
claim for trespass in the disputed triangle do not identify time spent 
specifically on such claim. 
The Plaintiffs have been awarded damages for trespass of $51,008. 
A reasonable attorney fee for prosecuting such claim under the relevant 
fee agreement may be as much as 45% or $22.953. As the Court is aware, 
in Good VS. Sic.helsticl, Koot~nai County Case No. 2010-1862, a trespass 
case under 6-202 decided by the tria.l court in June, 2011. trespass 
damages were found to be $49,769 and attorney fees awarded therein 
based upon IRCP criteria were $21,944. Whites submit that an award of 
$22,953 to Plaintiffs for successful prosecution of a trespass claim under 
6-202 that generates damages of $51,008 represents a reasonable 
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apportionment of fees in this case jf the other criteria of 6~202 are 
satisfied. There should be no award of fees for successful prosecution of 
claims for punitive damages, emotional distress and unsuccessful claims 
that no easement exists in Parcel B. 
J.:. Prevailing Party Determination 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, because Plaintiffs are not the prevailing 
party as required by the rule and statute. The Jdaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure specifically require the following analysis to determine who is 
the prevailing party: 
(B) Prevailing Party. Tn determining which party to an action is a 
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial c~>urt shall in its 
sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action 
in relation to the relief sought by the respective parti es, whether 
there were multiple claims, multiple issues, counterclaims~ third 
party claims, cross-claims, or other multiple or cross issues between 
the parties, and the extent to which each party prevailed upon each 
of such issue or claims. The trial court in its sound discretion may 
determine that a party to an actiun prevailed in part and did not 
prevail in part, and upon so ttnding may apportion lhe costs 
between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after 
considering a11 of the issues and claims involved in the action and 
the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
I.R.C.P. S4(d)(l)(B). 
The determination of who is a prevailing party, for the purpose of 
receiving an award of attorney fees, is committed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Israel v. Leachman, 72 P .3d 864 (Idaho 2003); 
Odziemek v. Wesely, 102 Idaho 582, 634 P .2d 623 (1981). The rules 
require the trial court to make an analysis of the entire action, including 
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the claims made and the relief obtained by the parties. brael, 72 P .3d at 
867. 
In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs sought to quiet title to Whites' 
easement, and then sought damages for trespass and emotional distress. 
However, Whites' casement was admitted by Plaintiffs and affirmed by 
the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal and remanded to this Court. The final 
judgment reflects that the Defendants have an easement from Mi11sap 
Loop Road to the section line over and across Plaintiffs' property. 
Furthermore, Plaintjffs sought welt over one million dollars in 
damages against the Defendants, but this Court only awarded damages 
eligible for an attorney fee award in the amount of $51 ,000 against 
Defendants. When comparing the amount of relief sought by Plaintiffs for 
which they may have a claim for attorney fees with the relief they actually 
obtained from this Court, the Plaint.iffs are not the prevailing party. 
Finally, given that the Plaintiffs admitted that Whites have an casement 
across Parcel B only after claiming and litigating incredibly a cJaim that 
the roadway never cTossed into Parc.el S, it would be reasonable and 
appropriate to regard that portion of the lawsuit as frivolous and 
unsuccessful. No a.ttorney fees should be awarded for Plaintiffs' claims 
on the Parcel B easement issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants object to the Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney's Fees because Plaintiffs failed to comply with the rules of civil 
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procedure, P1aintiffs were not the prevaiJing party on a claim fOT which 
attorney fees are arguable availabJe except as to a trespass claim in the 
disputed triangle, and there is no basis in Idaho law to award attorney 
fees. If any fees are to be awarded. the fees should be apportioned 
accordingly. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 2011. 
~ERTIFICATE OJ~ SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of October, 2011, I caused to 
be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by 
facsimile transmission to: 
And by mail to: 
Vernon J. Mortensen 
PO Box 330 
Naples, TD 847 
Susan Weeks 
James, Vernon & Vernon P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' AJene, Idaho 83814 
Fax: 208-664-1684 
Dustin Deissner 
Van Camp & Deissner 
1707 W. Broadway Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Fax: S09-326~6978 
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JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
FAX: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for: Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAJ 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. 
AKERS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
0.1. WHITE CONSTRUCTJON, INC.; 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. 
WHITE~ husband and wife; and VERNON 1. 
MORTENSEN and MARTI E. MORTENSEN, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-02-222 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT 
WHITE'S MOTION TO DISALLOW 
ATTORNEY FEES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendant White has moved to disa1Jow attorney fees in this matter on. 
several grounds. The original Objection to attorney fees .filed September 7, 2011 
raised five objections. A subsequent Memorandum in Support of the Objection 
raised additional. grounds for o~jection. 
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In reviewing a trial court's decision regarding attorneys, fees. an. abuse of 
discretion standard is folJowed. In determining whether a trial court properly 
exercised its discretion in an award of attorney fees, the Supreme Court considers 
(1) whether the trial court. correctly perceived the .issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specifi.c choices ava.ilable to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun 
Valley Shopping Or., Inc. \I. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 
1000 (1991). 
White submits that this Court did not have the discretion based Up0l1 the 
remand to reinstate previously awarded attorney fees. This argument is made 
because White has not previously argued apportionment and wishes to do so now 
without facing a challei1ge of waiver. Akers disagrees with this assessment and 
believes White has waived thelr apportionment argument. However, to the extent 
that the Court finds merit in White's argument that this matter is now before the 
Court, Akers presents the following response on all attorney fee i.ssues. 
IJ. PREVAILING PARTY STATUS 
A. Lega.l Standard 
Tn the recent case of Shore 11. Peterson, .l46ldaho 903.914.204 P.3d 1 J./4, 
1125 (2009), the Supreme Court provided a comprehensive analysis of the 
determination of a prevailing party in an action and he1 d: 
A prevailing party in an action is entitled to certain costs as a matter 
of right and may, in. some cases, also be awar.ded discretionary costs 
and attorney fees. Idaho R. Civ. P. S4(d)(1). A determination on 
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prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the trial court. 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 
Idaho 716, 718·19, 117 P.3d 130, ] 32-33 (2005), Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure S4(d)(1)(B) guides courts' inquir.ies on the prevailing party 
question. Jd. at 719, 117 PJd at 133. That mle provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party 
and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound 
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action 
in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. TIle 
trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party 
to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in Palt, and 
upon so finding may apportion the costs between alld 
among the parties in a fail' and equitable man.ner. after 
considering aU of the issues and claims involved in the 
action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
Idaho R. eiv. P. S4(d)(l)(B). In detel1l1ining which party prevailed 
where there are claims and counterclaims between opposing parties, 
the court determines who prevailed "in the action"; that is, the 
prevailing party question is examm.ed and detennined from an 
overall view, not a claim~by·clair.:n analysis. Eighteen Mile, 141 
Idaho at 719, 117 PJd at 133. 
Only in rare cases has this Court or the Court of Appeals reversed a 
trial court's determination of which party prevailed. In. Eighteen Mile, 
we reversed the trial court's determination that although the 
defendants had successfully defended against plaintiffs complah1t, 
because they recovered only a small portion of what they desired on 
their counterclaim, they were not prevailing parties. Jd. at 719, 117 
P.3d at 133. In. that case we emphasized that a defendant's non~ 
liability is evidence that it is the prevailing party. In Daisy 
Manufacturing Co. v. Paintball j..)jJorts, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 999 P.2d 
914 (Ct.App.2000), the Court of Appeals observed: "The· 'result 
obtained' in this case was a dismissal of [plaintiffs] action with 
pr~iudice, the most favorable outcome that could possibly be 
achieved by [a defendant]. [The plaintiff] gained no benefit as a 
consequ.ence of the Ii tigation." Id. at 262, 999 P.2d at 917, Those 
cases illustrate that a defendant may be the prevailing party when he 
or she is ultimately found not Hable. 
When both parties are partially successful, however, it is within the 
court's discretion to decline an. award of attorney fees to either side. 
Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.3d 864, 867 (2003). In 
hrael, the plaintiffs prevailed on their claim tmder the Idaho 
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Consumer Protection Act, but did not prevall on their claims for 
breach of c011tract, statutory violations, and fraud. Id. at 25-26, 72 
P.3d at 865~66. We affirmed the district court's decision to award no 
attorney fees because it determined that both parties prevailed in part. 
Id. at 28, 72 PJd 864, 72 PJd at 868. 
The district court's determination of who is a preva.iling party will not 
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Trilogy Network Sys .. Inc. 
v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119, 1122 (2007). When 
examining whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court 
considers whether the trial court: (l) perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of this discretion 8.11d 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specifi.c 
choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by ill1 exercise of 
reason.Id. (affirming the trial court's decision that each party bear its 
own costs jn a case where a plaintiff successfully showed a breach of 
contract, but failed to provide adequate evidence to show damages 
that were not mere speculation.) 
B. Akers PrevaUed in this Matter 
White claims Akers are not a prevailing party in this litigatio)1 in comparison 
to the relief and damages they sougbt or ill comparison of the relief and. damages 
sought by White in this litigation. Nothing could be farther from the tnlth. 
Pursuant to this Court's conclusions oflaw, Plaintiffs are the prevailing 
parties. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed Janu.ary 2, 2003, 
paragraph 28). 
In spite of the Court's specific ruling, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are 
not the prevailing party. Plaintiffs sued Defendants for trespass and won. Plaintiffs 
amended their complaint to include a claim for emotional distress damages and 
won. Plaintiffs never did dispute there was an express easement that was the width 
of the existing travel way. The Court decided with Plainti.ffs on these issues. 
The Defendants gained no benefit as a result of their quiet title 
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counterc.laims. The access road exists exactly as it did prior to the litigation. 
Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties. 
III. Total Costs Awarded 
White correctly notes that the costs for maps, surveys, etc. may not exceed 
$500. Akers requested the cost of the preparation of the legal description utilized by 
th.e Court in its :5.nal judgnlent. The Court is mandated by Idallo case I.aw to have 
such a descripti.on in defining an easement. The law is silent as to whose 
responsibility it is to pay for that cost. Akers wou1d request the $50 excess be 
awarded as a discretionary cost under 54(d)(1)(D). TIle Court was required to 
obtain this legal. description. The cost was necessary for the court to discharge its 
duties and therefore was reasonably incurred. The request for quiet title was 
brought by Whites, not Akers. White should bear the cost of providing the Court 
the infonn.ation required for the Court to meet its legal mandate. Thus, the excess 
cost was an exceptional cost to Akers which in fairness should be bome by White. 
IV. Attorney Fees 
A. Statutory Standards 
Previously~ this COl.llt awarded attorney fees on. the basis of trespass. 
Plall1tiffshave also requested attorney fees under I.C. § 12·123 ba.sed upon fiivolous 
conduct by White and Mortensen. 
Idaho Code §6·202 defines different types of trespasses that can occur. 
They include, trespass against postings; timber trespass; and right of way trespass. 
In Earl v. Fordice, 84 Idaho 542, 545, 374 P.2d 713, 714 (1962), the Supreme Court 
also held that, "it is necessary to establish the trespass was willful and intentiol1aUy 
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cornn:litted." II Intentional" is defined as II [d]one with the aim of carrying out the 
act." Black',,! Law Dictionary 370 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). WHJfu] is defined as " 
[v Joluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious." ld. at 779. 
Additi.onally, in trespass cases, Our Suprem.e Court held in Weitz v. Green, 
148 Idaho 851, 230 P.3d 743, 756 (2010): 
This Court strongly disfavors the resort to forceful self-help in resolving 
property disputes. See Burke v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02C59J.0~ 2004 WL 
784073, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Jan.. 29, 2004) C' Self-help in litigation is not condoned by 
the courts." ); Doles v. Doles .. No. 17462,2000 WL 511693, at "'2 (Va.Cir.Ct. Mar. 
10, 2000) (" [P]ublic policy favors the set11ement of disputes by litigation rather 
than by self help force ... " ). When parties have entered into a confl.ict over rea1 
property the rights are usually fixed fat in advance of the exchange of attorneys' 
letters, or subsequent filing of a lawsuit, motions, deposition.s, and hearings. Making 
a bold physical attempt to gain, or regain, possession or control of a real property 
interest, by demolishing or erecting gates or fences, bulldozing land, etc., results in 
no strategic advantage. Instead, passions become inflamed., positions become 
e11trenched, damages are exacerbated rather than mitigated, and the parties end up 
spending far more money in liti.gation than thejr supposed 111terest was worth to 
begin with. Attorneys who counsel their clients to engage in self-help, without being 
certain that the respective rights ~U1d responsibilities have been settled, do their 
clients a disservice. Clients who ignore the advice of counsel and take mat1ers into 
their own. hands do themselves a disservice. In short, parties who attempt to solve a 
property dispute through their own. forceful action do so at their own peril. 
B. Akers are entitled to Attorney Fees pursuant to the Statute 
White claim.s Akers may not recover because there is not evidence that the 
property was posted with ":no trespassjng" signs. 111 making this argument, White 
ignores that a portion of the damages awarded were for timber damage, which is 
awarded regardless of trespass sign postings. 
Further, it is undisputed White entered Akers property along a. road leading 
off the public road. It is un.disputed that this road .paralleled the side of the south 
boundary of the property, and this property sIde was less than 660 feet (See 
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Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 6). The record is replete with photographs that this road 
was posted in more than one location with ''No Trespassing" sign. Thus, there js 
evidence in the record that Akers met the statutory requirement that its property was 
posted. Further, there is evidence in the record that White was aware of these 
postings. Wlllte celtainly can't argue that the intent an.d purpose of the statute was 
not met in this case. He had actual knowledge of the posting. 
Finally, t11e evidence before the court demonstrates that White and 
Mortensen's acts were willful and jntention.a.l as defined by law. Therefore, this 
Court's concluded that Defendants' willful trespass on Plaintiffs' property supports 
an award of treble damages pursuant to I.C. §6-202. (Conclusions of Law, 
paragraph 22) is supported by the facts. Further, this Court's award of attorney's 
fees meets the Supreme Court's hol.ding that indivi.duals who take the law into their 
hand in property disputes do so at their own peril. Therefore. Akers are entitled to 
the "full reasonable attorney fee attributable to [their] successful trespass claim.'~ 
Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,644 (App. ] 993). 
\\'bite also claims that apportionm.ent is appropriate in this matter. White 
claims that the trespass was found to only have occurred in the triangle area 
awarded to Akers. From this premise, White argues that the "no trespassing signs" 
weren't directed to the disputed triangle area because one of them was hung on the 
gate. (The other sign was posted at the top of the hill.) 
White's argument is ftmdam.entally flawed. As the Court recalls, when the 
dispute abetlt White and Mortensen working i.n the triangle area arose, White and 
Mortensen advanced two theories 011 why they were not trespassing on Aker.s' 
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property, which were: (1) it's a public right of way; or (2) if not a public right of 
way, they obtained title to it through a deed obtained after the dispute arose. The 
evidence is clear that White Bud Mortensen were well aware that Akers claimed title 
to the disputed triangle area. As for the claim that the no trespassing posting was 
.Iimited to the gate, thjs argument is without meri.!. TIle signs are for the entirc area 
outside the existing travel way, not just for. the item which provided support for their 
posting. 
Further, White and Jerry Mortensen have actcd f'Tivolously on the remand of 
this matter. They have asked this Court to rule on motiol1s that were previously 
determined (i.e. the admissjon of additional evidence on remand). They have failed 
to follow the directive of the Cou,rt on rem.snd to assist in obtaining a legal 
description for the prescriptive easen:lent. Much of the time spent on remand has 
been to these isslles, and not to the issues remain.ing following remand. Therefore, 
an award of fees for such frivolous conduct is appropriate. 
C. The Amount Requested is Reasonable 
White also c1ajms the attol11ey fee awarded is not reasonable. White bases 
this argument upon an unre]ated case wherein the trial court's award of reasonable 
attorney fees represented 45% of tot a] amount given in damages. However, the trial 
court's decision was not based upon any formula dictated by rule, case law or 
statute. The trial court merely found that the amount was unreasonable under the 
circumstances of that case. 
White maintains it is reasonable to apportion the fees based upon work 
dedicated to the easement issue, the trespass portion oftbe case and the emotional 
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distress and punitive damage components of proof. Akers would submit that these 
issues are so intricately interwoven that they overlapped and can't be apportioned. 
In such circumstances, it is not an abuse of discretion 0 award the fees that result 
from overlapping legal work. See Bumgarner v. Bumgarner. supra. 
The trespass complaint filed by Plaintiff alleged that White and Morten~en 
were required to stay within the established travel way and had not done so. White 
and Mortensen denied the allegation, claiming they had not strayed outside the 
parameters of the easement. Even. if White and Mortensen had not counterclaimed 
with other easement theories, estabHshing the dimension and location of the 
easement was a necessary element of the trespass case as White and Mortensen 
denied the locatioll and diltl.ension were as alleged by Akers. Thus, the work on this 
portion of the case would have taken place. 
Regarding the damage claim, as the Court recalls, this trial was bifurcated. 
The damage portion was tried separate. The evidence that went to proving the 
trespass damages also supported the punitive dam.age and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. It was the egregiou.s method of trespassing that supported the 
pltnitive dan1age claim and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
As to the reasonableness of the amount of work invested by Plaintiff in this 
matter, this CO\lrt is very familiar with the extraordinary amowlt of pleadil:lgs filed 
by White and Mortensen which have escalated the fees in this litigation to 
sta,ggering amounts. Plaintiffs have not done anything unnecessary in the 
prosecution of this case. They have ll'I.ostly been in a defensive posture following 
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the first remand, merely responding to the plethora of pleadings by opposing 
counsel. 
v. Rule 54 Factors 
In the su.bsequent Memorandum filed by White, an additional ground is 
raised that Plaintiffs did not comply with the Rule 54(e)(3) in submitting their 
claims as they failed to address the factors ofI.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Plaintiffs previously 
made this argument to the Court. At the risk of being redWldant, Plaintiffhereby 
reprodu.ces its previous response to Mortensen's exact same argwnents. 
A. Plair.diffs addressed the fQctors to be taken into consideration whe.D 
granting an award of attorneY,'s fees. 
Defendants incorrectly state: "The Plaintiffs did 110t address the factors that 
must be taken 111to consideration in charging attorneys' fees." Defendants' 
Memorandum, pg. 5. Defendants then. cite eleven items set forth under I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3). In doing so, Defendants have apparently overlooked the "l.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3) Affidavit of Leatlder L. Jarn.cs in Support of Plaintiffs I Claim for At10mey 
Fees" :filed after Plaintiffs prevailed in the first trial. of this case and the "Amended 
l.RC.P. 54(e)(3) Affidavit of Leander L. Jam.es in. Support of Plaintiffs' Claims tor 
Attorney's Fees" filed on May 7,2004. 
Defendant's objection is without merit. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs should be awarded all costs and attorney fees claimed. 
DATED this 2nd day of November, 2011. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
~~(£~La 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. ) 
AKERS, husband and wife, ) 
) ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 39182-2011 
v. ) Kootenai ,County Docket No. 2002-222 
) 






VERNON J. MORTENSEN; D.L. WHITE ) -I 
CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID L. WHITE ) 
and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and ) I 




DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. ) 
AKERS, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 39293-2011 
v. ) Kootenai County Docket No. 2002-222 
) 






D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.; ) 
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V. ) 




ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS - Docket Nos. 39182-2011/39293-2011 
It appearing that these appeals should be consolidated for all purposes for reasons of 
judicial economy; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that appeal No. 39182 and 39293 shall be 
CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under No. 39182, but all documents filed shall bear 
both docket numbers. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a CLERK'S 
RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in the Notices of Appeal, together with a 
copy of this Order. '\ 
'31~ DATED this _, __ day of October 2011. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, rk 
ST A TE OF IDAHO 
County of KOOTENAI )" 
ll-ito-Il 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. ) 




D.L. WHITE CONST., INC., DAVID L. WHITE ) 
and MICHELLE V. WHITE, husband and wife; ) 
and VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. ) 
MORTENSEN, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV2002222 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING WHITES' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND 
GRANTING AKERS' CLAIMS FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES. 
Under consideration here are the Whites' Motion to Reconsider filed on August 24, 2011, 
Whites' Objection and Motion to Disallow Claimed Attorney Fees filed on September 7,2011, 
and Whites' Memorandum in Support of Objection to Claim for Attorney Fees filed on October 
25,2011. The Court is also considering the Akers' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs, LR.C.P. 
54(e)(3) and (e)(5) Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for Attorney Fees 
on Second Remand, both filed on August 24, 2011, Akers' Opposition to Motion to Reconsider 
filed on October 6, 2011, and Akers' Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant White's Motion to 
Disallow Attorney Fees filed on November 2,2011. 
These filings follow extensive litigation begun in 2002. The Clerk now utilizes 16 files to 
contain the record. 
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Some of the major events in the case are outlined as follows: On January 10, 2002, the 
Akers filed their civil complaint against the Whites, D.L. White Construction and the 
Mortensens. A fourteen-day Court trial occurring over the course of twenty months followed, 
with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by this Court on January 2,2003. The 
defendants appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court on May 28, 2004. The Idaho Supreme Court 
issued an opinion on January 1,2006. A Remittitur followed and the case was remanded. This 
Court issued an Amended Judgment and Decree on Remand and Second Amended Judgment and 
Decree on Remand on October 6,2006. Judgments were entered, and the defendants again 
appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme Court filed an opinion on June 4, 
2008. No Remittitur followed. On January 22,2009, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its 
"substitute opinion." The case was once again remanded. This Court then issued its 
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Easement Location 
on September 29,2010. Additional briefing was received on the issue of damages to the Akers, 
and on January 26, 2011, this Court heard oral argument of the issue of damages. On March 18, 
2011, this Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages and 
Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on Easement Location." On May 23, 
2011, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying: 1) Defendant Vernon 
Mortensen's "Affidavit on Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration on New Trial Issues, and 
Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Regarding Damages and Order Filed 4-1-04" 
and 2) Defendant Vernon Mortensen's Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Remand Re: Damages and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on 
Easement Location. 
On August 10,2011, this Court signed the Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on 
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Second Remand, as finally submitted by Akers' counsel. The parties filed the motions at issue 
after entry of the August 10,2011, Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand. 
Whites' Motion to Reconsider was filed on August 24, 2011, and Akers' Opposition to Motion to 
Reconsider was filed on October 6, 2011. Akers filed Akers' Supplemental Memorandum of 
Costs and Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for Attorney Fees on 
Second Remand filed on August 24,2011, to which Whites filed Whites' Objection and Motion 
to Disallow Claimed Attorney Fees on September 7,2011, and then Whites filed Whites' 
Memorandum in Support of Objection to Claim for Attorney Fees on October 25,2011. Finally, 
Akers filed Akers' Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant White's Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees 
filed on November 2, 2011. Oral argument on these motions was held on November 8, 2011, 
following which, the Court took the motions under advisement. 
The Whites' Motion to Reconsider concerns the Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on 
Second Remand. In the Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand, the Court decreed 
the following: 
1. It granted a twelve point two (12.2') foot easement by prescription to the defendants, the 
Whites and the Mortensens,just inside the northeast comer of the Defendants' land, turning south 
immediately west of the west boundary of Government Lot 2 (where the express easement ends) 
and the east boundary of Parcel B. 
2. The Court awarded compensatory damages to the Akers for willful trespass in the 
amount of $17,002.85, and trebled the damages pursuant to I.e. § 6-202 for a total amount of 
$51,008.55 in trespass damages against D.L. White Construction Inc.; David L. White and 
Michelle V. White, husband and wife; and Vernon J. Mortensen and Marti E. Mortensen, husband 
and wife, jointly and severally pursuant to I.C. § 6-803. 
3. The Court further awarded Sherri Akers compensatory damages for emotional distress in 
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the amount of$10,000 against D.L. White Construction Inc.; David L. White and Michelle V. 
White, husband and wife; and Vernon J. Mortensen and Marti E. Mortensen, husband and wife, 
jointly and severally pursuant to I.C. § 6-803. 
4. The Court awarded the plaintiff punitive damages against Vernon 1. Mortensen and Marti 
E. Mortensen in the amount of$150,000. 
5. The Court awarded the plaintiff punitive damages against David L. White and Michelle 
V. White in the amount of$30,000. 
6. The Court awarded a total of$105,534.06 in costs and attorneys fees to the plaintiff, 
together with interest at the applicable statutory rate, jointly and severally against each defendant. 
7. The Court further ordered that the Akers are entitled to seek judgement of costs and 
attorney fees as permitted by rule or statute. 
Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand, pp. 2-3. 
Defendants David L. White, Michelle V. White and D.L. White Construction filed their 
Motion to Reconsider the decree on August 24, 2011, citing I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B). Defendant's 
Motion to Reconsider, p. 1. The Whites wish for the Court to reconsider (a) the location of the 
easement; (b) the decision on the "scope and willfulness ofthe trespasses"; (c) the emotional 
distress damages awarded to Sherri Akers; (d) the punitive damages awarded against the 
defendants; and (e) the attorney fees awarded to the Akers. Id, pp. 1-2. The Whites further 
stated to the Court and to the other parties that the Whites would submit a brief in support of 
their motion to reconsider on or before September 14,2011. Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, 
p.2. Whites have failed to submit any such brief. 
The Akers filed an Opposition to Motion to Reconsider on October 6, 2011, stating that the 
Whites had failed to file a brief in support of the motion to reconsider, and so they could not 
address the motion. Opposition to Motion to Reconsider, pp. 1-2. Consequently, the Akers 
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requested that the Whites' Motion to Reconsider be denied. ld., p. 2. 
On August 24, 2011, the Akers filed a supplemental Memorandum of Costs pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs (Including Attorney Fees Incurred 
through August 24, 2011), p. 1. The Akers' costs for preparation of models, maps, and pictures, 
total $550, which the Akers state are allowable as a matter of right. ld., p. 2. The attorney fees 
listed total $18,620, a figure compiled by calculating 112.75 attorney hours at a fee of$175 per 
hour. ld. The amounts added together total $19,170.00. Id. 
Also on August 24,2011, Akers' attorney, Susan Weeks, submitted an I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and 
(e)( 5) Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for Attorney Fees on Second 
Remand. That Affidavit cited support from I.C. § 6-202; Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 
629,862 P.2d 321 (Ct.App. 1993); I.C. § 12-121; I.C. § 12-123; LR.C.P. 54(e)(1) - (5), and 
54(e)(7) - (9); as well as I.R.c.P. l1(a)(1) and "all applicable case law." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and 
(e)(5) Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for Attorney Fees on Second 
Remand, p. 2. Akers seek attorney fees in the amount of$18,620.00 (112.75 hours at 
$175.00/hour) and costs as a matter of right in the amount of$550.00 for preparation of the 
survey admitted at the hearing. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs (Including 
Attorney Fees Incurred Through August 24, 2011), p. 2. 
The Whites responded with an Objection and Motion to Disallow Claimed Attorney Fees 
filed on September 7,2011. They objected to the $19,170 the Akers requested in the 
Supplemental Memorandum of Costs, as well as to earlier cost and fee awards of $1 05,534.06 
and $6,037.50, pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(6) and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6). Objection to Claimed 
Attorney Fees, p. 2. 
In their objection, the Whites argue that the Akers "[a]re not entitled to an award of costs 
and attorney fees as a matter of right" because the Akers are "not the prevailing parties in this 
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litigation in comparison to the relief and damages they sought in this litigation nor in comparison 
to the relief and damages sought by Defendants White in this litigation." Objection to Claimed 
Attorney Fees, p. 2. The Whites also claim that the total costs for items such as maps and 
surveys may not be greater than $500. Id. Furthermore, the Whites argue that I.C. § 6-202 does 
not allow attorney fees to be awarded in cases where a party does not post the required "No 
Trespassing" signs. Id. In this case, the Whites state that they did not have the notice 
"contemplated by I.C. 6-202," and were found not to have willfully or intentionally trespassed. 
Id. The Whites further argue that Mortensens' willful or intentional conduct cannot be attributed 
to them, unless they authorized it or gave him the authority to conduct such activity. Id. 
The Whites argue alternatively that the Court should apportion attorney fees between the 
established trespass claim and those claims that were not established, and further should award 
no fees for claims for which there is no statutory or contractual basis. Objection to Claimed 
Attorney Fees, p. 3; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Attorney's Fees, p. 4. 
Finally, the Whites argue that I.C. § 6-202 "does not provide a basis" for an attorney fee 
award, since the Whites prevailed in establishing the existence of an easement across the Akers 
property to access their own property, and because they did not present unreasonable or frivolous 
arguments to the court. Objection to Claimed Attorney Fees, p. 3. 
The Whites filed a Memorandum in Support of Objection to Claim for Attorney Fees on 
October 25, 2011. In the Memorandum, the Whites argue against the" award of attorney fees 
during the entire course of these proceedings," referring again to the previously awarded 
$105,534.06, $6,037.50 and the requested $19,170.00. Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Disallow Attorney's Fees, p. 2. 
Whites' first argument in the Memorandum states that the Akers did not comply with 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in seeking the fees. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Attorney's 
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Fees, pp. 2-3. Under the rule, the court must take 11 factors into consideration, the Whites state 
in the Memorandum. Id. These include: 
1) The time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 3) the 
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability 
of the attorney in the particular field of law; 4) the prevailing charges for like work; 
5) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 6) the time limitations imposed by the 
client or the circumstances of the case; 7) the amount involved and the results 
obtained; 8) the undesirability of the case; 9) the nature and length of the 
professional relationship with the client; 10) awards in similar cases; and 11) the 
reasonable costs of automated legal research. 
Id., p. 3; LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
Whites next argue that the fees should be apportioned between parties because each 
prevailed in part. Id. Further, Whites argue I.C. § 6-202 allows fees to be awarded only for 
trespass claims, so the Akers should be entitled to fees only for their successful trespass claim in 
the disputed triangle. Id., p. 4. Whites argue the Akers should not be awarded fees for their 
unsuccessful trespass claim (since Whites did not trespass within the 12.2 foot easement over 
Parcel B), nor should Akers receive attorney fees for claims in which such fees are unsupported 
by statutory authority - which they claim in their motion are Akers' punitive damage, quiet title, 
and emotional distress awards. Id. The Whites also contend that the attorney fees awarded 
should pay only for the time spent on the prevailing claim. Id., p. 5. 
Furthermore, the Whites allege that a successful claim for attorney's fees under I.C. § 6-202 
"depends entirely whether the Plaintiffs posted signage to indicate that the disputed triangle was 
other property." Id. Whites claim the Akers did not post "No Trespassing" signs where required, 
and therefore cannot claim attorney fees. Id. Furthermore, Whites claim their trespass was not 
"willful or intentional." Id. 
The questions presented by these motions are as follows 
I. Should the Court reconsider the Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second 
Remand issued on August 10,2011, per Whites' Motion to Reconsider filed on August 24,2011? 
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II. Should the Court uphold the Akers' costs and attorney fees awards of $105,534.06, 
$6,037.50 and $19,170.00, when the Whites contend: (a) that the Akers are entitled to fees only 
for claims on which they prevailed, (b) that the award of fees under I.C. § 6-202 depends on 
whether the Akers posted trespass signs; and (c) that the awards of fees are not statutorily 
authorized? The second question involves answering the following questions: 
A. Did the Akers prevail? 
B. Does the award of fees under I.C. § 6-202 depend upon whether the Akers posted "No 
Trespassing" signs, or does other statutory authority allow the attorney fees award? 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586,592,21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). Similarly, the 
. district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision, subject to the abuse of 
discretion standard of review. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 753, 86 P.3d 458,467 (2004). 
III. ANALYSIS OF WHITES' MOTION TO RECONSIDER. 
In their Motion to Reconsider, the Whites ask for the Court to reconsider (a) the location of 
the easement; (b) the decision on the "scope and willfulness of the trespasses"; (c) the emotional 
distress damages awarded to Sherri Akers; (d) the punitive damages awarded against the 
defendants; and (e) the attorney fees awarded to the Akers. Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, 
pp. 1-2. The Whites promised to submit a brief in support of the motion on or before September 
14, 2011, but failed to do so. Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, p. 2. In opposition, the Akers 
pointed out that the Whites had not filed a brief in support of the motion. The Whites did not cite 
authorities beyond I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), which merely sets forth the procedure for filing a Motion 
for Reconsideration. I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). 
The Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have found that a judge may 
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properly exercise its discretion in denying a Motion for Reconsideration when the moving party 
"provide(s) no new facts to support its claim" and does not "direct the court to evidence in the 
record that would create a genuine issue of fact." Blackmore v. RelMax Tri-Cities, LLC, 149 
Idaho 558,564,237 P.3d 655, 661 (2010). This is because "the burden is on the moving party to 
draw to the trial court's attention any new evidence that the movant may be relying upon," though 
this does not preclude the court from reviewing its own orders for errors. Johnson v. Lambros, 
143 Idaho 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct.App. 2006). 
In this case, not only has the moving party not provided new facts, nor drawn attention to 
facts in the record, it has failed to provide argument and authority in the form of the promised, 
but undelivered, brief in support of the motion to reconsider. Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, 
p. 2; Blackmore, 149 Idaho 558, 564,237 P.3d 655,661. Because the Whites did not draw the 
Court's attention to new evidence upon which the Court can rely in reconsidering its decision, the 
Court must deny Whites' Motion to Reconsider. 
At oral argument, counsel for Whites made unsubstantiated claims that 1966 was not the 
pertinent time period for the prescriptive period, but rather 1982 and 1975 were the relevant time 
frames, and that Whites had briefed this issue "earlier", but did not disclose when or in what brief 
Whites had made that argument. The rest of Whites' counsel's argument on the motion to 
reconsider digressed into the attorney fee issue. Thus, oral argument provided no new evidence 
and absolutely no valid argument upon which this Court could grant a motion to reconsider. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF AKERS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY 
FEES INCURRED THROUGH AUGUST 24, 2011). 
A. Akers Are the Prevailing Parties. 
Whites argue that the attorney fees should be apportioned between parties because each 
prevailed in part. Objection to Claimed Attorney Fees, p. 2. They state that the Akers are 
entitled to fees only for their successful trespass claim in the disputed triangle. Memorandum in 
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Support of Motion to Disallow Attorney's Fees, p. 4. The Whites also contend that the Akers' 
attorney fees award should only be for the time Akers' attorney spent on the claims upon which 
Akers prevailed. ld., 5. Whites claim they themselves prevailed in establishing the existence of 
an easement across the Akers property to access their own property. Objection to Claimed 
Attorney Fees, p. 3. Whites also claim that since they did not present unreasonable or frivolous 
arguments to the court, attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 are not available. 
First, as noted by Akers, this Court has previously determined Akers are the prevailing 
party. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed January 2, 2003, ~ 28; Plaintiffs' 
Response to Defendant White's Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees, p. 3. Second, in the 
intervening eight years, Akers remain the prevailing party. Akers sued Whites and Mortensens 
for trespass, and won. As compared to Whites' claimed width of the easement, Akers prevailed 
on the width of the travelled portion of that easement. Based on Whites' trespass, Akers sued for 
emotional distress and punitive damages, and won. Whites lost on their quiet title counterclaims. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) governs the identification of the prevailing party. It 
states: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in 
its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and 
did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and 
among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues 
and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
I.R.C.P.54(d)(1)(B). The courts have interpreted this to require an "overall view" rather than a 
"claim-by-claim analysis." Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914,204 PJd 1114, 1125 (2009). 
"In determining which party prevailed where there are claims and counterclaims between 
opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed 'in the action'; that is, the prevailing party 
question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis", the 
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Idaho Supreme Court stated in Shore. Id., citing Eighteen Mile Ranch, L~C v. Nord Excavating 
& Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d l30, 133 (2005). If the court determines that the 
parties have each prevailed in part, it may exercise its discretion in apportioning costs among the 
parties. Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172, 174, 219 P.3d 1188, 1190 (2009). 
In the "overall view", the Akers clearly prevailed. The Fourth Amended Judgment and 
Decree on Second Remand recognized a 12.2-foot prescriptive easement for the defendants, 
which was much smaller than the 60-foot-wide right of way defendants wanted to establish. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 15, Findings of Fact, ~ 44; p. 25, Conclusion 
of Law ~ 10. The Akers were awarded a total of $51,008.55 in trespass damages; $10,000.00 in 
emotional distress damages; $150,000.00 in punitive damages against the Mortensens; 
$30,000.00 in punitive damages against the Whites; and $105,534.06 in previous costs and 
attorneys fees. Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on Second Remand, pp. 2-3. Whites have 
received nothing. Whites proved none of their affirmative defenses. In the "overall view," the 
Akers came out ahead. Shore, 146 Idaho 903, 914,204 P.3d 1114, 1125. While the Court 
recognized the prescriptive 12.2-foot easement, that width was a fraction of what Whites 
claimed. To consider the grant of a 12.2-foot prescriptive easement in favor of Whites as an issue 
upon which White prevailed, would require this Court to ignore the "overall view" and instead, 
engage in "claim by claim" analysis forbidden by the Idaho Supreme Court in Shore, 146 Idaho 
903,914,204 P.3d 1114, 1125. And since Whites only received about 20 percent of the width 
they sought, it would be a forbidden claim by claim analysis made with myopic lenses. The 
Court will not exercise its discretion and consider that limited issue as significant enough to 
constitute Whites as the prevailing party, given the "overall view" of this case. To do so would 
make a mockery of the case law regarding who is the prevailing party in determining costs and 
attorney fees. LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). 
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B. If The Award of Attorney Fees Under I.e. § 6-202 Depends Upon Whether Akers 
Posted "No Trespassing" Signs, the Uncontradicted Evidence Shows Akers 
Posted Such Requisite "No Trespassing" Signs. 
The Whites allege that a successful claim for attorney's fees under I.C. § 6-202 "depends 
entirely whether the Plaintiffs posted signage to indicate that the disputed triangle was their 
property." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Attorney's Fees, p. 4. Whites argue 
Akers did not post "No Trespassing" signs where required, and therefore cannot claim attorney 
fees. Jd Furthermore, the Whites' trespass was not "willful or intentional," they contend, and 
their defense was not "frivolous." Jd, p. 5. Whites claim Akers should not be awarded fees for 
their unsuccessful trespass claim. Jd, p. 4. Whites then argue that Akers should not receive fees 
for claims in which such fees are unsupported by any other statutory authority, as Whites argue 
their defense to Akers' claims for claims for punitive damages, quiet title, and emotional distress 
was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Jd, p. 4. 
Trial courts can award attorney fees only where a statute or contract authorizes such. 
I.R.C.P.54(e)(l). Regarding Akers' trespass claim, Idaho Code § 6-202, authorizes attorney fee 
awards as follows: 
Any person who, without permission of the owner, or the owner's agent, enters 
upon the real property of another person which property is posted with "No 
Trespassing" signs or other notices of like meaning, spaced at intervals of not less 
than one (1) notice per six hundred sixty (660) feet along such real property; or 
who cuts down or carries off any wood or underwood, tree or timber, or girdles, or 
otherwise injures any tree or timber on the land of another person, or on the street 
or highway of any person's house, village, or city lot, or cultivated grounds ... is 
liable to the owner of such land ... for treble the amount of damages which may be 
assessed therefor for fifty dollars ($50.00), plus a reasonable attorney's fee which 
shall be taxed as costs, in any civil action brought to enforce the terms of this act 
if the plaintiff prevails. 
I.C. § 6-202. Akers proved compliance with I.C. § 6-202 as there is ample evidence in the record 
that there was more than one "No Trespassing" sign and that the entire length of the disputed 
easement was less than 660 feet. In fact, this Court nearly nine years ago decided this issue as a 
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matter of fact and as a matter of law: 
36. Plaintiffs revoked defendants' permission to use the curved approach and the 
driveway west of Government Lot 2 in January 2002. Plaintiffs posted same 
with "No Trespassing" signs within 660 feet of each other. 
January 2,2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 14, Finding of Fact ~ 36, 
see also p. 25, Conclusion of Law ~ 13. (bold in oiginal). This established factual and legal 
conclusion was reiterated by this Court in its March 18, 2011, Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional Evidence on 
Easement Location, p. 21, and, in this Court's May 23, 2011, Memorandum Decision and Order 
Denying Vernon Mortensen's Motions, p. 11. Akers has met the statutory requirement that their 
property be posted with "No Trespassing" signs. The statutory interval of not less than 660 feet 
is not applicable, and even if it were applicable, the posting requirement was met and that has 
been met for nearly nine years. Whites' argument that the statutory requirement has not been met 
is simply absurd. Additionally, there is evidence in the record that David White was not simply 
aware of those posted signs, he had actual knowledge of the posted signs. 
White makes the claim that "If any attorney fees are nevertheless to be awarded under 6-
202, they must be reasonably related to prevailing on the claim for trespass in the disputed 
triangle, not in Parcel B and not on the express easement." Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Disallow Attorney Fees, p. 5. Trespass did not occur simply in the disputed triangle area; 
trespass occurred in exceeding the scope of the express easement and it occurred at the end of the 
easement. This, too, has been discussed previously by the Court. Apparently, Whites' attorney is 
not reading those previous opinions. This Court wrote in its March 18, 2011, Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Remand Re: Damages, and Order Denying Whites' Motion for Additional 
Evidence on Easement Location, p. 12-13: 
This disputed easement has two ends. 
One end, the "triangle" area, or the east end, is where this easement begins 
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at its intersection with Millsap Road. Much of the wrongful activity by 
defendants against plaintiffs took place in this "triangle" area. The two Idaho 
Supreme Court cases and this remand have nothing to do with the "triangle" area. 
Thus, as to this area of the easement, none of the damage issues have changed. 
The other end is where, after leaving Millsap Road, traveling west along 
plaintiffs' southern boundary, the easement goes up a hill and then at its terminus, 
bends into defendants' Mortensens' 260-acre parcel. January 2,2003, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, p. 12, ~31, p. 13, ~32. In 2001, defendants 
Whites purchased from Mortensens the northern 80 acres of Moretensens' 260 
acre parcel, and that 80 acres was contiguous to the southern boundary of Akers' 
land. Id., p. 14, ~34. On remand, this Court determined the location of the 
easement at this "terminus" end changed slightly. 
The fact that one small portion of the exact location of the easement across 
Akers' land changed slightly due to this Court's decision on remand [the 
September 29,2010, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order Re: Easement Location] does not change this Court's decision as 
to damages suffered by the Akers. It is uncontroverted that White and Mortensen 
excavated and deposited soil on plaintiffs' land in the area of this slight change. 
In other words, the claim simply cannot be made that White and Mortensen 
performed all their earthwork within the boundaries of the easement. Such a 
claim would simply be an impossibility, and not in any way supported by the 
evidence before this Court. Also, the work performed by defendants on this 
terminus end caused specific damage to plaintiffs caused by defendants' actions in 
changing the water drainage of the area. Thus, even if all the earthwork 
performed by defendants were within the boundaries of the easement (again, an 
impossibility), there was collateral damage caused by defendants' actions. 
That finding was also reiterated in this Court's May 23,2011, Memorandum Decision and Order 
Denying Vernon Mortensen's Motions, pp. 4-5. 
Finally, citing and comparing the instant case to Good v. Sichelstiel, Kootenai County Case 
No. CV 2010 1862, Whites make an incomprehensible argument that: 
Whites submit that an award of $22,953 to Plaintiffs for successful prosecution of 
a trespass claim under 6-202 that generates damages of $51,008 represents a 
reasonable apportionment of the fees in this case if the other criteria of 6-202 are 
satisfied. There should be no award of fees for successful prosecution of claims 
for punitive damages, emotional distress and unsuccessful claims that no 
easement exists in Parcel B. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Attorney's Fees, pp. 5-6. Is Whites' counsel 
arguing that $22,953 is appropriate attorney fees when only $18,620.00 is sought by Akers' 
counsel? In any event, this argument overlooks the obvious fact that the actions of defendants 
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constituting the trespass are the identical actions that resulted in punitive damages and damages 
for Sherrie Akers' emotional distress. No apportionment is warranted. 
C. Attorney Fees Under the Alternative Bases Sought by Akers. 
Attorney fees are requested by Whites against defendants not only under I.C. § 6-202, but 
also I.C. § 12-121, I.C. § 12-123, I.R.c.P. 54(e)(I) -(5), I.R.C.P. 54(e)(7)-(9), and I.R.C.P. 
11(a)(1). I.R.c.P. 54(e)(3) and (e)(5) Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims 
for Attorney Fees on Second Remand, p. 2. This kitchen sink approach is not very helpful to the 
Court. While Akers provide detailed analysis of why attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. 
§ 6-202, Akers provide no real analysis to any of these additional theories. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)( 1 ) provides no independent basis for an award of 
attorney fees. It simply provides that attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party when 
provided for by any statute, and that for attorney fees to be awarded under I. C. § 12-121, there 
must, in addition to a prevailing party analysis, be a finding by the court that the case was 
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2) provides no independent basis for an award of 
attorney fees. It simply requires findings for the basis for awarding attorney fees under I.C. § 12-
121. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(3) provides no independent basis for an award of 
attorney fees. It simply provides the criteria to be used by the court in determining the amount of 
attorney fees. Those criteria apply in an award of attorney fees in any civil action, no matter the 
statutory basis for those fees. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)( 4) provides no independent basis for an award of 
attorney fees. It applies only to attorney fees awarded in cases ending in default judgment, and 
thus, is entirely inapplicable to the instant matter. 
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)( 5) provides no independent basis for an award of 
attorney fees. It simply provides if attorney fees are allowed by contract or by some statute, that 
attorney fees shall be awarded as costs and must be supported by an affidavit setting forth the 
basis and method of computation of the attorney fees claimed, in addition to the requirement of a 
prevailing party analysis. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(7) provides no independent basis for an award of 
attorney fees. It simply requires a hearing on attorney fees if there is an objection. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(8) provides no independent basis for an award of 
attorney fees. It merely states that I.R.C.P. 54 applies to all attorney fees awarded pursuant to any 
statute. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(7) provides no independent basis for an award of 
attorney fees. It simply states I.R.C.P. 54 applies to all actions filed after March 1, 1979. 
Thus, as requested by Akers, none ofI.R.C.P. 54(e)(1)-(5) or I.R.C.P. 54(e)(7)-(9) provide 
any basis for attorney fees. 
Counsel for Akers also claim attorney fees under I.R.C.P. l1(a)(1). This rule allows 
imposition of attorney fees against a party or that party's attorney where the party's attorney fails 
to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts before filing a pleading. Landvik by Landvik v. 
Herbert, 130 Idaho 54,62,936 P.2d 607, 705 (Ct.App. 1997). Akers' counsel has set forth 
absolutely no facts, no argument, as to which counsel has created what pleadings which were not 
well grounded in fact and supported by law. 
Counsel for Akers also claim attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121. This case is a civil action, 
qualifying for an award of attorney fees under I.C § 12-121, if"the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." I.C. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). 
There has certainly been unreasonable conduct by the defendants over the years, as memorialized 
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by the compiled record, in which the Court concluded: 
Vernon Mortensen has violated and disregarded Kootenai County Ordinances and 
the orders of this Court for pecuniary gain, specifically to increase the value of his 
land development projects. In his actions, testimony and demeanor he has shown a 
conscious disregard and disrespect for the law. He has harmed innocent North 
Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, by his conscious disregard for the law. 
May 23,2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Vernon Mortensen's Motions, p. 22 
(quoting the April 1, 2004, Memorandum, and then stating that this fact has not changed). In 
addition, in that same May 23, 2011, Order, the Court states of the Whites: 
David White and D.L. White Construction, Inc., has violated and disregarded 
Kootenai County ordinances and the orders of this court for pecuniary gain, 
specifically to increase the value of his land development project. In his actions, 
testimony and demeanor he has shown a conscious disregard and disrespect for the 
law. He has harmed innocent North Idaho landowners, including Plaintiffs, by his 
conscious disregard for the law. 
May 23,2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Vernon Mortensen's Motions, p. 23 
(quoting the April 1, 2004, Memorandum, and then stating that this fact has not changed). 
However, the conduct of the parties, as opposed to the bringing, pursuing or defending of the 
action, cannot be a basis for the award under I.C. § 12-121. Verway v. Blincoe Packing Co., Inc., 
108 Idaho 315, 319, 698 P.2d 377, 381 (Ct.App. 1985), unless it is followed by an unreasonable 
prosecution or defense of the action. 0 'Boskey v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 112 Idaho 1002, 
1009-10,739 P.2d 301, 308-09 (1987). While there may at times have been prosecutions of 
counterclaims and defenses by defendants which are unreasonable, this Court cannot say that the 
total defense of this case by any of the defendants was unreasonable or frivolous. That is what 
the Court would be required to find under Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. 
Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 563, 808 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1991), see also 
Desfossess v. Desfossess, 122 Idaho 634,639,836, P.2d 1095, 1100 (1992). 
Finally, Akers also claim attorney fees under I.C. § 12-123. In Akers' Plaintiffs Response 
to Defendant White's Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees, Akers seem to limit their request for 
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attorney fees (other than under I.C. § 6-202) to a claim under I.C. § 12-123. There is little case 
law interpreting I.C. § 12-123, and it can only be assumed that it has been little used since its 
enactment in 1987. An explanation for that underutilization might be the fact that I.e. § 12-123 
has a protocol specific to that statute which must be followed. Idaho Code § 12-123 allows 
attorney fees for frivolous conduct. I.e. § 12-123(1)(b). Frivolous conduct is conduct by a party 
or his attorney that obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the 
civil action, or is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law. I.C. § 12-123(1 )(b )(i)(ii). 
But to obtain an award under I.e. § 12-123, the party requesting the fees must file a motion, and 
then the Court must set a date for hearing to determine whether the particular conduct was 
frivolous, giving notice of the date of the hearing to each party or counsel of record who 
allegedly engaged in frivolous conduct. I.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(i)(ii). Then, the Court must conduct 
the hearing to determine if the conduct was frivolous, and whether any party was adversely 
affected by the conduct if it is found to be frivolous. I.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(iii). There must be an 
itemized list of legal services that were necessitated by the frivolous conduct. Id, I.C. § 12-
123(2)(c). None of these procedures have been followed by Akers in the instant case. 
Accordingly, while attorney fees are awarded under I.C. § 6-202 against defendants and in 
favor of Akers, all other bases requested by Akers for imposition of attorney fees against 
defendants are denied. 
D. The Amount of Attorney's Fees Sought are Reasonable. 
Akers seek attorney fees in the amount of $18,620.00 (112.75 hours at $175.00/hour) and 
costs as a matter of right in the amount of $550.00 for preparation of the survey admitted at the 
hearing. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Costs (Including Attorney Fees Incurred 
Through August 24, 2011), p. 2. The costs of the preparation of the survey are costs as a matter 
of right under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C)(6). However, that rule limits the amount to $500.00. Akers 
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have not sought the additional $50.00 as a discretionary cost in their pleading. A pitch was made 
to add that $50.00 as a discretionary cost by Akers' counsel at hearing on November 8, 2011. 
However, that provides no notice to Whites' counsel. As such, costs as a matter of right in the 
amount of $500.00 are awarded in favor of Akers against Whites. 
Akers seek attorney fees against defendants for time spent by their attorney since March 9, 
2009. LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) and (e)(5) Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims 
for Attorney Fees on Second Remand, Exhibit A. No explanation is given by Akers as to why 
March 9, 2009, is the beginning date. 
The amount of attorney fees sought in favor of Akers against Whites is reasonable in light 
of the factors enumerated in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A)-(L). The Court has considered all those factors 
and finds absolutely no reason for any downward departure from the amount sought, $18,620.00. 
The hourly rate of Akers counsel of $175.00 per hour is very reasonable given the skill requisite 
to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of Akers' counsel, and given 
the prevailing charges for like work. The amount of time spent by Akers' counsel was 
documented and is reasonable as well. This is an undesirable case, and it has lasted nearly a 
decade. All of those factors indicate an upward departure from the amount sought is appropriate. 
Accordingly, this Court finds $22,000.00 to be the reasonable attorney fee awarded in favor of 
Akers against defendants. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
For the reasons stated above, this Court exercises its discretion and denies Whites' 
Motion to Reconsider and Whites' Objection to Claim for Attorney Fees, and this Court exercises 
its discretion and finds Akers to be the prevailing party, and that Akers are entitled to their 
attorney fees in the amount of $22,000.00 and costs as a matter of right in the amount of $500.00, 
against defendants under I.C. § 6-202. All other basis for attorney fees sought by Akers against 
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defendants are denied. 
IT IS ORDERED Whites' "Motion to Reconsider" is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Akers are the prevailing parties. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the amount of $22,000.00 is a reasonable amount given the 
factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A)-(L) in light of the amounts sought in Akers' Supplemental 
Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Support of Plaintiffs' Claims for 
Attorney Fees on Second Remand filed on August 24,2011, and the amount of $22,000.00 is 
GRANTED in favor of Akers against defendants under I.C. § 6-202. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED all other basis for attorney fees sought by Akers against 
defendants are DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the amount of $500.00 in costs as a matter of right is 
GRANTED in favor of Akers against defendants. The additional $50.00 sought as a 
discretionary cost is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' attorney prepare a judgment consistent with 
the above Opinion and this Order. 
Entered this 16th day of November, 2011. 
itchell, District Judge 
I certify that on the / ~ day of November, 2011, a true copy of the foregoing 
was mailed postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsimile to each of the following: 
Leander James Robert Covington Richard Deissner Vernon J. Mortensen 
Susan Weeks 208 762-4546 v' 509326-6978 ,/ P. O. Box 1922 
208 ~~ 1684/ .. J . B(f;rs Ferry, ID 83805 
;f1ftct ( ~1iJ~A.i /LftUU--eA 
D ty Clerk 
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ROBERT E. COVINGTON 
Attorney at Law 
8884 North Government Way, Suite A 
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CASE NO. CV -02-222 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, DENNIS LYLE AKERS 
AKERS, husband and wife, AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, 
SUSAN WEEKS of the firm JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellants, D.L. White Construction, Inc., 
David L. White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife, 
appeal against the above-named Respondents, Dennis Lyle Akers 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-l 
and Sherrie L. Akers, husband and wife, to the Idaho Supreme 
court from the Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand 
filed on March 18,2011, the Fourth Amended Judgment and 
Decree on Second Remand entered in the above-entitled action 
on or about the August 10, 2011, Honorable John T. Mitchell, 
presiding; all interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior 
to the judgment or decree appealed from, all final judgments 
and orders entered prior to the judgment appealed from, 
specifically including, without limitation the order of the Court 
dated November 16,2011 denying appellants' Motion to 
Reconsider and Granting Akers' Claims for Attorney Fees 
awarded in connection with the proceedings on remand and all 
those proceedings prior to the Second Remand from the Supreme 
Court, the Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand Re: 
Damages and Order Denying Whites Motion to Consider 
Additional Evidence on Easement Location filed on March 18, 
2011 and Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order Re: Easement Location. 
2. Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court 
and the judgment described in Paragraph 1 above is an 
appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(I), Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-2 
3. The following is a preliminary statement of the issues on appeal 
which the Appellants intend to assert; provided, such list of 
issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellants from asserting 
other issues on appeal: 
a. Did the District Court err in refusing to consider and 
admit additional proffered evidence relevant to the 
location of the easement in the area specified on the 
second remand for the purpose of accurately and precisely 
locating the easement? 
b. Did the District Court err in its decision regarding the size 
and location of the prescriptive easement determined by 
the Court? 
c. Did the District Court err in its award of damages, triple 
damages, punitive damages, damages for emotional 
distress and attorney fees? 
d. Did the District Court err in failing to apportion the 
attorney fees that it awarded to Respondents? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the 
record. 
5. Other than the original record and record on second appeal, 
Appellants White do not request a reporter's transcript 
6. The Appellants join in the requests of Appellants Mortensen for 
inclusion of specific documents in the clerk's record. In 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-3 
addition, Appellants request inclusion of the following 
documents: 
Appellants' Memorandum in Support of Objection to Claim of 
Attorney Fees da ted Octo ber 25, 2011. 
Appellant's Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Re: Easement 
Location dated June 30, 2011 including Exhibits A and B 
thereto. 
Affidavit of Mike Hathaway dated June 30, 2010 including 
Exhibits A, A-I, B and B-1 thereto. 
Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway dated January 18, 
2011 and Exhibit B-2 thereto. 
Brief of Defendant's White Re: Section 24 Easement Location 
dated March 25,2010 and Exhibits thereto. 
Reply Brief of Defendants White Re: Section 24 Easement 
Location and Exhibits thereto. 
Defendants White Objection to and Motion to Disallow Claimed 
Attorney Fees dated Septem ber 7, 2011. 
7. Appellants White request that the Exhibits to the Affidavits of 
Mike Hathaway referenced above be copies and sent to the 
Supreme Court. 
8. I certify: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-4 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the 
reporter, Julie Foland, PO Box 9000, Coeur d' Alene, 
Idaho, 83816 
b. No transcript fee has been paid as no transcript has been 
requested. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's 
record has been paid as certified by counsel for 
Defendants Mortensen in his Notice of Appeal dated 
September 29, 2011. 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be 
served pursuant to Rule 20, Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this 13th day of November, 2011. 
-?f-r{fe-.r-rt-~~i]J~---
Attorney for Defendants White 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of November, 2011, I caused to be 
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by placing the 
same in the United States Mail, First Class, postage prepaid thereon, to the 
following: 
Susan Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-S 
Dustin Deissner 
Deissner Law Office 
1707 West Broadway Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Vernon J. Mortensen 
PO Box 1922 
Bonners Ferry, ID 83805 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-6 
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I, CLIFFORD T. H.AYES, Clerk of District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the attached list 
of exhibits is a true and accurate copy ofthe exhibits being forwarded to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the following documents will be submitted as exhibits to the 
Record: 
1. CD of multiple documents too large to mail: 
a. DC 1 - Record of Survey, not admitted 
b. DC2 - Boundary Line Adjustment - Record of Survey, 
c. DC3 - Defendant's Exhibit Y - Geological Survey, admitted 12117/03 
d. DC4 - Topographic Survey & Road Profile, no exhibit sticker 
e. DC5 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, Record of Survey, admitted 9110102 
f. DC6 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, Geological Survey, admitted 911 0102 
g. DC7 - Exhibit 13, Geological Survey, not admitted 
h. DC8 - State Easement, exhibit sticker not legible, admitted 911 0102 
1. DC9 - Plaintiff's Exhibit, Topographic Survey, not admitted 
J. DCI0 - Aerial Photo, admitted 12/22/03, no exhibit sticker 
k. DC11 - Defendant's Exhibit 41, not admitted 
1. DC12 - Defendant's Exhibit G, Land Classification & Density of 
Standing Timber 
m. DCl3 - Defendant's Exhibit F, Road RlW Layout, admitted 12116/03 
n. DC14 -Plaintiff's Exhibit 104, Photo of Property, admitted 9/9/02 
o. DC15 Plaintiff's Exhibit 76, Photo of Property, admitted 9/9/02 
p. DC 16 - Plaintiff s Exhibit 31, Photo of Property, not admitted 
q. DC17 - Defendant's Exhibit BB, Record of Survey, admitted 12/22/03 
r. DC18 - Defendant's Exhibit Z, Record of Survey, admitted 12/22/03 
s. DC19 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 323, Preliminary Map, admitted 12117/03 
t. DC20 - Defendant's Exhibit B, Road Index Book, admitted 12116/03 
u. DC21 - Defendant's Exhibit B, Road Index Book, copy of DC 20 
v. DC22 - Defendant's Exhibit V, Record of Survey, not admitted 
w. DC23 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, Boundary & Topographic Survey Exhibit, 
not admitted 
x. DC24 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, Liberty Lake Quadrangle Topographic, 
admitted 911 0102 
y. DC25 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, Liberty Lake Quadrangle Topographic, not 
admitted 
z. DC26 - Defendant's Exhibit E, Area Map Based on 1998 Aerial Photo, 
admitted 12/22/03 
aa. DC27 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 331A, Road RlW Layout, admitted 12117/03 
bb. DC28 - Plaintiff's Exhibit 179, Boundary & Topographic Survey, 
admitted 12117/03 
cc. DC 29 - Plaintiffs Exhibit AA, Boundary & Topographic Survey Exhibit, 
admitted 12/22/03 
2. List of Plaintiff's Exhibits 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110102 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Quit Claim Deed, admitted 9110/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 10, Boundary Line Adjustment Record of Survey, admitted 
9/10/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, Segregation Revisions, admitted 9/1 0/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12, Legal Description Exhibit for Kelch to Akers, admitted 
911 0/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13, Segregation Revisions, admitted 9/10/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14, Aerial Photo 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 16, Viewers Report, admitted 9/11/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 17, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 18, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19, Affidavit of Dennis Akers in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 20, Affidavit of Dennis Akers in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, not 
admitted 
Plaintiff s Exhibit 21, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 22, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 24, Photo, admitted 12/16/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 25, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 26, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 27, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 28, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 29, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 30, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 31, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 32, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 33, Photo, admitted 10/16/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 34, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 35, Photo, admitted 10/16/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 36, Photo, admitted 10116/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 37, Photo, admitted 10/16/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 38, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 39, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 40, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 41, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 42, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 43, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff s Exhibit 44, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 45, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 46, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 47, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 48, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 49, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 50, Photo, admitted 9110/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 51, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 52, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 53, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 54, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 55, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 56, Photo, admitted 12116/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 57, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 58, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 59, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff s Exhibit 60, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff s Exhibit 61, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 62, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 63, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 64, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 65, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 66, Photo, admitted 10116/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 67, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 68, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 69, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 70, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 71, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 72, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 73, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 74, Stop Work Order, admitted 10116/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 77, Hand Drawn Map, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 78, Hand Drawn Map, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 79, Photos, admitted 10116/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 80, Photos, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 81, Photos, admitted 10116/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 82, Photo, admitted 10116/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 83, Photo, admitted 10116/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 84, Photo, admitted 10116/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 85, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 86, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 87, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 88, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 89, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 90, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 91, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 92, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 93, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 94, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 95, Photo, admitted 9/1 0/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 96, Photo, admitted 9/10/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 97, Photo, admitted 9110/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 98, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 99, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 100, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 101, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 102, Photos, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 103, Warranty Deed, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 106, Plat, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 107, Plat, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 108, List of Requirements, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 110, Hand Drawn Map, admitted 911 0/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 113, Receipt-Idaho Fence, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 114, Receipt-Rivercity Design, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 115, Receipt, admitted 10115/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 116, Receipt, admitted 10115/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 117, Receipt, admitted 10115/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 118, Receipt, admitted 10115/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 119, Receipt, admitted 10115/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 120, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 121, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 122, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 123, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiff s Exhibit 124, Receipt, admitted 10115102 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 125, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiff s Exhibit 126, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 127, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 128, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 129, Receipt, admitted 10/15102 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 130, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 131, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 132, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit l33, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 134, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 135, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit l36, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 137, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit l38, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 139, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 140, Receipt, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 141, Receipt, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 142, Receipt, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 143, Check, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 144, Work Order, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 145, Check, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 155 ,Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 156, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 157, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 158, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 159, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 160, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff s Exhibit 161, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 162, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 163, Photo, admitted 10115/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 164, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 165, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 166, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 167, Photo, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 168, Photo, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 169, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 170, Photo, admitted 9/9/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 171, Photo, admitted 10/15/02 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 172, Letter, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 173, Plaintiffs' Supplemental Responses to Defendants 
Vernon 1. Mortensen and Marti E. Mortensen's Requests for Admissions, not 
admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 173A, Hand Drawn Map, admitted 911 0/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 174, Hand Drawn Map, admitted 9/10/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 175, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 176, Photo, admitted 9110/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 177, Photo, admitted 9110/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 178, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 181, Photo, admitted 10/16/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 182, Quit Claim Deed, admitted 10/16/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 183, Photo, admitted 10/17/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 184, Photo, admitted 10/17/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 185, Copy of Complaint, admitted 10117/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 186, Agreement & Mutual Release, admitted 10117/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 187, Copy of Stipulation & Order, admitted 10/17/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 188, Photo, admitted 10/21/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 189, Copy of Stipulation & Order, admitted 10/21102 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 190, Copy of Order of Judgment, admitted 10/21/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 191, Photo, admitted 10/21/02 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 211, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 219, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 220, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 221, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 239, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 254, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 256, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 257, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 260, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 262, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 263, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 265, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 266, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 267, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 268, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 269, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 270, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 273, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 274, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 275, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 276, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 287, Receipt, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 287B, Receipt, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 295, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 296, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 297, Photo, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 298, Photo, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 300, Receipt, not admitted 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 301, Receipt, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 302, Receipt, admitted 9/8/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 303, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 304, Photo, admitted 9/9103 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 305, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 306, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 307, Photo, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 308, Receipt, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 309, Check, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 310, Letter, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 311, Letter, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 312, Invoices, admitted 9/9/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 313, Post Falls Highway District 
Minutes for December 2003, admitted 12/22/03 
Plaintiff s Exhibit 318, Topographic map, admitted 
12117/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 325, Plat of Survey, admitted 12117/03 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 332, Copy of Minutes, admitted 12/22/03 
3. List of Defendant's Exhibits 
Defendant's Exhibit A, Viewers Report, admitted 12/16/03 
Defendant's Exhibit Bl, Aerial Map, admitted 12116/03 
Defendant's Exhibit C, July 1908 Board Minutes, admitted 12116/03 
Defendant's Exhibit D, Letter, admitted 12117/03 
Defendant's Exhibit D, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit Dl, Warranty Deed, admitted 911 0/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D2, Plat, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D3, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110102 
Defendant's Exhibit D4, Warranty Deed, admitted 9/10/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D5, Affidavit ofW.L. Millsaps, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit D6, Record of Survey, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D7, Topography Survey, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D9, Record of Survey, admitted 9/10/02 
Defendant's Exhibit DlO, Plat, admitted 9110102 
Defendant's Exhibit D12, Plat, admitted 911 0102 
Defendant's Exhibit D15, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D16, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D17, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D18, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D19, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D20, Warranty Deed, admitted 9/10/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D21, Warranty Deed, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D22, Warranty Deed, admitted 9/10/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D23, Quitclaim Deed, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D25, Promissory Note, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D26, Settlement Statement, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D27, Plaintiffs' Objections and Responses to 
Defendant's Vernon J. Mortensen and Marti E. Mortenson's Requests 
for Admissions, admitted 911 0/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D28, Promissory Note, admitted 911 0/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D30, Receipt, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D31, Affidavit of Richard Peplinski, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit D32, Affidavit of Floyd G. Peplinski, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit D33, Affidavit ofV.J. Mortensen, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit D34, Affidavit of David L. White in Support of 
Motion for Tempolrary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, not 
admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit D35, Affidavit of David L. White in Support of 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit D36, Affidavit of John F. Adams Jr. in Support of 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit D37, Copy of Complaint, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D38, Copy of Answer & Counterclaim, admitted 
9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D39, Record of Survey, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D40, Record of Survey, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit D42, Aerial Map, admitted 9/10/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D43, Topographical Map, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D45, Photo, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit D46, Photo, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D47, Photo, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D48, Photo, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D49, Photo, admitted 9110/20 
Defendant's Exhibit D50, Photo, admitted 10/15/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D51, Photo, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D52, Photo, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D53, Photo, admitted 10115/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D54, Photo, admitted 10/15/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D56, Photo, admitted 10115/02 
Defendant's Exhibit D57, Photo, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit D58, Affidavit of David English, admitted 10116/02 
Defendant's Exhibit E, Board Minutes from 1908, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit F, Warranty Deed, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit H, Aerial Photo, admitted 12/16/03 
Defendant's Exhibit I, Aerial Photo, admitted 12/16/03 
Defendant's Exhibit II, Aerial Photo, admitted 12116/03 
Defendant's Exhibit J, Aerial Photo, admitted 12/16/03 
Defendant's Exhibit 11, Aerial Photo, admitted 12116/03 
Defendant's Exhibit K, Aerial Photo, admitted 12116/03 
Defendant's Exhibit Kl, Aerial Photo, admitted 12116/03 
Defendant's Exhibit L, Aerial Photo, admitted 12116103 
Defendant's Exhibit M, Letter, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit N, Photos, admitted 9/9103 
Defendant's Exhibit 0, Plat of Survey 1896, admitted 12116/03 
Defendant's Exhibit P, Viewers Report, admitted 12116/03 
Defendant's Exhibit Q, Plat of Survey, admitted 12117/03 
Defendant's Exhibit R, Description of Parcel 1, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit S, Description of Parcel 2, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit T, Description of Parcel 3, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit U, Description of Parcel 4, not admitted 
Defendant's Exhibit W, Aerial Photo, admitted 9110/02 
Defendant's Exhibit X, Letter, admitted 12117/03 
Defendant's Exhibit CC, Viewers Report, admitted, 12/22/03 
4. Volume t of Transcript on Appeal 
5. Volume 2 of Transcript on Appeal 
6. Deposition of Dennis Akers 
7. Deposition of White 
8. Deposition of Dennis Akers 
9. Deposition of Mortensen 
to. Deposition of Scott Rasor 
t 1. Deposition of Earl Sanders 
12. Deposition of Dennis Lyle Akers 
(Any maps mentioned in the Depositions are on the CD provided) 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunt9~set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court at Kootenai County, Idaho this clO day of rna rS~ k'-, 2012. 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
Clerk of District Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. ) 
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